What we keep: every table, column and log line

The short version.

Some tables hold request or answer text: agreement_evidence.content and agreement_jury.statement.

Every one of the 106 tables and 1,163 columns in the database schema is described on this page, and the build fails if a table or column is added without one.
No table has a column for a network address, and no line the code writes to its log records one. Calls without an API key are rate-limited by the caller's address, which appears only inside a Redis key that expires between 61 seconds and 3,601 seconds after the counting window begins. Over Tor no address is used at all.

Where something is kept, exactly

The response cache keeps answers when you ask it to

A request that turns the response cache on has its answer kept, sealed with AES-256-GCM, in Redis and in the router's memory. It is kept for the time-to-live the request asked for in cache.ttl: at most CACHE_TTL_S, which is 3,600 seconds unless the operator changed it, and also the default when the request names none. Requests that do not ask for caching leave nothing here, and a call paid with a blind token, a call on the attested lane or with any disclosure ceiling, a restricted model variant and a streamed answer are never cached. A semantic cache also keeps a 1,024-number hashed word vector of the prompt in memory.

A call paid with x402 keeps its answer for 24 hours, so a lost answer is never paid for twice

Where x402 is switched on, the answer to a call paid with x402 is kept, sealed with AES-256-GCM, in Redis (or the router's memory without Redis), never in the database, so the payer can have it sent again with PAYMENT-RECOVERY if it was lost on the way. 86,400 seconds (24 hours) from the answer, set when it is written; the x402-recovery-expire job also deletes it with its row. Calls not paid with x402 leave nothing here. For that time the database keeps only the payer, the authorization nonce, two hashes and the name of the Redis key.

The Batch API keeps a batch's requests and answers until its results expire

A batch sent to POST /api/v1/batches has its requests and answers kept, sealed with AES-256-GCM, in Redis (or the router's memory without Redis), never in the database. The sealed requests are deleted when the batch finishes; the sealed answers BATCH_RESULTS_TTL after that (86,400 seconds, 24 hours, unless the operator changed it). A batch that never finishes ends when its 24-hour completion window closes, so nothing outlives the window plus that time. Calls that are not part of a batch leave nothing here.

A failed provider attempt can keep a short piece of the provider's own error message

generations.attempts: up to 200 characters of the message a provider sent back when an attempt failed, with URLs, keys, emails and long hex removed. The text is the provider's, not ours; a provider could quote part of a rejected request in it.

Two request headers are kept as you wrote them

apps.url and apps.title: the HTTP-Referer and X-Title headers of a chat call, cut to 500 and 200 characters, so apps can be ranked. Leave the headers out and nothing is kept. They are not recorded on the unlinkable lane.

Settings you type are stored as you typed them

agent_approvals.intent, agent_policies.spec, agent_policy_events.intent, agent_profiles.settings, agent_sessions.metadata, keys.routing, keys.guardrails, keys.tracing, keys.topup, playbook_changes.spec, playbooks.spec, team_audit.detail, characters.card, facilitator_sellers.result_schema, preset_versions.config, saved_routes.description, saved_routes.config, skills.description, status_incidents.title, status_incidents.updates, tool_listings.canary, and webhook_destinations.events hold configuration you write: descriptions, routing and guardrail settings, the system prompts and tool definitions of your presets, the character cards you publish, session labels. The API checks their shape and size, but it cannot know what you choose to write in a description or a label.

Character memory is kept only as ciphertext, with a vector if you opt in

Memories you keep for a character are sealed on your device under a key the router never receives; the database holds the ciphertext. If you opt in to memory search, it also holds a vector your client computed from each memory, which cannot be turned back into the text but can reveal what it is about.

This page is about what is kept. It is not a claim that nobody can read a request while it is in flight: on ordinary chat routes on every lane the router reads the text of a request in memory, and the provider reads it too under its own policy. The dedicated, off-by-default E2EE adapter forwards encrypted content without decryption; the gateway enclave restores it. Clear routing and billing metadata remains visible.

Which version this is.

This page and /keep/inventory.json are generated from the same source, so they always agree. The hash is the SHA-256 of the exact bytes of that file.

Built from commit: 66b45a16c36bca828800331028a6141316097f55
Inventory SHA-256: bfc7bfa534773fb3292ef1d6332ace759a3fb3b148fa67ffc580d6eb42f6c8e6
Size: 106 tables, 1,163 columns, 121 columns that looked like request content or an address and carry a written review
Check it yourself: curl -s https://<this site>/keep/inventory.json | sha256sum prints the hash above. The file is canonical JSON: keys sorted, no whitespace.

Transparency logGET /api/v1/tlog/proof?kind=data_inventory

Asking the router’s log about this hash…

The hash is appended to the router’s public transparency log as a data_inventory entry when a router with a new inventory starts, where the operator has switched that on. Anyone can look it up by hash at /api/v1/tlog/lookup, and, where the log is anchored in Rekor, follow the link above to that entry.

Where a request’s text and a caller’s address are read.

An automated check scans the router’s source for every route that reads a request body and every piece of code that reads a caller’s address, and fails until each one is described here. The rows below say what is read, what happens to it and what is kept.

Request text

Where	What is read, and what happens	What is kept
src/hardening/body.ts	Request bytes before route dispatch, including ordinary plaintext inference, files and encrypted envelopes. Reads the declared Content-Length and streams up to each route's wire cap; an over-cap chunk is discarded. Rejects excess bytes with 413 before route side effects; passes a bounded replacement request to existing handlers, preserving the gateway origin record.	Bounded bytes in request memory only. This guard does not hide plaintext prompts from the router. No new database columns or body logging.
src/hardening/middleware.ts	The bounded MCP JSON message or batch, including tool arguments and any prompt. Rejects batches over 20 messages and charges each message against the anonymous minute limit. Existing MCP tool and rulebook guards still apply.	Parsed message in request memory only; count in the anonymous limiter. No tool arguments or prompts in the counter or logs.
src/tools/routes.ts	A paid tool call: the tool's address, method, a JSON body of at most 64 KiB for the tool, max_price and optionally a model and prompt to hand the answer to. A tool listing: name, summary, address and a canary probe. Sends the body to the tool through the egress guard and reads its answer (2 MB at most, JSON or plain text only) in memory, returning it to the caller marked untrusted. Only when the rulebook sets tools.pass_to_models and the call asks for it is the answer sent to a model through the ordinary chat route.	tool_calls keeps hashes of the request and answer, amounts, the address without its query and the signed receipt; tool_listings keeps the listing. The body, the query string and the answer are not stored or logged. No new Redis family beyond the two rate limits, no caller-address reader.
src/structured-output/chat.ts	Resolved chat messages and response_format schema, the final answer, and the opt-in anyroute.json_check setting when STRUCTURED_OUTPUT_CHECK_ENABLED is enabled. Reads request and answer text in router memory to check JSON and supported schema assertions. Repair may send the same provider and model one extra request containing the conversation, original answer, schema and validation errors. Each call passes the ordinary authorization, lane, agent and billing checks. Streams validate only.	No new database column, Redis family or log field. Both calls keep ordinary generation hashes, token counts, costs and signed receipts. Validation errors, JSON Pointer paths, combined charges and nested call receipts are unsigned response metadata, not written to generation receipts or returned by receipt lookup. Existing batch outputs can retain that metadata with the answer. Preset json_check settings live in the existing preset_versions.config JSON. Existing optional cache and batch retention rules still apply; non-streaming repair bypasses the response cache.
src/pay/recovery.ts	The body of a paid x402 call on the chat, completions, embeddings, rerank and character chat routes, and of a recovery request; and the answer's bytes once the call is answered. Hashes the request (the receipt's request_sha256) to bind the answer to it, or to compare a recovery request with it. Seals the answer's bytes with AES-256-GCM. A recovery checks the payer's EIP-191 signature first and never relays the payment again.	The two SHA-256 hashes, the payer, the nonce and the Redis key name in x402_paid_results, and the sealed answer in Redis (or the router's memory without Redis), each for 24 hours. The request text is not kept. No log field, no caller-address reader.
src/agreements/internal-transport.ts	Decrypted party evidence bundle and structured provider verdict text in router memory. Fixed rubric sent through attested-lane selection with fresh non-development attestation, stored provider credentials and quote-pinned TLS where configured. Gateway receipts must verify upstream attestation and exchange digests. No customer account or billing rows.	Existing agreement_jury.statement stores model reasons (which may quote evidence), signed operational receipt with request/response hashes, provider attestation and checked gateway receipt references, usage and provider-list-price operator cost estimates. Canaries have no separate operational-cost ledger. Failed calls may incur unmeasured cost. No evidence text in logs; no new Redis keys or caller-address readers. Same resolution-based jury retention applies.
src/agreements/routes.ts	Bounded party evidence text or JSON, or a strict create-agreement preparation with payee wallet, milestone USDG amounts, terms hash and future deadline. Requires an authenticated wallet-linked account matching the indexed payer/payee. Caps streams without trusting Content-Length. Preparation checks inherited rulebooks and returns unsigned calldata; jury calls use the attested chat path with a configured API key, or the optional internal provider transport.	Evidence hash and APP_SECRET-encrypted content in agreement_evidence, up to 32 items per party. Jury statement stores per-model answer reasons, receipt references and a signed ruling; reasons can quote evidence. Router reads evidence in memory. Parties can read both parties evidence through the API. Resolution plus 30 days by default permits deletion; a fresh-index retention job removes evidence and jury rows. No new Redis family, log field or caller-address reader.
src/api/e2ee.ts	A bounded encrypted JSON envelope and encrypted SSE or JSON response; model, roles, lengths, public keys, timestamp, nonce and clear usage remain visible. A caller must actually encrypt content; framing checks cannot prove encryption. Validates a strict text envelope, forwards the original bytes without decryption, hashes wire bytes, observes usage and completion for billing. No tools, files, search, cache, alias or content transformations.	Only hashes, counts or reservation bounds, charge and timing in generations and the ledger. The signed receipt adds end_to_end_encrypted, e2ee version/suite/gateway_attested/complete/billing_basis/input_byte_bound/max_tokens/request_bytes/response_bytes and gateway_receipt (id, keyset digest, response-hash/request-hash/upstream check states and upstream session id and GPU claim). Existing retention and deletion apply. No envelope, response ciphertext, public key, replay nonce, timestamp or credential is persisted; no new log fields or Redis families.
src/api/chat.ts	The whole JSON body of a chat or text completion: the messages, the model and the parameters (readJson). Read in memory to route the call on every lane: validated, checked against guardrails, priced, then sent to the provider chosen. The request is hashed (request_sha256) and the answer is hashed (response_sha256). Streaming answers are passed through chunk by chunk.	Not stored. Kept in memory for the length of the call. The opt-in response cache and batch content are kept sealed outside the database (see the Redis section), and a failed provider attempt can keep up to 200 characters of that provider's own error message.
src/api/batches.ts	The JSON body of a batch: up to BATCH_MAX_LINES chat or embeddings requests (requests or input_jsonl). Checked line by line, then sealed at once and kept in Redis (or memory) for the worker, which runs each line through the chat or embeddings handler as the key that sent the batch.	Not in the database: the database gets counts, statuses, costs and generation ids. The sealed requests are deleted when the batch finishes and the sealed answers when its results expire (see the Redis section).
src/api/embeddings.ts	The JSON body of an embeddings call: the input text. Sent to the provider chosen and the vectors returned.	Not stored; a generation row and receipt with hashes and counts are written.
src/api/rerank.ts	The JSON body of a rerank call: the query and the documents. Sent to the provider chosen; its scores are checked and returned, with the documents' own text when asked.	Not stored; a generation row and receipt with hashes and counts are written.
src/api/anthropic.ts	The JSON body of an Anthropic-format messages call and free onion count requests. The router reads code, prompts and tools in memory. Converted to a chat request and sent through the router's own chat route, so it is handled and kept exactly as a chat call is.	Nothing beyond what src/api/chat.ts keeps; token counts alone create no payment or request record.
src/api/responses.ts	The JSON body of a Responses-format call. Converted to a chat request and sent through the router's own chat route.	Nothing beyond what src/api/chat.ts keeps.
src/ollama/routes.ts	The JSON body of an Ollama-format chat, generate or embed call. Converted to a chat or embeddings request and sent through the router's own route, so it is handled and kept exactly as that call is.	Nothing beyond what src/api/chat.ts and src/api/embeddings.ts keep.
src/api/mcp.ts	The JSON-RPC body of a tool call for the MCP endpoint, which can include a prompt. Chat is forwarded to the router's own chat route. Rulebook tools forward caller authentication and prompt-free intent identifiers to the existing agents routes; token estimates use catalog prices. Reading and checking rules does not create policy events.	Nothing beyond what src/api/chat.ts and its existing policy enforcement keep. Rulebook reads and dry runs add no stored data.
src/api/rag.ts	The documents and the question of a retrieval call. Cut into chunks and embedded through the router's own embeddings route, ranked in memory, and the best chunks sent to the router's chat route.	Nothing of the documents, question or answer is kept; the chunks and vectors are dropped when the request ends. The response cache is never used.
src/ohttp/gateway.ts	An encapsulated request (Oblivious HTTP). The gateway opens it with its own private key, in memory. Dispatched to the router's own routes as an ordinary request without a client address.	Nothing beyond what the route it reaches keeps. The private key for an epoch is destroyed when its window ends.
src/services/telegram.ts	A Telegram message a user sent to the bot (fetched from Telegram by long polling). Sent to the router's own chat route with the user's own API key, so limits, billing and receipts apply.	The message text is not stored or logged; only the user's sealed key and chosen model are (kv table).
src/gateway/cache.ts	The request and the answer, only when the caller opted in. Encrypted and stored with a time-to-live (memory and, when configured, Redis). A hit is served without asking a provider.	The sealed answer, for the time-to-live the caller asked for (at most CACHE_TTL_S). A semantic cache also keeps, in memory only, a 1,024-number hashed word vector of the prompt so near-duplicates can match.
src/api/characters.ts	A character card (JSON or PNG) or, for a private card, only its ciphertext and hash; and on POST /api/v1/characters/:id/chat a chat request with the conversation, the memory the client decrypted and, for a private card, the decrypted card. A public or unlisted card is normalized and stored. A chat is assembled into a prompt in memory and sent through the chat route (src/api/chat.ts), like any other call; a private card sent with it is checked against its stored hash and used for that call only.	Public and unlisted cards in characters; for a private card only the ciphertext and hash. Nothing of a chat, its memory or a decrypted private card; public characters add one to a daily call and cost counter (character_usage).

38 routes that read a body but carry no prompt (settings, payments, public data)

Where	Carries	What is read, and what happens	What is kept
src/api/guard.ts	Settings	A strict bounded action name, optional target label and order digest, decimal amount and approval identifier, or a reported outcome. Authenticates the deciding key and serializes checks and reports with the account lock. Action and target are readable caller-chosen labels; targets can name a wallet or host. No full order details are accepted. When DECISION_TAGS_ENABLED is on and an order digest is given, the decision also reads the same agent's calls from the preceding 24 hours whose stored receipt carries that digest as decision_tag and returns their ids, model, provider and time as informed_by; GET /api/v1/guard/decisions reads decisions by digest or receipt id within the Activity scope. Neither stores anything new.	Decision metadata and reported outcomes in agent_action_decisions, with action decisions and outcomes on agent_policy_events and action approval projections in agent_approvals. Reported amounts are not verified execution.
src/api/deposits.ts	Settings	A strict transaction hash and deposit lane only. Form amounts and sender addresses are not accepted. Authenticates the key, excludes session and agent-only roles, scopes reads and submitted hashes to its account. Chain logs determine observed amounts, senders and credit values; submission never credits funds.	deposit-watch rows in kv keep account id, lane, hash and submission time across reloads. At most 20 submitted hashes per account; removed after indexed credit, otherwise retained until operator deletion. No new Redis keys, caller-address readers or log fields.
src/api/agent-pay.ts	Settings	A recipient (public profile id or 0x wallet), a decimal USD amount, an optional memo digest and approval id; or a transaction hash to confirm. Authenticates the agent key, decides with its rulebook through Agent Guard (action pay.agent), and returns unsigned USDG transfer instructions for the payer's own wallet. A confirmation reads that transaction's receipt, Transfer logs and block hash from Robinhood Chain and signs a receipt. The router never signs or sends the payment.	agent_payments and the existing Agent Guard decision, outcome and decision-chain records. One new rate-limit family; no caller-address reader or log field.
src/provisioning/scope.ts	Settings	A strict scope setting: inference or account. Authorization and x-api-key credentials are hashed in memory for route restrictions; receipt identifiers are checked against generation ownership. Requires a management key for account defaults; refuses inference-only keys on every route outside the model-call and own-generation/receipt allow-list. Newly minted child keys inherit the default, including sessions and team sign-ins.	A boolean in accounts.inference_keys_default; keys.scope stores the issued scope and keys.include_byok_in_limit stores the compatibility selection. Existing rows retain their access. No new request text, address readers, Redis families or log fields. Model calls still pass through existing routing and billing.
src/provisioning/inference.ts	Settings	Only model and fallback-model identifiers from the already parsed inference request, after per-key aliases resolve. No prompt or answer text is inspected by this check. Refuses @ references for inference-only keys before chat reads account routes, presets or character records. Catalog model calls continue through unchanged billing.	Nothing additional: no model identifier, body, Redis family, log field or address is stored by this scope check.
src/webhooks/routes.ts	Settings	Bounded JSON containing an HTTPS destination URL and selected fixed event types. Requires an authenticated owner/admin outside agent sessions. New account-wide destinations require a management key; non-management callers see and control only destinations scoped to their own key.	URL and generated signing key are encrypted under APP_SECRET. Selected event identifiers are retained. Subsequent responses redact the path/query and omit credentials. No new Redis family, log field, prompt/answer reader or caller-address reader.
src/facilitator/routes.ts	Payments or signatures	x402 verify and settle bodies (a payer's signed USDG authorization and the seller's payment requirements), signed seller listings, and gas float top-ups, each at most 64 KB. Checks signatures, amounts, time windows and nonces, relays a valid authorization from the payer straight to payTo with the relay key, and screens a listed payTo against the sanctions list.	Settled and failed attempts in facilitator_settlements, signed listings in facilitator_sellers and float balances in seller_gas_floats. Request bodies are not stored and carry no prompts.
src/api/agent-profiles.ts	Settings	Owner-written public profile fields (including an optional HTTPS agent endpoint and payout wallet), explicit rulebook category selections and bounded certificate claim identifiers. Authenticates the owner or authorised account administrator, checks key ownership, validates selected record claims, strips control and Unicode format characters from bounded owner text, and publishes the card at an independent random slug. Public reads sanitize existing owner text again and project only opted fields and verify certificate signatures and expiry.	Public settings, latest selected certificate and a private key-hash association in agent_profiles until unpublish. No new address reader, Redis family or log fields. Existing receipt signing key entries are published when certificates are requested.
src/identity/routes.ts	Settings	Owner identity choices (two booleans), a registration transaction hash, a publish flag for a track record; a reviewer's receipt id, receipt kind, 0 to 100 score and two short tags; or a track-record certificate to verify. Owner routes require an owner or administrator key of the same account, not a session key. Feedback is accepted only when the router's own receipt names the reviewer's account as payer and the agent as payee or the agent served, and never from the agent's own account. Free text is refused.	Choices and registration progress in agent_identities, entries in agent_feedback, issued certificates in agent_track_records. Verification keeps nothing. One new account rate-limit family (agent-feedback). No prompt, answer, caller address or log field.
src/api/agent-sealed.ts	Settings	Strict registration settings: HTTPS /attest URL without query, image digest and measured compose hash. Requires principal ownership of the active non-management key, obtains fresh quote evidence through guarded public-only pinned TLS and verifies key fingerprint and measured deployment.	Registration settings, random revision, fixed result codes, verifier names, TLS key hash and check time in the sealed-agent kv family; never inference bodies or API credentials. No new Redis family or log field.
src/telegram/delivery.ts	Settings	Private Telegram /link and /unlink commands and approval callbacks fetched by the existing bot poller. Link codes and callback identifiers are read in memory. The link is role-checked and recorded without a key secret. Callbacks run the same approval decision as the dashboard; inference consumption is unchanged. Telegram receives approval intent metadata and alerts.	Only the link identifiers, code hash, expiry and delivery markers described under kv. No Telegram message text or inference text is copied. No new request-body or network-address reader.
src/api/agent-certificates.ts	Settings	Bounded record claim identifiers for issuance; a signed certificate supplied by body or query for public verification. Checks retained generation counts and rulebook events, signs true claims with a fresh random pseudonym, or checks certificate signature and expiry. The router knows the authenticated issuing key.	No certificate, pseudonym, claims, query or body is persisted. Only an account issuance limiter counter and the reused public receipt signing key log entry are kept; no prompt fields are accepted.
src/api/playbooks.ts	Settings	A playbook name of at most 100 characters with a strict bounded rulebook and an optional team id, or a playbook id (or null) for a key to follow. Requires the same owner/admin permissions as editing a key's rulebook; account-wide playbooks change only with a management key. A rules change is copied to every following key under the account lock.	The playbook in playbooks, each change with its digest and rules in playbook_changes, the following keys' copies in agent_policies with policy_set events in agent_policy_events, and team audit entries. No prompt or answer fields are accepted.
src/api/agents.ts	Settings	A strict bounded rulebook, a kill reason, a metadata-only Intent for a dry run, or a draft rulebook and a number of days (1 to 7) to replay. Requires the same owner/admin permissions as editing the target key. Evaluates dry runs deterministically without event writes or kill changes. A replay reads that key's recorded calls (model, lane, cost, tokens and time from generations, plus the linked rulebook events) and its Agent Guard checks in a read-only transaction, and evaluates the draft against them.	Current rulebooks and optional principal-written kill reasons in agent_policies; decision metadata and changes in agent_policy_events. Dry runs and replays keep nothing. No prompt or answer fields are accepted.
src/agents/enforce.ts	Settings	Declared tool and function names from the inference body already parsed by the router. Projects only identifiers into the rulebook Intent, alongside the resolved model, lane, token bound and cost reservation.	Only Intent metadata and fixed decision reasons in agent_policy_events. Never arguments, descriptions, prompt or answer text; no new Redis key family or log field.
src/api/network-hosts.ts	Settings	Up to 8 KiB of host signup JSON or an operator-generated sidecar credential, with an existing wallet signature over the canonical JSON hash. Strictly validates signup fields, verifies the wallet and performs attestation, policy and sanctions checks. Credentials are accepted only for the recovered operator wallet.	Provider name, endpoint, operator and payout wallets, requested model IDs, optional contact, status and refusal reasons. Credential stored only in existing AES-GCM api_key_enc. The router sees it in memory. No whole-body log or signature column.
src/network/waitlist.ts	Settings	At most 4 KiB of JSON: waitlist fields or a deletion code. Validated strictly; a filled honeypot is discarded. The deletion code is hashed for an atomic delete.	Only sign-up fields, optional contact, id, deletion digest and time in network_waitlist. No raw deletion code, body log, IP or user agent. Free text is readable by the owner; public stats return counts only.
src/admin/trpc.ts	Settings	For network.publishPolicy, the operator's policy document decoded by the tRPC transport and validated by hostPolicySchema. No prompt fields are accepted. Checked for consecutive version and issue time, canonically encoded, signed with the log key, and committed with its transparency-log entry and checkpoint.	The public canonical policy, hash, signature, public verifier key, version and timestamps in host_policies, and a host_policy hash entry in tlog_entries. No caller address, operator token or request headers are retained by this publication path.
src/api/common.ts	Settings	The shared JSON body reader used by the routes below: it reads the text, checks its size (16 MB at most) and parses it. Returned to the route.	Nothing.
src/api/keys.ts	Settings	Key settings (name, budget, limits, allowed models, tracing destination, scope, include_byok_in_limit and the auto top-up amounts), amounts, BYOK provider keys, team roles and wallet sign-in challenges. Validated and written to the keys, byok_keys, teams and kv tables as described above.	The settings and, for a BYOK key or a tracing destination, the key or the destination URL and credentials encrypted under APP_SECRET.
src/api/saved-routes.ts	Settings	A saved route: fallback models, provider preferences and sampling controls. Validated against a strict schema with no field for message text, then stored.	The route in saved_routes.
src/api/skills.ts	Public data	A skill to publish: a repository URL, ref and folder, or an uploaded .tar.gz, .tar or .zip of a skill folder (SKILL.md, scripts and resources), and an optional price; an author's new price; an operator's revocation reason. The archive is read in memory under size, file-count and path limits (nothing is extracted to disk), normalised into one canonical tar, hashed and scanned; a repository is fetched at depth 1 and its tree read without a checkout.	The published skill, its hash and scan report in skills; installs in skill_installs.
src/api/presets.ts	Settings	A preset: fallback models, provider preferences, sampling controls and the owner's own system prompt, response_format and tool definitions. Validated against a strict schema with size caps, then stored as a new version.	The preset's versions in preset_versions.
src/api/memory.ts	Settings	A memory blob the client sealed (ciphertext), its opaque scope, kind and key fingerprint, and an embedding vector only when the client opts in. Checked to be in sealed form (plaintext is refused), then stored.	The ciphertext and its labels in character_memory, and the vector when the client opted in.
src/api/teams.ts	Payments or signatures	Team settings (a name, an org budget, a role), invites, and the proofs members sign in with: a passkey registration or assertion (WebAuthn clientDataJSON, authenticator data, signature) or a wallet signature over a one-time message. Settings are validated and stored; passkey and wallet proofs are verified and only the passkey's public key or the wallet address is kept. Each change is appended to the team's audit log.	The team, team_members, team_principals and team_audit tables; nothing of the proofs themselves.
src/api/spend.ts	Settings	A spend alert rule. Validated and stored.	The rule in spend_alerts.
src/api/agent-sessions.ts	Settings	An agent session: name, budget, lifetime and labels. Validated and stored.	The session in agent_sessions.
src/api/lane.ts	Settings	An operator's description of a model for the model lane: variant, status, licence and weights source. Checked for an operator token, validated and stored.	models_lane.
src/api/status.ts	Settings	An operator's incident notice for the status page: title, affected lanes and surfaces, impact, status and update text. Checked for an operator token, validated against a strict schema with size caps and stored.	status_incidents.
src/api/disclosure.ts	Settings	A provider disclosure profile written by an operator. Validated and stored.	provider_disclosure.
src/api/dayzero.ts	Settings	An operator's request to evaluate or approve a day-zero candidate. Validated and stored.	The lane tables.
src/api/creator-claims.ts	Settings	A creator claim: model, wallet address and Hugging Face handle. Validated and stored.	lane_claims.
src/api/host-anchor.ts	Public data	A request for an inclusion proof: a receipt envelope from an attested host (hashes and counts, no text) or a leaf hash. Looked up in host_anchor_leaves and answered.	Nothing.
src/api/ipx.ts	Settings	An operator's switch that halts or resumes the index-price oracle. Checked for an operator token and stored.	The halt flag in the kv table.
src/api/paymaster.ts	Payments or signatures	A paymaster (gas sponsorship) request. Checked and answered.	Nothing beyond the Redis rate-limit key.
src/api/public.ts	Payments or signatures	Receipt verification requests, pay-with authorisations, provider applications and creator claim challenges. Verified and, for a provider application or a pay-with authorisation, stored.	The provider and pay-with tables described above.
src/blind/routes.ts	Payments or signatures	A blinded token request. Signed by the issuer.	Nothing that links the buyer to the token.
src/tlog/routes.ts	Public data	A signed checkpoint note from a witness (16 KB at most). Verified and stored as a cosignature.	tlog_cosignatures.

A caller’s network address

Where	What is read, and what happens	What is kept
src/hardening/client.ts	The socket address, trusted X-Forwarded-For hop selected from the right by TRUST_PROXY_HOPS, and CF-Connecting-IP only when the enabled origin lock secret matches. The socket is also read to exempt direct private-network callers without forwarding headers from ingress guards. Validates IP syntax, selects the trusted client address for existing limiters, and rejects public forwarding traffic from private-socket exemptions. No caller address is read for authenticated Tor ingress.	Address held in request memory and anonymous Redis counter keys for 61 seconds. Existing limit families retain their lifetimes. No database or log address field.
src/hardening/middleware.ts	Existing per-address bucket for anonymous public API reads and MCP messages; all Tor callers use onion. Counts against anon with the configured minute limit. Keyed requests, health and readiness, and internal callers are exempt. Redis failure permits the call and logs a fixed warning.	Counter only; 61 seconds in Redis or until the memory limiter sweep. Never a prompt, key, header, secret or address in logs.
src/facilitator/routes.ts	The caller address bucket on every /facilitator route; over Tor the shared onion bucket. Counts requests in the facilitator's own per-address limiter; trusted proxy and onion rules apply.	Raw address in the limiter key for 61 seconds in Redis, or until the memory limiter sweeps; never in a settlement, listing, receipt or log line.
src/api/network-hosts.ts	The caller address bucket on host signup and credential writes. Counts attempts through the existing per-address limiter; trusted proxy and onion rules apply.	Raw address in the limiter key for 61 seconds in Redis, or until the memory limiter sweeps; never in the host row or application log.
src/network/waitlist.ts	Address bucket for a waitlist POST or DELETE; onion requests use the shared onion bucket. A secret-keyed HMAC of the address and current minute is passed to the existing limiter; onion stays the word onion.	Only a minute-specific keyed digest and counter: 61 seconds in Redis, or up to six minutes without Redis until the memory limiter sweeps old windows. No raw IP or user agent, and no address-derived value in the waitlist table.
src/api/e2ee.ts	The address only for encrypted calls without a key outside the Oblivious HTTP gateway; over Tor the fixed onion bucket is used. Uses the existing blind-ip rate-limit family.	Only the counter key, for 61 seconds; no address in a generation, receipt or log.
src/api/common.ts	The selected client address from the shared ingress helper: socket by default, the trusted hop counted from the right when TRUST_PROXY is on, or CF-Connecting-IP when the enabled origin lock secret is valid. Returned to a caller as the key of a per-address rate limit. Requests that arrived over Tor get the fixed word onion instead of an address (addressBucket).	Not written to Postgres and not logged. It exists in Redis only as part of the rate-limit keys listed above, for at most an hour.
src/api/chat.ts	The caller's address, only for a call that carries no API key and did not arrive through the Oblivious HTTP gateway. Counted against ip:<address> (or blind-ip:<address> for a blind token).	Only as the Redis rate-limit key.
src/api/embeddings.ts	The caller's address, only for a call without an API key. Counted against ip:<address> or blind-ip:<address>.	Only as the Redis rate-limit key.
src/api/rerank.ts	The caller's address, only for a call without an API key. Counted against ip:<address> or blind-ip:<address>.	Only as the Redis rate-limit key.
src/api/keys.ts	The caller's address when a key is created and when a wallet sign-in challenge is requested. Counted against newkey:<address> and wallet-login:<address>.	Only as the Redis rate-limit keys.
src/api/teams.ts	The caller's address when joining a team or signing in to one with a passkey or wallet (no API key yet). Counted against team-auth:<address>.	Only as the Redis rate-limit key.
src/api/paymaster.ts	The caller's address on a paymaster request. Counted against pm:<address>.	Only as the Redis rate-limit key.
src/ohttp/gateway.ts	The caller's address, only for a request that did not come through an authenticated relay. A request through a relay is counted by the relay's key id instead. Counted against ohttp-gw:ip:<address>.	Only as the Redis rate-limit key.
src/tlog/routes.ts	The submitter's address when a witness posts a cosignature. Counted against tlog-cosign:<address>.	Only as the Redis rate-limit key.
src/api/creator-claims.ts	The caller's address when a creator claim is issued or verified. Handed to services/creators.ts as an address bucket.	Only as the Redis rate-limit keys.
src/services/creators.ts	The address bucket it was given. Counted against claim-issue-ip:<address> and claim-verify-ip:<address>.	Only as the Redis rate-limit keys.
src/api/responses.ts	The caller's address, so the internal chat call it makes on the caller's behalf is limited exactly as the caller's own call would be. Passed to the chat route as an in-process value (requestIP) and then handled as in src/api/chat.ts.	Nothing beyond what src/api/chat.ts keeps.
src/ollama/routes.ts	The caller's address, so the internal chat or embeddings call it makes on the caller's behalf is limited exactly as the caller's own call would be. Passed to the chat or embeddings route as an in-process value (requestIP) and then handled as in src/api/chat.ts.	Nothing beyond what src/api/chat.ts keeps.
src/onion/ingress.ts	Nothing. It deletes every header that names a client address (X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, CF-Connecting-IP and others) from requests that arrived over Tor, before any route runs. Requests over Tor therefore carry no client address for a route, a limiter or a log line to use.	Not applicable.
relay/src/relay.ts	The separate Oblivious HTTP relay (run by relay operators, not by the router) forwards a request's body to a gateway without any header, address or cookie of the client. The forwarded request is built from configuration and the body only. The relay's automated checks fail if its source logs a request or reads a client address.	The relay keeps counters only: totals and fixed reason labels.
sidecar/src/headers.ts	The model-server sidecar inside a provider's enclave forwards only allow-listed headers, so a proxy header cannot carry a client address to the model server. Forwarded by allow-list, not deny-list; a header that names a network address is refused even in configuration.	Not applicable.

Redis.

Redis holds rate-limit counters, the opt-in response cache, the sealed answers of x402 calls kept 24 hours for payment recovery, replay markers and the job queue. It is optional in development and required in production. Every key expires; the rate-limit keys below are the only place a caller's network address is used, and only for calls without an API key.

Key	What it is for	Part of the key	Lives for
`rl:anon:<caller address or onion>:<window start>`src/hardening/middleware.ts	Anonymous public API reads and MCP messages share one per-client minute counter. Valid API keys retain their existing limits. Tor shares a separate onion counter with ONION_POOL_MULTIPLIER times the limit. Authenticated in-process dispatch and direct private-network traffic without forwarding headers are exempt.	The caller's network address	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:tools-call:<key hash>:<window start>`src/tools/call.ts	Paid tool calls per minute for one API key (60).	A SHA-256 of an API key	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:tools-list:<account id>:<window start>`src/tools/routes.ts	Tool listings per hour for one account (20); each listing asks the tool for its quote.	An account id	3,601 seconds (the 3,600-second window plus one second)
`rl:agent-pay:<key hash>:<window start>`src/api/agent-pay.ts	Payment confirmations and reads per minute for one agent key (60); each can read the chain.	A SHA-256 of an API key	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:agent-certificate:<account id>:<window start>`src/api/agent-certificates.ts	Record-certificate and track-record issuance attempts: five per minute per account, shared across standalone, profile and track-record issuance, its keys and router replicas. Contains only the account id and a counter; no certificate pseudonym, claims or stats.	An account id	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:agent-replay:<caller key hash>:<window start>`src/api/agents.ts	Rulebook replays (POST /api/v1/agents/:key_hash/replay), ten per minute per calling key. Contains only the caller's key hash and a counter; no draft, call or result.	A SHA-256 of an API key	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:agent-feedback:<account id>:<window start>`src/identity/routes.ts	Paid-feedback submissions, thirty per minute per reviewing account. Contains only the account id and a counter.	An account id	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:proof-pack:<key hash>:<window start>`src/api/proof-pack.ts	Proof pack downloads, ten per minute per API key. Contains only the key hash and a counter.	A SHA-256 of an API key	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:lane-report:<key hash>:<window start>`src/api/lane-report.ts	Lane reports, thirty per minute per API key. Contains only the key hash and a counter.	A SHA-256 of an API key	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:telegram-link:<action>:<account or Telegram user id>:<window start>`src/telegram/linking.ts	Account link-code issuance (five per minute per account), code consumption (ten per minute per Telegram user) and approval callbacks (twenty per minute per Telegram user). Only identifiers and counters, no code or message text.	A Telegram user id	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:facilitator:<caller address or onion>:<window start>`src/facilitator/routes.ts	Facilitator requests per caller address per minute (FACILITATOR_RPM, 120 by default), a bucket apart from the API's. The raw address is part of the key; over Tor the shared onion bucket is used.	The caller's network address	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:facilitator-payer:<payer wallet>:<window start>`src/facilitator/routes.ts	Verify and settle calls per payer wallet per minute, so one payer cannot drain the relay with tiny payments. Links calls by the public payer wallet.	A wallet address	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:facilitator-seller:<payTo wallet>:<window start>`src/facilitator/routes.ts	Verify and settle calls per seller payTo wallet per minute.	A wallet address	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:facilitator-listing:<payTo wallet>:<window start>`src/facilitator/routes.ts	Signed listing writes per payTo wallet per hour (FACILITATOR_LISTINGS_PER_HOUR).	A wallet address	3,601 seconds (the 3,600-second window plus one second)
`rl:network-host-wallet:<operator wallet>:<window start>`src/api/network-hosts.ts	Wallet-authenticated host signup and credential updates, three per minute per wallet. Links attempts by the public operator wallet.	A wallet address	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:network-host-address:<caller address or onion>:<window start>`src/api/network-hosts.ts	Host signup and credential attempts, ten per minute per network address, with the existing scaled shared onion bucket. The raw address is temporarily part of the Redis key.	The caller's network address	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:network-waitlist:<minute-keyed address digest or onion>:<window start>`src/network/waitlist.ts	Waitlist POST and DELETE requests, ten per minute per address; onion requests share the existing scaled onion bucket. A secret-keyed HMAC rotates every minute; no raw IP or user agent is stored. The digest still links requests within that minute.	A SHA-256 digest	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:ip:<caller address>:<window start>`src/api/chat.ts	Requests per minute for a call that carries no API key. The caller's network address is part of the key. Over Tor the address is replaced by the word onion, so no address is used.	The caller's network address	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:blind-ip:<caller address>:<window start>`src/api/chat.ts	Requests per minute for a call paid with a blind token. The caller's network address is part of the key. Over Tor the address is replaced by the word onion, so no address is used.	The caller's network address	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:newkey:<caller address>:<window start>`src/api/keys.ts	New API keys per hour. The caller's network address is part of the key. Over Tor the address is replaced by the word onion, so no address is used.	The caller's network address	3,601 seconds (the 3,600-second window plus one second)
`rl:wallet-login:<caller address>:<window start>`src/api/keys.ts	Wallet sign-in challenges per minute. The caller's network address is part of the key. Over Tor the address is replaced by the word onion, so no address is used.	The caller's network address	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:team-auth:<caller address>:<window start>`src/api/teams.ts	Team join and sign-in attempts per minute (passkey or wallet), which need no API key. The caller's network address is part of the key. Over Tor the address is replaced by the word onion, so no address is used.	The caller's network address	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:pm:<caller address>:<window start>`src/api/paymaster.ts	Paymaster requests per minute. The caller's network address is part of the key. Over Tor the address is replaced by the word onion, so no address is used.	The caller's network address	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:ohttp-gw:ip:<caller address>:<window start>`src/ohttp/gateway.ts	Oblivious HTTP gateway requests per minute from a client that did not come through an authenticated relay. The caller's network address is part of the key. Over Tor the address is replaced by the word onion, so no address is used.	The caller's network address	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:ohttp-gw:relay:<relay key id>:<window start>`src/ohttp/gateway.ts	Oblivious HTTP gateway requests per minute for one authenticated relay. It names the relay, not the clients behind it.	Nothing personal	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:tlog-cosign:<caller address>:<window start>`src/tlog/routes.ts	Transparency-log cosignature submissions per minute. The caller's network address is part of the key. Over Tor the address is replaced by the word onion, so no address is used.	The caller's network address	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:claim-issue-ip:<caller address>:<window start>`src/services/creators.ts	Creator claim challenges per hour. The caller's network address is part of the key. Over Tor the address is replaced by the word onion, so no address is used.	The caller's network address	3,601 seconds (the 3,600-second window plus one second)
`rl:claim-verify-ip:<caller address>:<window start>`src/services/creators.ts	Creator claim verifications per hour. The caller's network address is part of the key. Over Tor the address is replaced by the word onion, so no address is used.	The caller's network address	3,601 seconds (the 3,600-second window plus one second)
`rl:k:<key hash>:<window start>`src/api/chat.ts	Requests per minute for one API key. Keyed by the SHA-256 of the key; no address is read for a call that carries a key.	A SHA-256 of an API key	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:kc:<key hash>:<window start>`src/api/anthropic.ts	Requests per minute for one API key on the Anthropic-compatible endpoint.	A SHA-256 of an API key	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:kt:<key hash>:<window start>`src/api/chat.ts	Tokens per minute for one API key: a running count of prompt tokens, not their text.	A SHA-256 of an API key	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:skills-import:<key hash>:<window start>`src/api/skills.ts	Skill imports per hour for one API key (each import may fetch a repository and runs the scanner).	A SHA-256 of an API key	3,601 seconds (the 3,600-second window plus one second)
`rl:blind:buy:<key hash>:<window start>`src/blind/purchase.ts	Blind-token purchases per minute for one API key.	A SHA-256 of an API key	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:provider-applications:<window start>`src/providers/application.ts	Provider applications per minute, counted across all callers in one key. There is no per-caller part.	Nothing personal	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:claim:<model id>:<window start>`src/api/public.ts	Creator claims per hour for one model.	A model id	3,601 seconds (the 3,600-second window plus one second)
`rl:claim-issue:<model id>:<window start>`src/services/creators.ts	Claim challenges per hour for one model.	A model id	3,601 seconds (the 3,600-second window plus one second)
`rl:claim-verify:<claim id>:<window start>`src/services/creators.ts	Claim verifications per hour for one claim.	Nothing personal	3,601 seconds (the 3,600-second window plus one second)
`rl:telegram:<Telegram user id>:<window start>`src/services/telegram.ts	Telegram bot messages per minute for one Telegram user. The user id is a number Telegram assigns; the message text is not part of the key.	A Telegram user id	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`rl:readiness:<window start>`src/services/readiness.ts	The readiness probe checks the limiter works by taking zero from a fixed key.	Nothing personal	61 seconds (the 60-second window plus one second)
`cache:<sha256>`src/gateway/cache.ts	The opt-in response cache (a request that sends cache.mode or the X-Anyroute-Cache header). It holds the answer to a request, so for as long as it lives this is a place answer text is kept: sealed with AES-256-GCM under a key derived from the router's APP_SECRET and the caller's own scope, so only that caller's identical request can read it back. The Redis key is a SHA-256 of the scope and the request, not the request.	A SHA-256 digest	It is kept for the time-to-live the request asked for in cache.ttl: at most CACHE_TTL_S, which is 3,600 seconds unless the operator changed it, and also the default when the request names none.
`walletauth:<sha256>`src/api/auth.ts	Replay protection for wallet-signed requests: a marker that a signature was already used. The key is a SHA-256 of the wallet address, the timestamp and the request's hash.	A wallet address	600 seconds
`batch:<batch id>:in and batch:<batch id>:out`src/services/batches.ts	The Batch API (POST /api/v1/batches). A batch's requests (:in) and its answers (:out), one field per line, each sealed with AES-256-GCM under a key derived from the router's APP_SECRET, the batch id and the hash of the key that sent it, so only that key's batch can read them back. They are kept here, never in the database, so the worker can run the lines and the key can fetch the results.	Nothing personal	The sealed requests are deleted when the batch finishes; the sealed answers BATCH_RESULTS_TTL after that (86,400 seconds, 24 hours, unless the operator changed it). A batch that never finishes ends when its 24-hour completion window closes, so nothing outlives the window plus that time.
`bull:anyroute-jobs-<group>:*`src/services/jobs.ts	The background job queue (BullMQ) that makes exactly one replica run each recurring job. The job data is empty ({}), so no request or user data is in it; a finished job's result or failure message is kept for the last 100 completed and 100 failed jobs.	Nothing personal	Recurring job schedules stay while the router runs; only the most recent 100 completed and 100 failed jobs are kept.
`x402paid:<sha256>`src/pay/recovery.ts	x402 payment recovery. The answer to a call paid with x402, kept so the payer can have it sent again, byte for byte, if it was lost on the way (PAYMENT-RECOVERY), instead of paying twice. It is sealed with AES-256-GCM under a key derived from the router's APP_SECRET, the payer, the authorization nonce and the request's hash, so only a recovery of that exact request by that payer can open it. The key is a SHA-256 of the payer and the nonce.	A SHA-256 digest	86,400 seconds (24 hours) from the answer, set when it is written; the x402-recovery-expire job also deletes it with its row. Calls not paid with x402 leave nothing here.

Without Redis (development): Without Redis (development) the same rate-limit counters live in the router process's memory and are removed once their window started more than five minutes ago (checked every minute). Nothing is written to disk.

Logs.

The router writes one JSON line per event to standard output (standard error for warnings and errors). A line is a time, a level, a fixed message and a few fields chosen at each call site. No call site writes a request or response body, a header, a client address, a query string or a prompt.

What a line can carry

A provisional deposit reversal logs its durable chain/lane/transaction/log identifier once when the reversing ledger entry commits. A separate durable check per reversal enters the existing operator alert notifier; notifications require an operator webhook and are at-least-once on delivery failure or a crash.
The time, the level and a message written in the code.
Anonymous limiter failure: fixed warning that a request was allowed; no exception, address, header, key or body.
Host slash dry-run intent: provider id, evidence commitment root, proposeSlash function name, whole-bond USDG amount, numeric contract reason, contract and chain id, bytes32 host id and delist flag. Logged once per evidence root; no signed bytes, key, raw quote or receipt envelope.
Sanctions refresh counts (distinct EVM entries, ignored formats and digital currency entries), publication date and source hash; screening skip/refusal reasons and provider ids. Freshness exceptions for previously paid addresses and refresh failures use fixed reason codes. No payout wallet or identity fields are added to these logs.
Identifiers and counts: provider ids, model ids, job names, hold and generation ids, epochs, block numbers, transaction hashes, hashed key ids and, on rare settlement and escrow events, an account id.
Wallet addresses of payers on pay-per-call and pay-with events (public on chain).
For an unhandled error: the path of the request without its query string, the error message and the first five lines of the stack.
Error messages from libraries and upstream services, each cut to 200 characters where a call site truncates them. Configured private chain RPC URLs, including paths and queries on the same host, are redacted before log emission; chain transport failures are redacted before callers truncate them.

What the code never passes to the logger

Client network addresses. No log call passes one; addresses are used for rate limits and direct private-network ingress checks. src/api/common.ts
Request or response bodies and prompts. The unhandled-error line takes the path and the error, not the body. src/app.ts
Request headers, cookies and API keys. The Telegram bot states the same rule for its own lines. src/services/telegram.ts
Query strings: only the pathname of a failing request is logged. src/app.ts

What this cannot promise

The text of an unexpected exception is logged as the library wrote it (src/app.ts unhandled error, src/lib/process-guard.ts uncaught exception, job failures). No code path puts request text into an error message on purpose, but only configured private chain RPC URLs are filtered, and a library error could quote a fragment of what it was parsing.
The hosting platform's own network layer sees connection addresses and may keep its own access logs. This inventory covers what the router's code records; it cannot describe the platform's logs.

Retention. The router does not rotate or store its logs: it writes them to standard output and the hosting platform keeps them under its own retention. No log retention is set in this repository. Format. JSON lines: { t, level, msg, ...fields }.

Other places data lives.

Operator capacity and daily counts

The operator-only GET /trpc/rush reads daily aggregate milestones over at most 90 UTC days. New wallet sign-ins mean wallet accounts created with a management key at the same transaction timestamp; an account created earlier by a deposit is excluded. First credited deposits mean the first positive deposit, stock_deposit, anyr_deposit or usdg_deposit ledger row per account. First successful calls mean the first signed generation per account that was not cancelled and did not finish with an error. Earlier retained rows are checked to exclude repeats; deleted historical records cannot be reconstructed. No per-account rows leave these queries.

Holds: Daily counts and dates; latest upstream USD balances, check states and hold expiry times on the operator surface only. In memory the enabled monitor reads the existing encrypted provider credential and configured headers to authenticate a documented balance check; neither credential nor upstream response text is retained in the new state or logs. API replicas refresh balances and temporary holds on health flushes; catalogue requests also refresh them before reading the cache, with starts at least five seconds apart per process. Both catalogue routes share one in-flight refresh promise and its monotonic start time in memory; failed reads preserve the previous availability state. Changed exhausted state invalidates that process’s catalogue cache. The catalogue cache holds up to 64 public catalogue JSON variants and 64 in-flight computations, keyed only by the four supported public catalogue filters. It contains catalogue metadata, prices, capabilities and provider evidence, never inference text or caller addresses. No new table, column or Redis family.
Lives for: Aggregate responses discarded after delivery with no-store. Catalogue JSON expires after 30 seconds, successful catalogue sync or an observed exhausted-state change; process memory disappears on exit. Failure-based routing holds expire after five minutes; exhausted balance readings persist until a reading exceeds the configured threshold. Balance readings and alert delivery times are overwritten in place and remain until operator deletion. Existing source retention applies.

src/rush/funnel.ts

Public tool catalog in the router's memory

When TOOLS_PUBLIC_CATALOG_URL is set, the router fetches that public x402 catalog through the egress guard to answer tool searches.

Holds: Public tool names, summaries, addresses, prices and payTo wallets. No caller data.
Lives for: TOOLS_PUBLIC_CATALOG_TTL_S (900 seconds by default); a failed refresh keeps the previous copy; lost on restart.

src/tools/catalog.ts

Signed account event delivery

When WEBHOOK_SIGNING_ENABLED is enabled, a minute worker reads at most 50 destinations, one 100-row activity page per destination, and sends at most 100 due notices per tick. Activity readers retain account, key, team and wallet-party guards. It delivers metadata references, fixed types/statuses and timestamps; existing Spend Watch and agent delivery retain their original alert fields. Signing covers exact wire JSON bytes plus a timestamp. The signed body binds event_id to the header. Secrets use the existing APP_SECRET encryption helper. Legacy URLs remain unsigned until rotation. Revocation stops future deliveries; an already in-flight request can finish. The disabled flag retains original alert delivery without signing, imports or worker writes.

Holds: Decrypted URLs and signing secrets enter router process memory only for delivery or credential issuance. Account wallet and host operator addresses are read by the status-write hook to match operated hosts. No prompt/answer is added to deliveries, and no arbitrary response or transport error text is logged. The browser holds a newly revealed signing secret in component memory until dismissed, disconnected or navigation; it is not written to browser storage.
Lives for: Activity discovery begins at destination creation, uses five minutes of overlap and durable pagination, and can miss source rows removed before discovery or commits delayed beyond the overlap. Approval requests/decisions and operated host status changes enqueue references in the transaction that records the change, so changes between worker ticks are retained. Approval references are approval ids. Direct database writes outside the router do not generate these notices. Delivery can repeat after a crash before result persistence: receivers must verify exact bytes with a five-minute timestamp tolerance and atomically deduplicate event ids. Delivery metadata is retained for 90 days; the API shows 100 attempts. Three attempts per event, five minutes apart. Owner-requested connectivity notices are limited to one per destination per minute.

src/webhooks/worker.ts

Make-good refund decisions

With MAKEGOOD_ENABLED (off by default), the call finaliser, the all-providers-failed path and the JSON repair check record a pending candidate when a call meets a refund rule; the hourly settlement job issues it as a ledger line linked to the generation, a signed refund receipt naming the original receipt, a refund.issued webhook reference and, for a network host that caused it, review-only host slashing evidence. Calls paid on-chain per call are refunded by the makegood-payouts job from MAKEGOOD_REFUND_PRIVATE_KEY, which refuses to run without that key.

Holds: Rule decisions use token counts, prices, provider ids, error classes, lane and attestation results already in router memory. The JSON rule parses the repair answer in memory only to decide whether it is JSON; the text is not stored. Refund rows keep amounts, fixed codes, ids, transaction hashes and the payer wallet address for on-chain refunds. The treasury key stays in worker memory and is never logged or stored; signed transfers are stored encrypted.
Lives for: Refund rows and transfers are kept with the ledger (no automatic deletion). Webhook references follow the webhook delivery retention. No new Redis family or log field carries request text or a caller address.

src/services/makegood.ts

Liveness probes to listed agent endpoints

When AGENT_IDENTITY_ENABLED is on, the agent-liveness job sends one GET a day to each listed profile's owner-declared HTTPS endpoint, to a public address only (no redirects, a ten-second timeout by default), with a fixed Anyroute-Liveness user agent and no credentials, and does not read the response body.

Holds: The status code, latency and a fixed failure code in agent_liveness with a signed probe receipt. The endpoint's operator sees the router's network address and the request.
Lives for: Each probe replaces the previous result. Nothing is kept in memory between runs.

src/identity/liveness.ts

ERC-8004 registries on Robinhood Chain

An identity registration (owner-sent, or sent by the isolated registrar worker) writes a public, permanent record: the registration file URL, a metadata entry pointing at the router's receipt keys, and the holding wallet. Optional feedback and validation calldata the router prepares is sent only by the reviewer's or validator's own wallet.

Holds: Public chain data: agent ids, registration URLs, wallets, scores, tags and document hashes. No key hash, account id, receipt id or amount is placed in calldata the router prepares.
Lives for: Permanent on chain; opting out stops the router serving the registration file and links, but cannot remove a sent transaction.

src/identity/erc8004.ts

Track-record Merkle trees in memory

Proof requests rebuild a certificate's tree from the router's generation records and keep at most 32 trees in process memory.

Holds: Receipt anchor leaves (hashes) and generation ids of the certified key's counted receipts.
Lives for: Until evicted by newer trees or the process exits.

src/identity/track-record.ts

Account activity response in memory

GET /api/v1/activity merges existing generations, ledger entries, agent approvals, policy events, the retained agent alert feed, spending alert history, escrow deposit statuses, key auto top-up records and wallet-party agreement events. Each source and response is limited to 100 rows. Ordinary and session keys read only their own key records; management and owner/admin keys read account records. Non-management administrators retain the agent routes' team boundary. Key and model filters further restrict results. Spending alerts keep their existing management-or-own-key boundary. CSV and JSON contain the same selected page; a cursor continues the filtered range.

Holds: Times, fixed event titles, exact signed USDG amounts, model and provider ids, recorded lanes, key names or existing short labels, receipt references, status and approval limits. It reads account wallet addresses and existing on-chain payer/payee and deposit sender addresses to select matching records, without returning those addresses. Agreement amounts describe wallet escrow movements, not router balance changes. It reads only model and lane from stored approval/policy intents and only lane from receipts; no request body, agreement evidence, delivery targets, key secrets or full key hashes enter the response. Oracle-only events require an indexed ruling linking their key to the agreement; until then they remain in the agreement view.
Lives for: Discarded after the response; cache-control is no-store. No new durable storage, logs or Redis keys. Downloads stay on the caller's device. Existing source retention still applies; the agent alert feed retains at most 100 records for 90 days and spending alerts retain up to 20 firings per rule.

src/activity/read.ts

Signed monthly statements in memory

With STATEMENTS_ENABLED (off by default), GET /api/v1/statements/:month aggregates the existing ledger in one SQL snapshot and signs canonical JSON with the existing receipt signer. Management and owner/admin keys see account totals; ordinary and session keys see only movements attributed to their key. The account creation month sets the earliest readable month. UTC month bounds exclude the next month; the current month ends at the read time.

Holds: Account creation date, key hashes and existing names or labels, exact pico-USDG ledger totals converted to decimal strings, movement kinds, model ids and lanes from linked generation receipts, call counts and reconciliation results. Reads only lane from receipt JSON, no request text, wallet or network addresses, key secrets, ledger descriptions or receipt content hashes. Unrecorded group values are null. Key-only balances are attributed ledger sums rather than the shared account balance. Separate fee entries are distinguished from fees embedded in usage. Call time and settlement time can differ; external payments are outside the router balance ledger.
Lives for: Discarded after response with cache-control no-store. No new tables, columns, Redis keys or log fields. Signing uses existing receipt key storage and retention. Downloaded JSON and printed statements remain on the caller's device; the signature is the router's statement, not an independent ledger audit.

src/statements/read.ts

Account export on the caller's device

The account shell builds a JSON bundle in the browser by paging existing authenticated read APIs. It includes accessible account and key metadata, rulebooks, policy events, sessions, approvals, activity, signed statements, wallet-party agreements and owned profile settings. A manifest describes included sections, access failures, retention and omitted records; this is not a complete storage dump.

Holds: Existing endpoint response data, including key hashes, wallet metadata or addresses where the endpoints expose them, policies and readable policy-event intents, session metadata, approval intents, activity and agreement projection records, owned profile settings and signed statements. Key secrets and credential-shaped fields are stripped. Chat history, private files, saved content, raw statement ledger, agreement evidence and dispute details are outside this export. Approvals are limited by the existing endpoint to 100 per stored status. Agent events and profiles retain per-agent access errors in the bundle.
Lives for: Kept in browser memory during export, then downloaded as JSON to the caller's device. Cancel stops requests and prevents download. No new server-side bulk endpoint, persistence or logs. Existing endpoint and source retention apply; APIs are read sequentially, not in one database snapshot.

web/lib/account-export.js

Proof pack in memory

With STATEMENTS_ENABLED (off by default), GET /api/v1/proof-pack?from=&to= builds one JSON file for at most 31 UTC days: the calls Activity lists for the key's scope with their stored signed receipts and Merkle paths, issued refund receipts, the signed monthly statements covering the range, the published receipt keys, a lane report of the listed calls and a manifest signed with the existing receipt signer. Management and owner/admin keys read the account; ordinary and session keys read only their own key. A range with more than 2,000 calls, or calls under more than 200 anchors, is split into parts with a cursor.

Holds: Generation ids, call times, key hashes, model and provider ids, mode, lane, exact charged amounts, the stored signed receipt payloads and COSE claims (request and response hashes, token counts or buckets, amounts, attestation references, and the payer key hash or per-call payer wallet and payment transaction a receipt was signed with), anchor roots, indexes and Merkle paths, refund receipts with their stored evidence and any on-chain refund wallet, signed statements, public receipt keys and the manifest of listed receipt ids and leaves. No request or answer text, key secrets or network addresses; recorded provider attempts are not read.
Lives for: Discarded after the response with cache-control no-store. No new tables, columns or log fields; one rate-limit counter per key. Downloaded files remain on the caller's device. Existing receipt, refund, ledger and anchor retention apply.

src/proof-pack/read.ts

Lane report in memory

With STATEMENTS_ENABLED (off by default), GET /api/v1/lane-report?from=&to= groups the calls Activity lists for the key's scope over at most 31 UTC days by the lane each receipt records, provider and model, and returns calls and charged spend per lane, the share on the attested and unlinkable lanes, and per provider and model rows for those lanes with links to the provider's public attestation record. Management and owner/admin keys read the account; ordinary and session keys read only their own key. The proof pack carries the same summary for the calls in each file.

Holds: Lane names read from receipt JSON, provider and model ids, call counts, exact charged amounts, the range and the key hash for key-scoped reports. No request or answer text, receipt hashes, key secrets or network addresses.
Lives for: Discarded after the response with cache-control no-store. No new tables, columns or log fields; one rate-limit counter per key.

src/lane-report/read.ts

Spend insights response in memory

GET /api/v1/insights aggregates existing call charges and ledger refunds over at most 92 days, with UTC day or Monday-week buckets. It uses Activity's account-or-own-key access, including session restrictions. Each model/key breakdown includes the first 100 by cost or calls; totals include all visible records. Refunds count when posted; linked refunds use their generation's model and lane. Unlinked refunds have unknown model/lane.

Holds: Exact decimal charges, refunds, net spending, call and token counts, model ids, recorded lanes/disclosure classes, existing key names/short labels, and historical hardware-check counts from signed v1 receipts. Missing evidence and cache calls do not count as proven. An average includes its exact numerator/denominator and a decimal truncated to 12 places. It reads key hashes internally for grouping but returns response-local key numbers. Price comparisons read live catalog capabilities, endpoint lane/disclosure availability and token/request prices at the observed input/output mix; estimates exclude royalties, account fees, cache discounts, reasoning/media/search charges and refunds. No request text, wallet addresses, key secrets, new logs, tables, columns or Redis keys are read or written.
Lives for: Discarded after the response; cache-control is no-store. Existing source retention applies. No durable storage added.

src/insights/read.ts

Market-data tool readings in memory

When DATA_TOOLS_ENABLED is on, GET /api/v1/data/stock/:symbol and /actions read a Stock Token's Chainlink feed and its uiMultiplier, newUIMultiplier, effectiveAt, paused and oraclePaused views from Robinhood Chain; GET /api/v1/data/ipx/:class reuses the inference price index snapshot. A paid call is charged once, after the reading passed its checks: a prepaid key through the ordinary hold and ledger (kind data_tool), a keyless caller through the existing per-call payment, whose quote binds the method and path.

Holds: Public chain readings per token (feed answer, decimals, update time, multiplier values, pause flags) and the read time, and the public index snapshot per class and hour. Nothing about the caller is kept here; the charge is the existing ledger line and, for per-call payments, the existing quote row with the payer's wallet address. No request text: these are GET requests without a body.
Lives for: A token reading is reused for 15 seconds and an index snapshot for 60 seconds; both are lost when the router instance exits.

src/data-tools/stock.ts

Decision tags in signed receipts

When DECISION_TAGS_ENABLED is on, a chat or completion call may send X-Anyroute-Decision-Tag: a SHA-256 digest the caller computed, for example of an order intent. The router signs it into that call's v1 and v2 receipts as decision_tag, so the caller can later show which model answered before a decision. A malformed tag is refused before anything is charged, and the unlinkable lane refuses a tag because a reused tag joins calls together. An Agent Guard decision whose details_sha256 equals a tag names the same agent's tagged calls as informed_by, and a proof pack lists the tags its receipts carry; both read the stored receipts and store nothing new.

Holds: The 64-hex digest as sent, inside the generation's stored receipt and receipt_v2. Never the intent itself, which the router never receives.
Lives for: Kept with the generation record and its receipt, under their existing retention.

src/receipts/decision-tag.ts

Account inbox response and browser seen time

GET /api/v1/inbox reuses Activity's account, ordinary-key, session-key, team, spending-alert and wallet-party agreement visibility. It merges retained alerts, posted deposit credits, key auto top-ups, indexed disputes/rulings and, when AGENT_PAY_ENABLED, confirmed agent payments sent by this account's keys or received by a published wallet of its agents, since the browser's seen time, with unexpired pending approvals regardless of that time. It reads up to 100 records per activity kind and up to 100 pending approvals and operated host records; capped indicates a source may have more. The count describes returned items, not an unbounded total. Owner/admin access follows the existing agent decision endpoint, which remains the sole approval writer. POST /api/v1/inbox/seen authenticates the key and echoes a validated displayed-snapshot timestamp; it does not read a body or persist state.

Holds: Fixed event titles, timestamps, recorded statuses, signed credited amounts, paid USDG amounts of agent payments, key names, approval ids, expiry and spending limits. Stored approval intents are read and projected to kind, model, lane, tool names, estimated cost and output limits; no request text or Telegram messages are added. Account wallet and provider operator addresses are read in memory to match this account's operated network hosts, without returning addresses or private provider configuration. Host items show current status at the provider record's update time, which can also change for reasons other than status; no transition history is inferred. A secret-keyed visibility digest separates account, team, management and ordinary/session key bookmarks, without exposing account ids or full key hashes.
Lives for: Responses live in memory and use cache-control no-store. The browser stores only a last-seen timestamp under anyroute-inbox-seen-v1:<visibility digest> in local storage until browser data is cleared; items and API keys are not stored there. Bookmarks do not sync between browsers. Pending approvals remain counted until decided or expired. No new database table/column, Redis key family, log field or Telegram message storage. Existing source retention still applies.

src/inbox/read.ts

Network host routing evidence in memory

When NETWORK_HOSTS_ENABLED is on, routing uses existing signed generation records, health probes and attestation outcomes to limit admitted hosts during probation and exclude unavailable hosts.

Holds: Provider ids, probation deadlines, aggregate attested success and recent outcome counts, fresh canonical active bond base units matched to the host id and operator wallet, probe availability and median latency, the latest attestation failure flag and refresh time. No request text or caller address. Successful network probes also record latency in the existing health table.
Lives for: Rebuilt by health refreshes, including idle flushes; evidence older than 120 seconds is refused. Failed refreshes clear the evidence. Lost when the router instance is released or exits.

src/network/routing.ts

Host registration on the operator’s computer

The join command reads a dedicated operator wallet key from the explicitly selected file or environment variable and signs the router’s existing wallet-auth message. It optionally reads the host-generated sidecar API key from an explicitly selected UTF-8 file or environment variable, trims and validates it, and checks POSIX file read permissions. It submits host name, sidecar endpoint, payout address, model ids and optional contact to the selected router. After successful signup, or in credential-only mode, it sends the sidecar API key and provider id over HTTPS to the router’s existing wallet-authenticated credential endpoint; an explicitly selected loopback router may use HTTP. Status polling sends a provider id without a wallet key. It sends no inference text and no transactions.

Holds: The operator’s existing wallet and sidecar key files or environment variables are left in place. The command reads the key and signup fields in process memory; the wallet address, timestamp and signature leave as authentication. The sidecar API key leaves in the credential request body and is stored in the router’s existing AES-GCM encrypted provider-key column; the router can decrypt it to call the sidecar. The command writes no key or signup file, logs no key and redacts loaded sidecar credentials (including JSON-escaped forms) and wallet-key-shaped output. Dry runs read neither key and show a redacted credential body, with the signup-assigned provider id still unknown. File read buffers are cleared, but JavaScript strings and signing-library memory cannot be reliably erased. Signup details and resulting status are printed to the operator’s terminal; the operator controls terminal retention. The router still reads inference request text in memory on every lane.
Lives for: Process memory lasts until the command exits. The key source and terminal history remain under the operator’s control. Router storage for host admission is described by the admission endpoint’s inventory when available.

scripts/network-join.ts

Public network statistics in router memory

When NETWORK_STATS_ENABLED is on, cache read-only network statistics and share one refresh among concurrent readers.

Holds: Only the public aggregate response: snapshot time, host status counts, fresh admitted host count, distinct eligible model IDs, 100,000-token ranges from retained public-lane generation counts, indexer total/active USDG bonds with freshness and block, waitlist counts and published policy version. Private-lane generation rows are excluded; existing router-wide DP releases cannot identify network-host totals. Database query results and public admission evidence are read temporarily to form the snapshot. The host query selects no credentials, operator wallets or contact fields. The existing bond adapter reads public on-chain projection metadata, which can include operator addresses; only aggregate amounts, freshness and indexed block enter this cache. No inference text or caller address is read. No new database rows, Redis keys or log fields.
Lives for: Cache freshness ends 30 seconds after refresh begins, with no stale-on-error serving. The single expired snapshot may remain allocated until replaced or the router exits. Query results are eligible for collection after refresh; process exit releases all cache memory.

src/network/stats.ts

Public commerce ledger in router memory

When COMMERCE_STATS_ENABLED is on, cache the public commerce ledger and share one refresh among concurrent readers.

Holds: Only the public aggregate response: snapshot time, receipt kinds, filter settings and transfer-index position, and per window and kind the gross and filtered settlement, distinct payer and payee counts, USDG volume, median price, refund count and rate, and the count excluded by each rule. To build it, the router reads in memory the payer and payee wallet or account identifiers, amounts, times, transaction hashes, anchor status and refund flags of settled payments, and public USDG transfers; none of these enter the cache. Figures are never split by privacy lane, so a private-lane settlement cannot be told apart. No inference text or caller network address is read. No Redis keys. A failed refresh logs one warning with the first line of the error, cut to 200 characters; database errors put the query text on that line, not its parameters.
Lives for: Cache freshness ends 60 seconds after refresh begins, with no stale-on-error serving. The single expired snapshot may remain allocated until replaced or the router exits. Settlement rows read for a refresh are eligible for collection when it ends.

src/commerce/stats.ts

Owner's sealed agent VM

The dedicated agent sidecar uses the guest agent's application-scoped GetKey with a measured-compose-specific path to seal a provisioned AnyRoute credential with AES-256-GCM. It obtains TDX quotes committing the key fingerprint, image, measured compose, version and TLS key. The internal proxy forwards agent request and response streams to fixed paths at the configured HTTPS router origin.

Holds: An encrypted credential file in the VM's sealed volume. Raw credential and guest-derived key enter process memory during provisioning or boot; the API credential is sent to AnyRoute as Bearer authentication over TLS. The agent container receives no credential. Provisioning input, guest console retention and any owner-held credential copies remain the owner's responsibility. VM software and administrators can access guest memory. JavaScript strings cannot be reliably erased. No prompt or answer file is written by the sidecar.
Lives for: Ciphertext survives restarts until volume removal or replacement. Memory lasts for the sidecar process; the KMS key is scoped to app identity and a path containing the measured compose. Manifest changes require fresh provisioning. No anti-rollback guarantee is provided.

sidecar/src/agent/credential-store.ts

Agreement escrow and dispute records on chain

Agreements are switched on at anyroute.tech, with the escrow and dispute contracts deployed on Robinhood Chain. A payer funds individual milestones in USDG and an oracle can pay only that agreement's payer or payee. The optional agreements service indexes this public state, stores party evidence and model verdict statements, and prepares payer-signed funding transactions; its separate database and reader disclosures appear in this inventory.

Holds: Public permanent blockchain state, transaction calldata and events: payer, payee, token, escrow, oracle, owner, panel and jury wallet addresses; agreement and milestone ids; amounts, deadline, immutable review window and dispute timeout, delivery and dispute-opening timestamps and status; terms and deliverable digests, opening evidence digest and evidence root; jury version, signer order, threshold, participation and consensus bitmaps, signed per-signer basis-point verdicts, tally digest, final verdict, neutral stale-dispute 50/50 recovery events and payouts; a panel-pending tally remains historical metadata after escrow recovery. The digest fields accept arbitrary caller-supplied bytes32 values; they do not prove the absence of encoded text or conceal low-entropy content. Evidence text is not required by the contracts, and any off-chain jury service needs its own retention disclosure. Deployment prints only escrow and oracle addresses.
Lives for: Permanent public chain history; the contracts have no deletion function. When enabled, the agreement service indexes chain records into the separately described agreement tables.

contracts/src/agents/AgreementEscrow.sol

Messages proxy prices on the caller's computer

The local proxy estimates a Messages budget using model prices fetched over Tor. The request text, code, tool schemas and results are read in memory to count tokens, then forwarded over Tor; count_tokens is answered locally without any network request.

Holds: The public unlinkable model directory in memory. The existing local tokens.json file atomically moves every selected bearer token to unconfirmed before sending; uncertainty keeps all members there, while a definite unserved refusal returns them. No request or answer text is written to that file or logged.
Lives for: Model prices are refreshed after one minute and lost on process exit. Local token credentials remain until expiry filtering, successful settlement or removal by the caller; uncertain sent sets are never automatically reused.

packages/private/src/messages.ts

Batch requests and answers in the router's memory, without Redis

Without Redis (a single router in development), the Batch API keeps the same sealed requests and answers in the router process's memory instead.

Holds: The same sealed requests and answers as the Redis keys batch:<batch id>:in and :out.
Lives for: The sealed requests are deleted when the batch finishes; the sealed answers BATCH_RESULTS_TTL after that (86,400 seconds, 24 hours, unless the operator changed it). A batch that never finishes ends when its 24-hour completion window closes, so nothing outlives the window plus that time. A restart loses them.

src/services/batches.ts

Response cache in the router's memory

The opt-in response cache also keeps each entry in the router process's memory (up to 5,000 entries), whether or not Redis is configured.

Holds: The same sealed answer as the Redis entry, and for the semantic mode a hashed word vector of the prompt.
Lives for: An entry is not served after its time-to-live, but it stays in memory until newer entries push it out (oldest first, at 5,000) or the process restarts.

src/gateway/cache.ts

Replay guards in memory

Two small in-memory sets stop replays: a used wallet signature (when Redis is not configured) and an Oblivious HTTP encapsulated request prefix.

Holds: SHA-256 digests of a wallet address, timestamp and request hash, and of the first bytes of an encapsulated request. Not the request.
Lives for: Ten minutes for a wallet signature (old entries are swept once the set passes 50,000); until the key's acceptance window ends for an encapsulated request, with at most 100,000 kept.

src/api/auth.ts

Private-lane counters in memory

Differentially private hourly counters for the attested and unlinkable lanes: how many requests, how many were refused and why, latency and token buckets. They contain no request, no address, no key and no timestamp finer than an hour.

Holds: Four families of counts for the current hour, released once with noise when the hour ends; the raw counts are then discarded.
Lives for: Released hours are kept for 48 hours; the privacy-budget ledger for 30 days.

src/lib/dpstats.ts

Trace export (OpenTelemetry), off unless an endpoint is set

When OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT is set, one span per chat or text-completion call is sent to that endpoint: model, provider, token counts, cost, generation id, mode, attempt count, whether it streamed, and the trace id from a traceparent header if the caller sent one. Calls on the attested and unlinkable lanes send no span. Spans carry no prompt or completion.

Holds: The attributes listed, buffered in memory for up to five seconds before export.
Lives for: In memory for seconds; kept by whatever receives it, which the operator chooses.

src/api/chat.ts

Trace export to a key owner's own destination, off unless the owner sets one

A key's owner can set a tracing destination on the key (their OpenTelemetry collector, Langfuse or Helicone). Each public-lane call made with that key is then sent there: model, provider, token counts, sampling settings, finish reason, latency, cost, receipt id and lane. Prompt and completion text is included only if the owner set include_content. Calls on the attested and unlinkable lanes are never sent.

Holds: The listed fields of recent calls, in a bounded in-memory queue (2,000 calls at most across all keys; more are dropped and counted) until they are delivered or given up.
Lives for: In memory for seconds, or until retries end; kept by the destination the key's owner chose.

src/api/chat.ts

Encrypted database backups

A scheduled pg_dump (daily in the reference deployment) of the whole database, encrypted to public age recipients and uploaded to S3-compatible storage. Every table listed on this page is in it. The private key that opens it is never on the host that makes the backup.

Holds: The database as it was when the backup ran.
Lives for: The code writes each archive under a new key and never deletes one; how long archives last is set by the storage bucket's own rules, which are not in this repository.

scripts/backup-offsite.ts

The database, table by table.

106 tables and 1,163 columns, grouped by what they are for. “About a request” says whether a value is recorded for each call, summed from calls, or has nothing to do with calls. A column whose name or type suggests request content or a network address (a name such as prompt, body, ip or address, or a free-form JSON or network type) carries a written review, shown with the column.

Request records

One row per call: which model and provider answered, how many tokens, what it cost and when. Never the text of the call.

appsPer request · 4 columns · 2 reviewed

Where calls come from, for app rankings: the HTTP-Referer and X-Title headers a caller chose to send, kept as the caller wrote them (truncated). Not recorded for the unlinkable lane.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	First 24 hex characters of SHA-256 of the referer and title, so the same app maps to one row.	Per request
`url`text	The HTTP-Referer header value, cut to 500 characters. It is whatever the calling application sent, usually its own site address.A request header, kept as written. A request header kept on purpose so apps can be ranked. It names an application's site, not the caller's network address, and callers can omit it.	Per request
`title`text	The X-Title header value, cut to 200 characters: the application's display name.A request header, kept as written. A request header kept on purpose for app rankings. It is a short label the caller chooses, not a prompt.	Per request
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Per request

batch_linesPer request · 12 columns

One row per line of a batch: its status, the HTTP status its call returned, the generation (and so the signed receipt) it produced and what it was charged. No request or answer text: that is sealed outside the database.

How long: Deleted with the batch's sealed answers when its results expire (BATCH_RESULTS_TTL after the batch finished, 24 hours unless the operator changed it).

Column	What it holds	About a request
`batch_id`text	The batch the line belongs to.	Per request
`idx`integer	The line's position in the batch, from 0.	Per request
`api`text	chat or embeddings.	Per request
`status`text	queued, running, succeeded, failed, cancelled or expired.	Per request
`attempts`integer	How many times the worker started the line (a line whose providers were all unavailable is tried again, up to BATCH_LINE_MAX_ATTEMPTS).	Per request
`status_code`integer	The HTTP status the line's call returned.	Per request
`generation_id`text	The generation the line produced, whose receipt it has.	Per request
`cost`bigint	What the line was charged, after the batch discount, in pico-USD.	Per request
`list_cost`bigint	What the line would have cost without the discount, in pico-USD.	Per request
`failure_code`text	For a line that did not succeed, the error type (for example insufficient_credits or batch_cancelled). A fixed code, never text from a request.	Per request
`not_before`timestamp with time zone	The earliest the line runs (a rate-limited line waits), or, while it runs, when it counts as interrupted.	Per request
`finished_at`timestamp with time zone	When the line ended.	Per request

batchesSummed from requests · 18 columns

One row per batch sent to the Batch API (POST /api/v1/batches): the key that sent it, its status, how many lines it has and how many succeeded or failed, and what it cost. The requests and answers of its lines are never written to the database: they are kept sealed in Redis or the router's memory (see the Redis section) until the batch's results expire.

How long: No automatic deletion of the row itself; when the batch's results expire (results_expire_at), its line rows and its sealed requests and answers are deleted and purged_at is set.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	The batch id (batch_ and random hex).	Summed from requests
`account_id`text	The account the batch's lines are billed to.	Summed from requests
`key_hash`text	The hash of the API key that sent the batch; only that key can read or cancel it.	Summed from requests
`api`text	Which API every line calls: chat or embeddings.	Summed from requests
`status`text	validating, in_progress, cancelling, completed, failed, expired or cancelled.	Summed from requests
`total`integer	How many lines the batch has.	Summed from requests
`completed`integer	How many lines succeeded.	Summed from requests
`failed`integer	How many lines failed.	Summed from requests
`cost`bigint	What the batch's lines were charged, after the batch discount, in pico-USD.	Summed from requests
`list_cost`bigint	What the same calls would have cost without the batch discount, in pico-USD.	Summed from requests
`discount_bps`integer	The batch discount in basis points (BATCH_DISCOUNT_BPS when the batch was sent; 5000 is half price).	Summed from requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Summed from requests
`started_at`timestamp with time zone	When the worker started the batch.	Summed from requests
`cancelling_at`timestamp with time zone	When the key asked to cancel the batch.	Summed from requests
`finished_at`timestamp with time zone	When the batch's last line ended.	Summed from requests
`expires_at`timestamp with time zone	The end of the 24-hour completion window: lines not run by then end unrun and unbilled.	Summed from requests
`results_expire_at`timestamp with time zone	When the batch's answers and line rows are deleted (finished_at plus BATCH_RESULTS_TTL).	Summed from requests
`purged_at`timestamp with time zone	When they were deleted.	Summed from requests

generationsPer request · 46 columns · 6 reviewed

One row per call the router served: who was billed, which model and provider answered, token counts, cost, timing, how it was paid and the signed receipt. It holds hashes of the request and the response, never their text.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table. Rows are read back for receipts, usage history, settlement and provider scoring.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Generation id, random. It is also the id of the signed receipt (the X-Receipt-Id response header).	Per request
`ts`timestamp with time zone	When the call was recorded.	Per request
`key_hash`text	SHA-256 of the API key that made the call (the key itself is never stored). Empty for wallet-paid and blind-token calls.	Per request
`account_id`text	The account that was billed. For a blind-token call it is the shared token pool, not a person.	Per request
`model_id`text	The catalogue model id that answered, such as author/slug.	Per request
`provider_id`text	The provider that served the call.	Per request
`tokens_in`integer	Prompt tokens billed, as a count.	Per request
`tokens_out`integer	Completion tokens billed, as a count.	Per request
`reasoning_tokens`integer	Reasoning tokens billed, as a count.	Per request
`cached_tokens`integer	Prompt tokens the provider served from its cache, as a count.	Per request
`cache_write_tokens`integer	Prompt tokens written to the provider's cache, as a count.	Per request
`cost`bigint	Total charged to the caller, in pico-USD (1e-12 USD).	Per request
`upstream_cost`bigint	What the provider charged the router for the call, in pico-USD.	Per request
`royalty`bigint	The share of the cost owed to the model's creator, in pico-USD.	Per request
`margin`bigint	The router's fee on the call, in pico-USD.	Per request
`cache_discount`bigint	The discount given for cached prompt tokens, in pico-USD.	Per request
`mode`text	How the call was paid: prepaid, per_call, paywith, byok, cache or blind.	Per request
`latency_ms`integer	Milliseconds until the provider's first response.	Per request
`generation_time_ms`integer	Milliseconds for the whole call.	Per request
`finish_reason`text	Why the model stopped, such as stop or length.	Per request
`native_finish_reason`text	The stop reason as the provider reported it.	Per request
`streamed`boolean	Whether the answer was streamed.	Per request
`cancelled`boolean	Whether the caller cancelled before the answer finished.	Per request
`quant`text	Quantisation of the endpoint that answered (for example fp8), or unknown.	Per request
`data_region`text	The first datacenter region the provider lists, not the caller's location.	Per request
`is_byok`boolean	Whether the caller's own provider key paid for the call.	Per request
`private`boolean	Whether the caller asked for a private route (provider.private or a :private model).	Per request
`attestation_hash`text	Hash of the attestation report of the provider, when an attested provider served the call.	Per request
`receipt_id`text	The receipt's id (the same as id).	Per request
`receipt_sig`text	The router's Ed25519 signature over the receipt.	Per request
`receipt_key_id`text	Which receipt signing key signed it.	Per request
`receipt`jsonb	The signed v1 receipt payload: model, provider, token counts, cost, timing, mode, lane, disclosure class, payer (a key hash or a wallet address), the two SHA-256 digests and a summary of the provider's attestation. Blind payment adds a single nullifier and issuer key id, or token_count, nullifiers and token_key_ids for a set; no buyer or credential bytes. The ciphertext chat adapter also signs end_to_end_encrypted and e2ee: version, suite, gateway_attested, complete, billing_basis, input_byte_bound, max_tokens, request_bytes, response_bytes and gateway_receipt with id, keyset digest, response-hash, request-hash and upstream verification state plus upstream session id and GPU claim. Request-hash verification remains false in the router. No public keys, replay nonces, credentials or content are retained. When ROUTE_EXPLAIN_ENABLED is true, route stores version, serving provider id, selection reason, eligible count, aggregate skip and fallback error-class counts, lane, required parameter names from a fixed allowlist and whether the provider is a network host. No other provider ids, weights, URLs, messages or content are added. With DECISION_TAGS_ENABLED, decision_tag stores the caller's X-Anyroute-Decision-Tag: a validated sha256 digest the caller computed, never what it was computed from. Fixed fields chosen by the router.Cannot hold request content. Every field is set by the router's receipt code from numbers, ids and hashes; it never copies request or answer text into the payload.	Per request
`receipt_leaf`text	This receipt's leaf hash in the anchoring tree.	Per request
`anchor_index`integer	Which anchor (Merkle root) this receipt was included in, once anchored.	Per request
`leaf_index`integer	The receipt's position in that anchor tree.	Per request
`receipt_v2`jsonb	The v2 receipt claims as JSON: model, provider, lane, hashed request and response, power-of-two token-count buckets and cost units. The optional route claim carries the same versioned selection summary as v1, without other provider ids, raw errors or weights. The optional decision_tag claim is the same caller-computed sha256 digest as v1. Null for receipts made before v2.Cannot hold request content. Built by buildClaimsV2 from ids, hashes and buckets; the claims carry no payer, address, IP or content.	Per request
`receipt_cose`text	The v2 receipt as signed COSE_Sign1 bytes, base64.	Per request
`receipt_leaf_v2`text	The v2 receipt's leaf hash in the anchoring tree.	Per request
`leaf_index_v2`integer	The v2 leaf's position in the anchor tree.	Per request
`paid_with`jsonb	For a pay-with call: the token symbol and address, raw units accrued, the fair price used and the swap transaction, when there is one.Cannot hold request content. Written by the pay-with code from token symbols, addresses and amounts.	Per request
`payment_tx`text	For a per-call payment: the transaction hash that paid.	Per request
`app_id`text	Links to the apps row when the caller sent HTTP-Referer or X-Title. Not recorded for the unlinkable lane.	Per request
`attempts`jsonb	Every provider the router tried for the call: provider, model, whether it worked, error kind, HTTP status and latency. A failed attempt also keeps up to 200 characters of the provider's own error message, with URLs, keys, emails and long hex removed.May hold a short piece of request text. The failure message is the provider's text, not ours. Providers normally send a generic reason, but a provider could quote part of a rejected request in it, so up to 200 characters of request text could end up here.	Per request
`request_sha256`text	Ordinary chat: SHA-256 of canonical request JSON (stream flags excluded). The E2EE adapter hashes the exact forwarded encrypted envelope bytes, including whitespace and stream flags. Someone who already has the exact request can check it against this; the text cannot be recovered from it.A hash, not the text. A hash of the request, kept so a receipt can be checked against a request the caller holds; it is 64 hex characters and holds no text.	Per request
`response_sha256`text	Ordinary chat: SHA-256 of response text (all choices joined). The E2EE adapter hashes encrypted JSON or SSE wire bytes, including framing; an interrupted response hashes the observed prefix. The text cannot be recovered from it.A hash, not the text. A hash of the answer, kept for the receipt; it is 64 hex characters and holds no text.	Per request
`settled_period`text	The UTC hour in which the call was settled to the provider, for example 2026-09-26T13.	Per request

healthPer request · 11 columns · 1 reviewed

One row per provider attempt (and per probe): did it work, how fast, which status. It feeds routing and provider scores. It has no request or answer text and no account id.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`model_id`text	The model that was tried.	Per request
`provider_id`text	The provider that was tried.	Per request
`ts`timestamp with time zone	When the attempt finished.	Per request
`ok`boolean	Whether the attempt produced a usable answer.	Per request
`latency_ms`integer	Milliseconds until the first response.	Per request
`tps`real	Output tokens per second, when it could be measured.	Per request
`empty200`boolean	Whether the provider answered 200 with an empty completion.	Per request
`status_code`integer	The HTTP status the provider returned, when there was one.	Per request
`error_kind`text	A fixed code for the failure from the router's ErrorKind list, such as http_5xx, rate_limited, provider_auth, rejected, empty200 or interrupted. Null when the attempt worked.Cannot hold request content. One of a short list of codes chosen by the router (ErrorKind); the provider's message is not stored here.	Per request
`source`text	traffic for a real call, probe for the router's own health probe.	Per request
`caller`text	A 16-character truncation of the SHA-256 of the account id, set only on failed attempts, so one caller cannot single-handedly mark a provider as failing. It is not the account id.	Per request

Billing

Balances, the append-only ledger, spending holds, per-call payment quotes and what providers are owed.

accountsNot about requests · 7 columns

One row per billing account: an API-key account or a wallet account, with its settled balance and the amount held for calls in flight.

How long: No automatic deletion. The ledger refers to accounts and is append-only, so an account row stays.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	The account id. For a wallet account it is derived from the wallet address.	Not about requests
`inference_keys_default`boolean	Whether newly provisioned child keys default to inference-only access. Management keys can explicitly select account scope.	Not about requests
`kind`text	key for an API-key account, wallet for a wallet account.	Not about requests
`wallet`text	The wallet address of a wallet account. Empty for a key account.	Not about requests
`balance`bigint	The spendable balance, including provisional deposit credits: the sum of the account's ledger lines, in pico-USD. A database trigger keeps it equal to that sum.	Summed from requests
`held`bigint	The amount reserved by open holds for calls in flight, in pico-USD.	Summed from requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests

holdsPer request · 9 columns · 1 reviewed

A reservation of balance made before a call runs, settled to the real cost afterwards or released. One hold per call.

How long: The database refuses to delete holds (trigger holds_apply_held), so they are kept permanently.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Hold id; for a chat call it is the generation id.	Per request
`account_id`text	The account the amount is reserved on.	Per request
`key_hash`text	The key hash that made the call, when there is one.	Per request
`amount`bigint	The reserved amount in pico-USD; it cannot change after creation.	Per request
`status`text	held, settled or released.	Per request
`kind`text	What the hold was for; usage for a call, tool_call for a paid x402 tool, data_tool for a market-data tool call.	Per request
`result`jsonb	How the hold ended: the amount charged and any uncovered amount, as strings in pico-USD, and expired: true when the hold timed out.Cannot hold request content. Written only by settle() and release() in ledger.ts as { charged, uncovered, expired } amounts.	Per request
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Per request
`expires_at`timestamp with time zone	When an unsettled hold is released automatically (the holds-expire job).	Per request

ledgerPer request · 9 columns · 1 reviewed

The append-only money ledger: deposits, credits, usage charges, refunds, withdrawals and adjustments. A usage line names the generation it paid for; it does not say what the call was about.

How long: The database refuses every update and delete on this table (trigger ledger_no_update), so lines are kept permanently.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Ledger line id.	Per request
`account_id`text	The account the line applies to.	Per request
`key_hash`text	The key hash the line came from, when there is one.	Per request
`amount`bigint	The signed amount in pico-USD: positive adds to the balance, negative takes from it.	Per request
`kind`text	What the line is: provisional (early escrow credit), deposit, credit, usage, refund, paywith, change, adjustment, withdrawal_lock, withdrawal, blind_purchase, tool_call (a paid x402 tool), data_tool (a market-data tool call) and similar.	Per request
`ref`text	A unique idempotency reference, such as usage:<generation id> or escrow:<transaction>:<log index>, so a line can never be posted twice.	Per request
`generation_id`text	For a usage line, the generation it paid for.	Per request
`description`text	A short line written by the router, such as "<model> via <provider>", "USDG deposit <transaction hash>" or "Model usage". Never text from a request.Cannot hold request content. Every description is built in code from model ids, provider ids, transaction hashes and fixed phrases (ledger.ts, escrow.ts, indexer.ts); no caller-supplied string is used.	Per request
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Per request

makegood_refundsPer request · 22 columns · 2 reviewed

One row per call (or per unserved per-call payment) that met a make-good refund rule: the rule, the capped refund, the signed refund receipt and, for calls paid on-chain per call, the on-chain refund still owed or paid. Disabled unless MAKEGOOD_ENABLED.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table. At most one row per source: the source id is unique, so a call is never refunded twice.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Refund id, also the id of its signed refund receipt (GET /api/v1/receipts/{id}).	Per request
`source_id`text	What is refunded: the generation id, or payment:<transaction hash> for a per-call payment no provider served. Unique.	Per request
`generation_id`text	The refunded generation, whose id is also its original receipt id. Null for an unserved paid call.	Per request
`account_id`text	Account credited (or whose per-call wallet is refunded on-chain).	Per request
`key_hash`text	Hash of the API key that made the call, copied from the generation; null for a per-call wallet payer.	Per request
`rule`text	Fixed rule name: upstream_failure, fallback_price, truncated_stream, structured_output or unattested_lane.	Per request
`status`text	pending until the settlement job decides it, then issued, or void when nothing charged is left to refund.	Per request
`amount`bigint	Refund in pico-USD: the rule's amount capped by what the ledger charged (or, for an unserved paid call, by the payment still unspent).	Per request
`charged`bigint	What the ledger charged for the call, or what the unserved per-call payment was, in pico-USD.	Per request
`evidence`jsonb	Fixed facts behind the rule: error class counts, provider ids, token counts, costs, lane and disclosure class, a payment transaction hash or the first call id of a JSON repair.Cannot hold request content. Written only by the make-good hooks from numbers, fixed codes, provider ids, generation ids and transaction hashes; never request or answer text, headers or caller addresses.	Per request
`provider_id`text	Provider whose failure caused the refund, when one did; null when no provider is responsible (a JSON answer that does not parse).	Per request
`strike`boolean	Whether the refund is also a strike against that provider (an attested-lane call served without a fresh attestation).	Per request
`payer`text	Wallet address that paid the call on-chain per call, refunded on-chain; null for credits to a prepaid balance.	Per request
`onchain_usdg`bigint	USDG base units owed on-chain for this refund (whole units; any remainder below one unit stays as balance).	Per request
`payout_status`text	none, owed, batched (in a signed transfer) or paid.	Per request
`payout_id`text	The makegood_payouts transfer that pays this refund.	Per request
`receipt`jsonb	The signed refund receipt payload (kind refund): ids, rule, amounts, settlement, provider and the evidence above.Cannot hold request content. Canonical JSON built by issueRefund from the fields of this row and the original generation id; it carries amounts, fixed codes and hashes, no request or answer text.	Per request
`receipt_sig`text	Ed25519 signature over the canonical refund receipt, by the router's receipt key.	Per request
`receipt_key_id`text	Id of the receipt key that signed it.	Per request
`receipt_leaf`text	Hash of the signed receipt in the form receipt anchoring uses; refund receipts are not yet anchored.	Per request
`detected_at`timestamp with time zone	When the rule was met (the call settled or failed).	Per request
`issued_at`timestamp with time zone	When the settlement job issued or voided the refund.	Per request

network_fee_ledgerSummed from requests · 10 columns

Network host fees from confirmed per-host receipt roots, grouped in the UTC hour when they accrue. Gross and fee are pico-USD; net is invoiced through settlements. Closed-hour fees are swapped through the guarded buyback oracle path and transferred to the token dead address. Swap and burn transactions are public through the network burns API.

How long: No automatic deletion, and rows are never changed after they are written.

The planned executor reads its public token, adapter, oracle and keeper addresses, daily cap, operation state and transaction events from the chain in memory to check configured settings and reconcile swaps. Quotes use a pinned block and may add an independent pool TWAP. No request text, caller address, new log field or Redis key is read or stored by these checks. Payouts and fee burns are not switched on yet.
Sub-USDG-unit fee dust remains unswapped and is reported separately. Burns transfer to the dead address; AnyrToken totalSupply is unchanged. Public totals aggregate across hosts; recent entries expose transactions, status and token amounts, without host invoice amounts. Transactions themselves are public on chain and can be correlated with hosts. Amounts above the configured per-run or remaining daily cap wait for a later run or operator reconciliation.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Provider and accrual-hour identifier; also the input to the on-chain operation digest.	Summed from requests
`provider_id`text	The host owed a net payout.	Summed from requests
`period`text	UTC hour when anchored receipts accrue, which may follow the served hour.	Summed from requests
`gross_pico`numeric(78, 0)	Sum of upstream_cost for eligible linked generations, before the network fee.	Summed from requests
`fee_pico`numeric(78, 0)	Floor of gross times configured basis points divided by 10000.	Summed from requests
`status`text	accrued, swapped or burned, reconciled with on-chain operation state.	Summed from requests
`swap_tx`text	Confirmed swap transaction hash, not request content.	Summed from requests
`burn_tx`text	Confirmed dead-address transfer transaction hash.	Summed from requests
`anyr_amount`numeric(78, 0)	ANYR base units measured by the executor's balance delta.	Summed from requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Summed from requests

payoutsNot about requests · 7 columns

A payout to a provider: the amount in USDG, where it went and its status.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Payout id.	Not about requests
`provider_id`text	The provider paid.	Not about requests
`usdg`bigint	Amount in USDG base units.	Not about requests
`to`text	The destination address for the payout.	Not about requests
`status`text	pending, submitted, paid or invoice.	Not about requests
`tx`text	The payment transaction.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests

quotesPer request · 11 columns · 1 reviewed

A price quoted for one pay-per-call request (HTTP 402 and x402), so a payment can be matched to exactly the request it was for.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`nonce`text	The quote id (32 bytes hex). For an x402 payment claim it is x402:<payer wallet>:<authorization nonce>.	Per request
`price_usdg`bigint	The quoted price in USDG base units (1e-6).	Per request
`price_pico`bigint	The same price in pico-USD.	Per request
`request_sha256`text	SHA-256 of the request the quote is for. It binds the quote to that one request; the request cannot be recovered from it.A hash, not the text. A hash of the request body, used to check that a payment belongs to the request it quoted.	Per request
`model_id`text	The model the quote is for.	Per request
`expires_at`timestamp with time zone	When the quote stops being payable.	Per request
`status`text	open, paid, used, expired or failed.	Per request
`payer`text	The wallet address that paid, once a payment is seen.	Per request
`tx_hash`text	The payment transaction.	Per request
`account_id`text	The account the payment was credited to.	Per request
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Per request

royaltiesSummed from requests · 7 columns

The royalty a model's creator earned in one period, and whether it was claimed.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`model_id`text	The model.	Summed from requests
`period`text	The settlement period.	Summed from requests
`amount`bigint	Royalty in pico-USD.	Summed from requests
`usdg`bigint	Royalty in USDG base units.	Summed from requests
`creator`text	The creator's payout address, when one is known.	Summed from requests
`stream_tx`text	The transaction that streamed the royalty.	Summed from requests
`claimed`boolean	Whether the creator claimed it.	Summed from requests

seller_gas_floatsSummed from requests · 5 columns

USDG a seller prepaid to the treasury so the facilitator settles its payments below the minimum; each such settle is debited at its measured gas times a buffer.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`seller_id`text	The listing the float belongs to.	Summed from requests
`balance`numeric(78, 0)	USDG base units left.	Summed from requests
`funded`numeric(78, 0)	USDG base units paid in, in total.	Summed from requests
`debited`numeric(78, 0)	USDG base units taken for gas, in total.	Summed from requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Summed from requests

settlementsSummed from requests · 10 columns

What one provider is owed for one UTC hour: token totals, request count, upstream cost, the router's fee and the USDG owed. Network hosts use only confirmed per-host receipts and the configured network fee; their period is the accrual hour.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`provider_id`text	The provider owed.	Summed from requests
`period`text	The UTC hour, such as 2026-09-26T13.	Summed from requests
`tokens`bigint	Total tokens invoiced in the hour; network hosts include only newly eligible anchored work.	Summed from requests
`requests`integer	Number of calls invoiced in the hour; network hosts include only newly eligible anchored work.	Summed from requests
`upstream`bigint	Upstream cost for the hour, in pico-USD.	Summed from requests
`fee`bigint	The router's fee for the hour, in pico-USD.	Summed from requests
`usdg_owed`bigint	USDG base units owed to the provider for the hour.	Summed from requests
`payout_id`text	The payout that included the hour, once paid.	Summed from requests
`paid_tx`text	The transaction that paid it.	Summed from requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Summed from requests

skill_installsNot about requests · 9 columns · 1 reviewed

One row per (skill, installing account): the price paid, the author's share, the network fee and the signed install receipt. The ledger rows of a paid install use refs derived from the same pair, which makes an install idempotent.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Install id (si_...).	Not about requests
`skill_id`text	The skill installed.	Not about requests
`account_id`text	The installing account.	Not about requests
`key_hash`text	The key that installed it.	Not about requests
`price_usdg`bigint	The price paid in USDG base units; 0 for a free skill or the author's own.	Not about requests
`author_share`bigint	Pico-USD credited to the author's account (the price less SKILLS_FEE_BPS).	Not about requests
`fee`bigint	Pico-USD credited to the network fee account.	Not about requests
`receipt`jsonb	The install receipt: skill id, content hash, level, installer and author accounts, amounts and time, with an Ed25519 signature from the receipt key.Cannot hold request content. Ids, hashes, amounts and a timestamp chosen by our code, plus the signature over them.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests

tool_callsPer request · 24 columns · 2 reviewed

One row per paid x402 tool call made with a key's balance: the seller, the tool address, the price and take, the hold, the signed authorization's nonce and the settlement transaction, the answer's hash and the signed tool.call receipt. Never the tool arguments, the query string or the answer.

How long: No automatic deletion: these are billing records, like generations and the ledger.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Call id (tc_...), also the id of its hold.	Per request
`key_hash`text	The key that paid.	Per request
`account_id`text	The account charged.	Per request
`seller_id`text	The tool listing id when the address is listed, else null.	Per request
`pay_to`text	The seller's payTo wallet (public on chain).	Per request
`resource`text	The tool's https origin and path that was paid, without the query string.	Per request
`method`text	GET or POST.	Per request
`network`text	The x402 network of the paid offer.	Per request
`x402_version`integer	1 or 2: which x402 wire format the seller spoke.	Per request
`price_units`bigint	The seller's price in USDG base units.	Per request
`price`bigint	The seller's price in pico-USD.	Per request
`take`bigint	The router's take in pico-USD (TOOLS_TAKE_BPS).	Per request
`hold_id`text	The hold on the key's balance.	Per request
`payer`text	The router's own buyer wallet that signed the authorization.	Per request
`nonce`text	The EIP-3009 nonce of that authorization; the reconcile job asks the chain whether it was used.	Per request
`valid_before`timestamp with time zone	When that authorization expires.	Per request
`settle_tx`text	The settlement transaction hash the seller reported, if any.	Per request
`response_sha256`text	SHA-256 of the tool's answer bytes, as in the receipt. The answer cannot be recovered from it.A hash, not the text. A hash of the tool answer kept for the signed receipt; 64 hex characters, no text.	Per request
`seller_status`integer	The tool's HTTP status code.	Per request
`status`text	paying, ok, failed, released or charged_after_failure.	Per request
`failure`text	A fixed failure code, such as seller_status_500 or response_too_large.	Per request
`receipt`jsonb	The tool.call receipt: COSE_Sign1 bytes (base64), key id, leaf and the signed claims (hashes, amounts, seller, address, settlement).Cannot hold request content. Ids, hashes, amounts, the public tool address and wallet, and the signature over them; no arguments or answer text.	Per request
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Per request
`closed_at`timestamp with time zone	When the hold was charged or released.	Per request

x402_paid_resultsPer request · 6 columns · 3 reviewed

One row per x402 payment whose call was answered, so a payer who lost the answer can have it sent again instead of paying twice. It names the paying wallet and the authorization nonce and holds hashes; the answer itself is sealed outside the database.

How long: 24 hours. Recovery refuses an older row, and the x402-recovery-expire job (and, at most hourly, each router replica that keeps answers) deletes it together with any sealed answer still held for it.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`payer`text	The wallet that signed the payment authorization (lowercase hex), as on the public settlement.	Per request
`nonce`text	The authorization's EIP-3009 nonce (32 bytes hex), public on-chain once settled.	Per request
`request_sha256`text	SHA-256 of the request the payment paid for (the receipt's request_sha256). A recovery must send the identical request.A hash, not the text. A hash of the request body, compared with the hash of a recovery request so an answer is sent again only for the request it answered.	Per request
`response_sha256`text	SHA-256 of the answer's bytes as they were sent, checked before the sealed answer is sent again.A hash, not the text. A hash of the answer bytes, so the answer sent again is checked to be byte-identical to the one first sent; the answer cannot be recovered from it.	Per request
`body_ref`text	The name of the Redis key that holds the sealed answer: x402paid: and a SHA-256 of the payer and the nonce.Cannot hold request content. A fixed prefix and a hash of the payer and the nonce naming where the sealed answer lives; the answer bytes are never written to this column.	Per request
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Per request

Receipts & proofs

Signing keys, anchors and the transparency log that let anyone check a receipt without asking us.

agent_track_recordsSummed from requests · 6 columns · 1 reviewed

Portable track-record certificates: a router-signed count, total spend, refund and dispute rates of one key's anchored receipts, with a Merkle root over those receipts' anchor leaves.

How long: Until the key is deleted (cascade). Certificates expire after seven days but stay stored; published ones show on the card until they expire.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Random public certificate id.	Summed from requests
`key_hash`text	The certified key; never published.	Summed from requests
`certificate`jsonb	The signed certificate: random pseudonym, aggregate stats, Merkle root and anchor counts, the public profile slug and ERC-8004 agent id when registered.Cannot hold request content. Aggregates and hashes written by the router: no counterparty, no amount per counterparty, no request or answer text and no key hash.	Summed from requests
`published`boolean	Whether the owner chose to show it on the public card.	Summed from requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was issued.	Summed from requests
`expires_at`timestamp with time zone	Seven days after issuance.	Summed from requests

anchorsSummed from requests · 8 columns

A Merkle root over the receipts signed in one interval, and the chain transaction that recorded it. Lets anyone check that a receipt existed at that time.

How long: No automatic deletion, and rows are never changed after they are written.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`index`integer	Anchor number, counting up from zero.	Summed from requests
`root`text	The Merkle root of the interval's receipt leaves (32 bytes, hex).	Summed from requests
`from_ts`timestamp with time zone	Start of the interval covered.	Summed from requests
`to_ts`timestamp with time zone	End of the interval covered.	Summed from requests
`count`integer	How many receipts the root covers.	Summed from requests
`tx_hash`text	The chain transaction that recorded the root.	Summed from requests
`status`text	pending, submitted, confirmed or local.	Summed from requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Summed from requests

host_anchor_leavesPer request · 7 columns

The receipt leaves collected from attested hosts. A row holds a leaf hash, the receipt id and the time; not the receipt's own hashes or usage.

How long: No automatic deletion, and rows are never changed after they are written.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`provider_id`text	The attested host that produced the receipt.	Per request
`leaf`text	The receipt's leaf hash.	Per request
`anchor_id`integer	The host_anchors row that includes it.	Per request
`leaf_index`integer	Its position in that root's tree.	Per request
`receipt_id`text	The receipt's id.	Per request
`receipt_ts`timestamp with time zone	The time the receipt itself states.	Per request
`collected_at`timestamp with time zone	When the router collected the leaf.	Per request

host_anchorsSummed from requests · 14 columns

A Merkle root over the receipts one attested host signed in an interval, tied to the attestation its receipt key was bound in.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`serial	Row number, counting up from 1.	Summed from requests
`provider_id`text	The attested host.	Summed from requests
`attestation_ref`text	SHA-256 of the boot quote the router verified for that host.	Summed from requests
`receipt_key_id`text	The host's receipt key id.	Summed from requests
`receipt_public_key`text	The host's raw Ed25519 receipt public key, hex, as its verified quote bound it.	Summed from requests
`root`text	The Merkle root of the collected leaves.	Summed from requests
`from_ts`timestamp with time zone	Start of the interval the leaves were collected in.	Summed from requests
`to_ts`timestamp with time zone	End of that interval.	Summed from requests
`count`integer	How many leaves the root covers.	Summed from requests
`status`text	pending, confirmed or local.	Summed from requests
`tx_hash`text	The chain transaction that recorded the root.	Summed from requests
`block_number`bigint	The block of that transaction.	Summed from requests
`chain_index`integer	The anchor's index in the on-chain receipt anchor contract once posted.	Summed from requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Summed from requests

network_receipt_linksPer request · 4 columns

Links a router generation to a sidecar receipt ID from the response header, so only work included in that host's confirmed root can be invoiced. The collected leaf's signature is checked by host-anchor. Each sidecar receipt may be linked once per provider.

How long: No automatic deletion, and rows are never changed after they are written.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`generation_id`text	Router generation ID; no prompt or response bytes.	Per request
`provider_id`text	Provider that served the call.	Per request
`receipt_id`text	Strict rcpt_ identifier from the upstream response header, not caller-provided text.	Per request
`accrued_period`text	Null until included in a network invoice; then the UTC accrual hour preventing repeated accrual.	Per request

receipt_keysNot about requests · 7 columns

The Ed25519 keys that sign receipts, with the dates each was valid. Public halves are published; the private half is encrypted at rest.

How long: Keys are rotated (RECEIPT_KEY_ROTATION_DAYS) and retired, never deleted, so old receipts stay verifiable.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Key id: 16 hex characters, the first bytes of the public key's digest.	Not about requests
`public_key`text	The raw 32-byte public key, hex. Published at /api/v1/receipts/keys.	Not about requests
`private_key_enc`text	The private key, AES-256-GCM encrypted with the router's APP_SECRET. Null for a key that can no longer sign; the router then makes a new one.	Not about requests
`valid_from`timestamp with time zone	When the key started signing.	Not about requests
`retired_at`timestamp with time zone	When it stopped signing, once rotated out.	Not about requests
`onchain_tx`text	The transaction that published the public key on chain.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests

tlog_checkpointsNot about requests · 5 columns

Signed checkpoints of the transparency log: its size and root, signed by the log's key.

How long: No automatic deletion, and rows are never changed after they are written.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`size`bigint	The tree size the checkpoint is for.	Not about requests
`root_hash`text	The tree's root hash, hex.	Not about requests
`checkpoint`text	The checkpoint text: origin, size and base64 root hash.	Not about requests
`signature`text	The log's signature line over that text.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests

tlog_cosignaturesNot about requests · 7 columns

Witness cosignatures on checkpoints: independent parties confirming the log showed them the same tree.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`size`bigint	The checkpoint size the witness signed.	Not about requests
`witness`text	The witness's key name.	Not about requests
`key_id`text	Hex of the 4-byte signed-note key id.	Not about requests
`timestamp`bigint	The cosignature's own time, in seconds.	Not about requests
`line`text	The signature line as the witness sent it.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When a newer cosignature from the same witness replaced the row.	Not about requests

tlog_entriesNot about requests · 7 columns

The entries of the public transparency log: receipt keys, Oblivious HTTP key configurations, blind-token issuer keys, measurement bundles, attestation bindings and data inventories (this page's own hash).

How long: Append-only by design: entries are never updated or deleted, because the log's tree hashes them.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`idx`bigint	The entry's leaf index in the log.	Not about requests
`kind`text	receipt_key, ohttp_key_config, blind_issuer_key, measurement_bundle, attestation_binding or data_inventory.	Not about requests
`sha256`text	Hex digest of the key or configuration the entry names.	Not about requests
`subject`text	The key id, epoch, provider or inventory the entry is about.	Not about requests
`entry`text	The exact canonical JSON that was hashed into the log: public keys, digests and configuration, never request data. Sidecar bindings v2 include the source archive hash, engine name and image digest, and model ID and digest.	Not about requests
`leaf_hash`text	The entry's RFC 6962 leaf hash.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests

tlog_rekor_anchorsNot about requests · 19 columns · 3 reviewed

Records of checkpoints the router anchored in a public Rekor log, with the proof that the entry is included.

How long: A pending row that turns out not to be an entry for its checkpoint is dropped and the checkpoint is submitted again; verified rows are kept.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`serial	Row number, counting up from 1.	Not about requests
`size`bigint	The checkpoint's tree size.	Not about requests
`root_hash`text	The checkpoint's root hash, hex.	Not about requests
`note`text	The signed checkpoint note that was anchored: checkpoint text, a blank line and the log's signature line.Cannot hold request content. The note is the transparency-log checkpoint text (origin, size, root hash) plus a signature line; nothing else is ever placed in it.	Not about requests
`artifact_sha256`text	The SHA-256 the Rekor entry holds.	Not about requests
`key_id`text	SHA-256 of the anchoring key's public key info, hex.	Not about requests
`rekor_url`text	The address of the Rekor log the entry was submitted to.A public address, not a caller's. The address of a public transparency log server, set by the operator; it is not a caller's address.	Not about requests
`uuid`text	The Rekor entry id.	Not about requests
`status`text	pending or verified. Only verified rows are served.	Not about requests
`log_index`bigint	The entry's index in Rekor.	Not about requests
`integrated_time`bigint	When Rekor integrated the entry, in seconds.	Not about requests
`log_id`text	Rekor's log id.	Not about requests
`entry_base64`text	The entry body as Rekor returned it, base64.	Not about requests
`inclusion_proof`jsonb	The inclusion proof: log index, tree size, root hash, hashes and Rekor's checkpoint.Cannot hold request content. Copied from Rekor's inclusion-proof response and typed as { logIndex, treeSize, rootHash, hashes, checkpoint }.	Not about requests
`signed_entry_timestamp`text	Rekor's signed entry timestamp, base64.	Not about requests
`checkpoint_verified`boolean	Whether Rekor's checkpoint signature verified against the pinned key.	Not about requests
`set_verified`boolean	Whether the signed entry timestamp verified against the pinned key.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests
`verified_at`timestamp with time zone	When the inclusion proof verified.	Not about requests

Keys & auth

API keys (stored as hashes), teams with their passkey and wallet members and audit log, agent sessions, keys you bring, and the issuer and gateway keys behind blind tokens and Oblivious HTTP.

agent_action_decisionsPer request · 12 columns

Action checks, reported outcomes and rolling action limits for the deciding agent key, separate from model spend.

How long: Rows remain until operator deletion. Rolling day and hour limits read only the preceding 24 hours and hour; those windows do not delete records.

Action and target labels remain readable, including symbols, recipient wallet addresses or hosts supplied by the agent. Do not send secrets or request text in these labels. Only a SHA-256 digest of order details is accepted; full orders are not accepted here.
Unreported allowed actions count their requested amount. Executed outcomes count the agent-reported amount; skipped and failed outcomes release the daily amount. All allowed checks still count toward the hourly count. These records do not prove execution or control brokerage or wallet keys.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Random URL-safe decision identifier, not an authentication credential.	Per request
`key_hash`text	Hash of the deciding API key; only that key can report an outcome.	Per request
`event_id`bigint	Identifier of the aggregate action decision on the existing agent event hash chain; events have their own retention.	Per request
`action`text	Caller-chosen bounded action name such as trade.order or transfer.send.	Per request
`target`text	Optional caller-chosen symbol, recipient wallet address or host label, stored verbatim; this is not the caller's network address.	Per request
`amount_pico`numeric(78, 0)	Requested action amount in integer pico-USD; an unreported allow holds this amount against the daily action limit.	Per request
`details_sha256`text	Optional SHA-256 digest of canonical order JSON; order details themselves are not stored.	Per request
`decision`text	allow, deny or approval_required from the rulebooks checked at decision time.	Per request
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the decision was recorded.	Per request
`outcome_status`text	Null before reporting; executed, skipped or failed afterward, accepted once only for an allowed action.	Per request
`outcome_amount_pico`numeric(78, 0)	Optional agent-reported actual pico-USD amount, required for executed; it may exceed the allowed amount and is not verified against a brokerage or chain.	Per request
`outcome_at`timestamp with time zone	When the deciding key reported its outcome, or null before reporting.	Per request

agent_approvalsPer request · 11 columns · 1 reviewed

Principal approval of an agent's estimated inference spend or reported action amount, consumed once by the requesting key.

How long: Approval validity defaults to 15 minutes (AGENT_APPROVAL_TTL_S). Pending and approved rows become expired on access or another approval evaluation. Rows remain until operator deletion; validity expiry does not delete records.

No prompt or answer fields are stored. Model and declared tool names remain readable; callers choose these identifiers. The router still reads request text in memory on every lane. Action approvals store the action name, optional readable target (including wallet or host labels), optional order digest and amount, never full order details. Council and dual requests store the entire set of model intents with a shared total cost ceiling.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Random URL-safe approval identifier, not an authentication credential.	Per request
`key_hash`text	The API or session key requesting this approval; approval cannot transfer to another key.	Per request
`intent`jsonb	Explicit projection of model, lane, declared tool names, output token limit and estimated pico-USD cost, or action name, target, order digest and pico-USD amount; a multi-model request stores an intents array.Settings written by you or an operator. Only routing or action metadata is copied; action targets can be symbols, recipient wallets or hosts. messages, answers, tool arguments and descriptions are excluded. Declared model and tool identifiers are caller-chosen labels whose meaning cannot be inferred by shape checks.	Per request
`intent_hash`text	SHA-256 of canonical projected intents including the estimated cost, used to reuse an identical pending approval.	Per request
`max_cost_pico`numeric(78, 0)	The original estimated pico-USD cost ceiling; retries may cost less but cannot exceed this amount.	Per request
`status`text	pending, approved, denied, expired or used. Only approved, unexpired approvals can be consumed.	Per request
`requested_at`timestamp with time zone	When the approval was created.	Per request
`decided_at`timestamp with time zone	When the principal approved or denied the request, or null.	Per request
`decided_by`text	The deciding principal's API key hash, or null before a decision.	Per request
`expires_at`timestamp with time zone	The fixed validity deadline from request time; approval does not extend it.	Per request
`used_at`timestamp with time zone	When the router consumed the approval after a successful spend reservation, on an allowed cache hit, or on an allowed action check.	Per request

agent_feedbackNot about requests · 12 columns

Paid feedback: a 0 to 100 score and up to two short tags per receipt, accepted only from the receipt's payer about its payee or the agent it served.

How long: Until the subject key is deleted (cascade). A reviewer can withdraw an entry, which stops counting it; the row is kept with its withdrawal time. No automatic deletion.

Public: the score, tags, receipt kind, a coarse payment band and the payment day, linked to the agent's public profile slug. Never public: the reviewer's account, the receipt id and the exact amount. One entry per receipt.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Random public feedback id.	Not about requests
`subject_key_hash`text	The reviewed agent's key; never published.	Not about requests
`reviewer_account_id`text	The paying account, kept to enforce one entry per receipt and the reviewer's right to withdraw; never published.	Not about requests
`receipt_kind`text	Fixed receipt kind such as model.call or agreement.release.	Not about requests
`receipt_id`text	The router's own receipt or agreement milestone id that backs the entry; never published.	Not about requests
`score`integer	Score from 0 to 100.	Not about requests
`tag1`text	Optional short tag (letters, digits, spaces and . _ : - only, up to 32 characters).	Not about requests
`tag2`text	Optional second short tag, same limits.	Not about requests
`paid_pico`bigint	What the reviewer paid on the receipt, net of recorded refunds, in pico-USD; used for weighting and shown only as a band.	Not about requests
`paid_at`timestamp with time zone	When the payment happened; weights halve every PAID_FEEDBACK_HALF_LIFE_DAYS after it.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the entry was written.	Not about requests
`revoked_at`timestamp with time zone	When the reviewer withdrew it; null while it counts.	Not about requests

agent_identitiesNot about requests · 12 columns · 2 reviewed

Per agent key: the owner's identity opt-out and reputation opt-in, and the progress of an ERC-8004 identity registration the owner asked for.

How long: Until the key is deleted (cascade). Opting out keeps the row so the choice persists. A registration sent to the chain is public and permanent there; deleting this row does not remove it.

The ERC-8004 identity registry is a public contract the router does not operate. The registration file it points to is served only while the key has not opted out and contains owner-written profile fields and router links, never the key hash or account. Keys whose rulebook allows only the unlinkable lane are opted out unless the owner opts in.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`key_hash`text	The agent key these choices belong to; never published.	Not about requests
`id`text	Random 144-bit public id used in the registration file URL; independent of the key hash and the profile slug.	Not about requests
`identity_opt_out`boolean	Owner's choice; null means the default (opted out only when the key's rulebook allows only the unlinkable lane).	Not about requests
`reputation_opt_in`boolean	Owner's choice to accept paid feedback; false by default.	Not about requests
`status`text	Fixed registration state: none, awaiting_owner, queued, submitted, registered or failed.	Not about requests
`mode`text	owner (the owner's wallet sends the transaction) or registrar (the isolated worker sends it).	Not about requests
`registry`text	Public registry identifier eip155:<chain id>:<contract address>.	Not about requests
`agent_id`text	The public ERC-8004 agent id read from the registration transaction.	Not about requests
`owner_address`text	The wallet that holds the identity token, read from the public registration event.A wallet address, not a network address. A blockchain wallet address from a public on-chain event, not a network address; it is shown to the owner only.	Not about requests
`tx_hash`text	The public registration transaction hash.	Not about requests
`error`text	Fixed failure code of the last registration attempt.Cannot hold request content. Only fixed codes written by the router (reverted, no_registration, uri_mismatch, send_failed); never library text, a request or an answer.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row last changed.	Not about requests

agent_ledger_linksPer request · 7 columns · 1 reviewed

Explicit correlation of rulebook decision events, requesting keys and generation identifiers for the agent activity ledger.

How long: 90 days; the agent-ledger-retention worker removes older links hourly when AGENT_POLICY_ENABLED is on. Deleting a linked event also removes that event's link. Generations retain their existing lifetime. With the flag off or worker absent, deletion waits.

Only router-generated identifiers, timestamps and key hashes are stored. No prompt or answer text is added. A reservation link can precede a generation or remain without one after a provider failure. Existing records without correlation remain separate and are marked unlinked in the API. Parent policy events are attributed to the session key that made the request. The ledger describes policy evaluations and recorded generations through AnyRoute; errors before policy evaluation or generation creation have no ledger row.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`bigserial	Allocated correlation identifier.	Per request
`request_id`text	Router-generated request scope identifier; groups multiple models and inherited policy evaluations in one request.Cannot hold request content. A random UUID is generated inside the router for correlation. It never includes a URL, body, prompt, answer, or any caller-supplied string.	Per request
`key_hash`text	The actual requesting API key or session key, rather than the parent policy key.	Per request
`ts`timestamp with time zone	When the correlation was recorded, in UTC.	Per request
`event_id`bigint	The exact policy decision or approval-use event; null for generation links. Removed with its event.	Per request
`generation_id`text	The exact generation or reservation identifier; null for event links. A failed reservation or provider call need not produce a generation.	Per request
`approval_id`text	The approval identifier on a recorded approval-use event; otherwise null.	Per request

agent_livenessNot about requests · 8 columns · 3 reviewed

The latest signed liveness probe of each listed agent's declared endpoint (daily agent-liveness job).

How long: Replaced by each probe; deleted with the key (cascade). A result for an endpoint the owner has since changed is not shown.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`key_hash`text	The listed agent key; never published.	Not about requests
`endpoint_sha256`text	SHA-256 of the probed endpoint URL, so a changed endpoint invalidates the old result.A hash, not the text. A digest of the owner-declared public endpoint URL; never a caller's network address.	Not about requests
`live`boolean	Whether the endpoint answered with a status below 500, other than 404 and 410, within the timeout.	Not about requests
`http_status`integer	The status code the endpoint answered with; null when it did not answer.	Not about requests
`latency_ms`integer	Time to the response headers in milliseconds.	Not about requests
`error`text	Fixed failure code: timeout, network, blocked or http.Cannot hold request content. Only fixed codes chosen by the router; no response body, header or library message is stored.	Not about requests
`probed_at`timestamp with time zone	When the probe ran.	Not about requests
`receipt`jsonb	The probe receipt the router signed with its receipt key: the public profile slug, endpoint digest, time, result, status and latency.Cannot hold request content. Fixed fields written by the router, signed with the published receipt key; no response body, headers or key hash.	Not about requests

agent_policiesNot about requests · 10 columns · 1 reviewed

The principal's current agent rulebook and kill state, enforced by the router for requests through AnyRoute.

How long: Until the principal removes the rulebook. Updating a rulebook replaces its current specification and preserves kill state.

Model and tool identifiers and a kill reason are user-supplied text. Shape and size checks cannot judge the meaning a principal assigns to these labels. Action rules retain owner-chosen action names and target allow/deny labels, including recipient wallets or hosts; amount limits are separate from model caps. No prompt or answer fields are accepted.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`key_hash`text	The API key this rulebook governs.	Not about requests
`version`integer	Rulebook schema version, currently 1.	Not about requests
`spec`jsonb	Optional agreements.max_escrow_usd and counterparties_allow restrict preparation through the router; they do not enforce transactions sent elsewhere. Strict bounded rulebook: model and tool allow/deny names, lanes, an optional default privacy route (route_default) for requests that name no lane, cost and output caps, UTC windows, approval threshold, optional spend/request/denial/distinct-model circuit breakers and breach action, plus optional action and target allow/deny lists, separate action amount and count caps and an action approval threshold. Optional autonomy stores bounded rung requirements, spending multipliers and selected reset event kinds; it contains no prompt fields.Settings written by you or an operator. A strict schema excludes prompt and answer fields. Model and tool labels are owner-written identifiers of at most 160 characters; their contents are whatever the owner chooses to write.	Not about requests
`sha256`text	SHA-256 of the canonical rulebook JSON.	Not about requests
`killed`boolean	Whether the router refuses the next request under this rulebook.	Not about requests
`killed_at`timestamp with time zone	When the rulebook was killed, if it is killed.	Not about requests
`killed_reason`text	A principal-supplied reason of at most 160 characters, or fixed policy reason codes for an automatic kill, including breaker:<field> for circuit breakers.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the policy or kill state last changed.	Not about requests
`updated_by`text	The principal key hash or the agent key hash for an automatic kill.	Not about requests
`playbook_id`text	The playbook this key follows, or null. While set, spec and sha256 hold a copy of that playbook's current rules, rewritten in the same transaction as every playbook change; stopping following keeps the copy as the key's own rulebook.	Not about requests

agent_policy_eventsPer request · 10 columns · 2 reviewed

A per-key hash chain of rulebook decisions and policy, kill and resume changes. Decisions contain routing metadata, never prompts or answers.

How long: 90 days; the agent-policy-retention worker removes older events hourly when AGENT_POLICY_ENABLED is on and the worker runs this job. With the flag off or the worker absent, deletion waits. A retained suffix starts with its prior hash as a checkpoint. For active autonomy rulebooks, the latest autonomy_state checkpoint and following suffix remain until superseded or the rulebook is removed, even beyond 90 days, to preserve earned progress.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`bigserial	Monotonically allocated event identifier for pagination.	Per request
`key_hash`text	The key whose rulebook was evaluated or changed; parent decisions are recorded under the parent key.	Per request
`ts`timestamp with time zone	When the event was recorded, at millisecond precision.	Per request
`kind`text	action_decision and action_outcome (readable action/target identifiers, order digest and reported amounts), decision, breaker_request (one observation per policy admission batch with breakers), policy_set, killed, resumed, approval_requested, approval_approved, approval_denied or approval_used. Approval events are recorded under the requesting key. Removing a rulebook records policy_set with a null intent. Autonomy also records autonomy_clean once per allowed reservation or cache/tool authorization, autonomy_state for derived progress, and breaker for an agent breaker event.	Per request
`decision`text	allow, deny or approval_required for a decision; null for changes; breaker_request stores the batch decision.	Per request
`reasons`jsonb	Fixed reason codes and router-written messages; policy change events carry an empty list.Cannot hold request content. Only evaluator-defined codes and constant messages are stored. No request text or principal-written kill reason is copied into this field.	Per request
`intent`jsonb	Inference model, lane, estimated pico-USD cost, maximum output tokens and declared tool names; or an MCP tool name; action intents include a readable action and optional target (including recipient wallets or hosts), an amount and optional order digest, never full order details. Outcome events include the decision id, reported status and amount and whether it exceeded the requested amount. Approval and breaker_request events may contain an intents array for the full model set. Breaker counters read these routing identifiers and decisions; legacy decision events without a batch marker count individually. Resume resets breaker observations, leaving cap spend unchanged. Null for policy changes. An autonomy_state checkpoint stores only rung number, rung since timestamp, clean request count and last clean timestamp. Autonomy clean and breaker events have null intent; none stores prompt text.Settings written by you or an operator. Explicit metadata projection excludes messages, tool arguments, descriptions and answers. Model and tool identifiers are readable labels from the request or catalogue; a caller can choose what a declared tool name means.	Per request
`policy_sha256`text	Digest of the evaluated or changed rulebook.	Per request
`prev_hash`text	The previous retained chain head, or 64 zeros when no preceding event remains.	Per request
`hash`text	SHA-256 of prior hash bytes and canonical event fields excluding id, prev_hash and hash.	Per request

agent_profilesNot about requests · 4 columns · 2 reviewed

Opt-in public agent cards and an internal mapping to the owned key for updates, removal and selected live rulebook summaries.

How long: Until unpublish or deletion of the key. Profile updates replace settings and certificates. Database backups and copies made by public readers can outlive deletion.

Public: random slug, owner-written name, description, optional homepage, optional payout wallet, capability tags, only selected boolean rulebook categories, and selected router-issued certificates while signatures and expiry are valid. Publishing intentionally links certificate pseudonyms to this profile. The private key-hash mapping is never returned publicly; the router still knows it. Disabled or expired keys are hidden. No certificate or rulebook proves host sealing or hardware attestation, which is reported unavailable. User-written text can identify its owner. No inference prompt or answer is collected here.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`slug`text	Random 144-bit public identifier independent of the key hash; regenerated after unpublish and republish.	Not about requests
`key_hash`text	Internal unique key association for ownership checks and current opted-in policy categories; never returned in public cards.	Not about requests
`settings`jsonb	Validated public display name, short description, optional HTTP(S) homepage, optional HTTPS agent endpoint (probed daily for liveness when AGENT_IDENTITY_ENABLED is on), optional payout wallet that other agents pay directly in USDG, capability tags and selected rulebook categories.Settings written by you or an operator. Owner-supplied publication settings deliberately become public. They contain bounded text and chosen category names, never a copied private rulebook or automatic key identifiers.	Not about requests
`certificates`jsonb	Latest router-issued certificate for the selected key and chosen claims; replaced or cleared on each publication update.Cannot hold request content. Strict signed claim identifiers, fresh pseudonym, issuance and expiry times, signing key identifier and signature. Valid certificates are public; expired or invalid certificates stay stored until update or deletion but are not returned publicly.	Not about requests

agent_sessionsNot about requests · 11 columns · 1 reviewed

A short-lived sub-key for one agent run, with its own budget and expiry, so an agent's spending can be capped and ended.

How long: Ended sessions keep their row; a session ends at its expiry, when its budget is spent or when its owner ends it.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Session id.	Not about requests
`account_id`text	The account the session belongs to.	Not about requests
`parent_key_hash`text	The key that created the session.	Not about requests
`key_hash`text	The session's own key hash (a row in keys).	Not about requests
`name`text	A label the creator gave the session.	Not about requests
`budget`bigint	The session's spend cap in pico-USD; empty means only the parent key's limits apply.	Not about requests
`expires_at`timestamp with time zone	When the session ends by itself.	Not about requests
`ended_at`timestamp with time zone	When it ended.	Not about requests
`end_reason`text	ended, expired or budget.	Not about requests
`metadata`jsonb	Labels the creator attached to the session: up to 32 short string, number or boolean values, 2 KB in all.Settings written by you or an operator. checkMetadata refuses key names that look like prompt or completion text (such as prompt or messages), at most 32 keys, string values of at most 256 characters and 2,048 bytes in all. It cannot judge what a creator types into a value, so the text is whatever the creator wrote.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests

blind_keysNot about requests · 12 columns

Issuer keys for blind tokens (Privacy Pass): one per epoch and denomination. Nothing here links a buyer to a token.

How long: The private half is wiped when the epoch stops issuing; the public half stays so old tokens remain verifiable.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`key_id`text	The token key id: hex SHA-256 of the RFC 9578 public key info.	Not about requests
`epoch`integer	The epoch the key issues in.	Not about requests
`denomination`integer	Token units a token from this key is worth.	Not about requests
`unit_price`bigint	Pico-USD per token unit, fixed when the key is made.	Not about requests
`spki`text	The public key, base64url.	Not about requests
`private_enc`text	The private key, AES-GCM encrypted with APP_SECRET. Null once the key no longer issues.	Not about requests
`valid_from`timestamp with time zone	When the key started.	Not about requests
`issue_until`timestamp with time zone	When it stops signing new tokens.	Not about requests
`redeem_until`timestamp with time zone	When tokens from it stop being accepted.	Not about requests
`revoked_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was revoked, if it was.	Not about requests
`issued`bigint	How many tokens were signed: a count and nothing else.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests

blind_nullifiersPer request · 6 columns

Spent blind tokens, one row per token including each member of a request set reserved atomically. A row holds the SHA-256 of a token so it cannot be spent twice; the issuer cannot connect that hash to the blinded request it signed.

How long: A reservation is deleted if the request fails before anything is served; spent rows are kept so a token cannot be replayed.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`nullifier`text	SHA-256 of the token.	Per request
`key_id`text	The issuer key that signed it.	Per request
`status`text	reserved while a request runs, spent once served.	Per request
`reserved_at`timestamp with time zone	When the token was reserved.	Per request
`spent_at`timestamp with time zone	When the request it paid for was served.	Per request
`generation_id`text	The generation the token paid for; all members of a set share it, linking those redeemed tokens to the same request but never to a purchase.	Per request

byok_keysNot about requests · 6 columns

A provider API key an account brought so calls to that provider use its own account there. Stored encrypted; only the router can decrypt it, to make calls for that account.

How long: Kept until the owner deletes it (DELETE /api/v1/byok/:provider removes the row).

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Row number, counting up from 1.	Not about requests
`account_id`text	The account that brought the key.	Not about requests
`provider_id`text	The provider the key is for.	Not about requests
`key_enc`text	The provider key, AES-256-GCM encrypted with the router's APP_SECRET.	Not about requests
`label`text	A masked label so the owner can tell keys apart.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests

key_topupsSummed from requests · 14 columns

One row per auto top-up of a key's limit, and one per top-up the router skipped and why (once per key, reason, limit and week). No money moves: the limit is an allowance on the account's own balance. Activity and the inbox show these rows.

How long: No automatic deletion, and rows are never changed after they are written.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Random record id.	Summed from requests
`ref`text	What triggered it: settle:<hold id> after a debit, reserve:<request id> when the key's limit would refuse a request, or skip:<key hash>:<reason>:<limit>:<week> for a skipped top-up. Unique, so each is recorded once.	Summed from requests
`key_hash`text	The key whose limit was raised.	Summed from requests
`account_id`text	The account the key belongs to.	Summed from requests
`outcome`text	added, skipped_balance (the account's available credits did not cover the key's allowance after it), skipped_weekly (the rule's weekly maximum) or skipped_org_budget (the team's org budget).	Summed from requests
`amount_pico`bigint	The rule's top-up amount in pico-USD.	Summed from requests
`limit_before_pico`bigint	The key's limit before, in pico-USD.	Summed from requests
`limit_after_pico`bigint	The key's limit after; the same as before when skipped.	Summed from requests
`spent_pico`bigint	The key's spend counted against its limit when checked, in pico-USD.	Summed from requests
`available_pico`bigint	The account's balance minus open holds when checked, in pico-USD.	Summed from requests
`week_start`timestamp with time zone	UTC Monday 00:00 of the week the top-up counts in.	Summed from requests
`week_total_pico`bigint	Top-ups added to the key that week, including this one when added, in pico-USD.	Summed from requests
`max_per_week_pico`bigint	The rule's weekly maximum, in pico-USD.	Summed from requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Summed from requests

keysNot about requests · 28 columns · 5 reviewed

One row per API key. The secret is never stored: the row holds its SHA-256 and a masked label. It also holds the key's limits, budget and spend.

How long: Deleting a key only disables it (DELETE /api/v1/keys/:hash sets disabled); the row stays because generations and balances refer to it.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`key_hash`text	SHA-256 of the key's secret. The secret itself is never stored.	Not about requests
`chain_key_hash`text	keccak256 of the address derived from the secret, the id the on-chain contracts use for the key.	Not about requests
`key_address`text	The blockchain address derived from the key's secret. It is public on chain when the key is funded.A wallet address, not a network address. A blockchain address derived from the key, not a network address of a caller.	Not about requests
`account_id`text	The account the key belongs to.	Not about requests
`parent_hash`text	For a key made from another key (an agent session), the parent's key hash.	Not about requests
`name`text	The label the owner gave the key.	Not about requests
`label`text	A masked display form of the key, such as sk-ar-v1-abcd...wxyz: the first and last few characters only.	Not about requests
`budget`bigint	The key's spend limit in pico-USD. Empty means unlimited.	Not about requests
`budget_reset`text	How often the budget resets: daily, weekly or monthly, or never.	Not about requests
`period_start`timestamp with time zone	When the current budget period began.	Not about requests
`spent`bigint	Spend in the current budget period, in pico-USD.	Summed from requests
`spent_total`bigint	All-time spend of the key, in pico-USD.	Summed from requests
`rpm`integer	Requests-per-minute limit for the key.	Not about requests
`tpm`integer	Tokens-per-minute limit for the key.	Not about requests
`team_id`text	The team the key belongs to, when it has one.	Not about requests
`allowed_models`text[]	If set, the only models the key may call.	Not about requests
`pay_with_default`text	The Stock Token symbol the key pays with by default.	Not about requests
`scope`text	Null keeps account access; inference permits model calls and this key’s own generation and receipt reads only.	Not about requests
`include_byok_in_limit`boolean	Stored compatibility selection. Provider-side BYOK expenditure is not tracked; usage counts router-billed charges once.	Not about requests
`management`boolean	Whether the key may manage other keys.	Not about requests
`routing`jsonb	Imported routing presets: model aliases and default provider preferences the owner set for this key.Settings written by you or an operator. Routing settings written by the key's owner and validated as aliases and provider preferences; there is no field for message text.	Not about requests
`guardrails`jsonb	The key's input guardrails: PII mode, phrases to block, a maximum input length and whether to redact output.Settings written by you or an operator. The owner's filter settings. Deny phrases are words the owner wants blocked (up to 50 of 200 characters); they are rules, not requests.	Not about requests
`tracing`jsonb	Where the key's owner asked for traces of this key's public-lane calls to go (their own OpenTelemetry collector, Langfuse or Helicone), and whether to include prompt and completion text. The destination URL and credentials are AES-256-GCM encrypted with APP_SECRET and never returned by the API.Settings written by you or an operator. Destination settings written by the key's owner: a type, flags, a masked host, header names and one sealed string. The schema has no field for message text; content is only ever sent to the owner's destination, never stored here.	Not about requests
`topup`jsonb	The key's auto top-up rule, or empty: below_usd, add_usd and max_per_week_usd. When the key has less than below_usd of its limit left, the router raises the limit by add_usd from the account's own credits, at most max_per_week_usd per UTC week.Settings written by you or an operator. Three numbers written by the key's owner and checked against a strict schema; there is no field for text.	Not about requests
`disabled`boolean	Whether the key is turned off.	Not about requests
`expires_at`timestamp with time zone	When the key stops working, if it expires.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests
`last_used`timestamp with time zone	When the key last made a call.	Per request

ohttp_keysNot about requests · 11 columns

Oblivious HTTP gateway keys, one per epoch. Their public halves are published; each private half is destroyed when its epoch's window ends.

How long: The private half is destroyed when the epoch's acceptance window ends, after which recorded traffic for that epoch can no longer be opened. The public half stays.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`epoch`integer	The key's epoch.	Not about requests
`key_id`integer	The 8-bit key identifier of the key configuration (epoch mod 256).	Not about requests
`kem_id`integer	The HPKE KEM identifier.	Not about requests
`public_key`text	The public key, base64url.	Not about requests
`config`text	The encoded key configuration (RFC 9458), base64url.	Not about requests
`config_sha256`text	SHA-256 of that configuration.	Not about requests
`private_enc`text	The private key, AES-GCM encrypted with APP_SECRET. Null once destroyed.	Not about requests
`valid_from`timestamp with time zone	When the key starts to be used.	Not about requests
`accept_until`timestamp with time zone	Requests to this key are opened until here.	Not about requests
`revoked_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was revoked, if it was.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests

playbook_changesNot about requests · 13 columns · 1 reviewed

A record of every playbook change (create, update, rename, delete) with its version, digest, rules and the number of keys following it; changes to a team's playbooks also appear in the team inbox.

How long: Rows remain until operator deletion, including after the playbook is deleted.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`bigserial	Monotonically allocated change identifier.	Not about requests
`playbook_id`text	The playbook changed; kept after the playbook is deleted.	Not about requests
`account_id`text	The owning account.	Not about requests
`team_id`text	The owning team, or null for an account-wide playbook.	Not about requests
`name`text	The playbook's name after this change.	Not about requests
`action`text	create, update (new rules and version), rename or delete.	Not about requests
`version`integer	The playbook's version after this change.	Not about requests
`sha256`text	SHA-256 of the canonical rules after this change.	Not about requests
`spec`jsonb	The rules as of this change, so each recorded digest can be checked.Settings written by you or an operator. A copy of a playbook's strict rulebook: owner-written configuration validated against a schema that excludes prompt and answer fields.	Not about requests
`followers`integer	How many keys followed the playbook when it changed.	Not about requests
`actor`text	Hash of the principal key that made the change.	Not about requests
`notify`boolean	Whether the change belongs to a team (a team playbook, or an account-wide one in an account with teams); updates marked so appear in the inbox of the team's owners and admins.	Not about requests
`at`timestamp with time zone	When the change was recorded, at millisecond precision.	Not about requests

playbooksNot about requests · 10 columns · 1 reviewed

Shared rulebooks (playbooks): one named rulebook that many keys of an account or team follow, so one change applies to all of them.

How long: Until a principal deletes the playbook. Deleting is refused while keys follow it unless they each keep its rules as their own.

The rules are the same strict rulebook as agent_policies.spec and carry the same owner-written labels. The name is owner-written text of at most 100 characters. No prompt or answer fields are accepted.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Random playbook identifier.	Not about requests
`account_id`text	The account that owns the playbook.	Not about requests
`team_id`text	The team whose owners and admins may change it, or null for an account-wide playbook that only management keys change.	Not about requests
`name`text	Owner-chosen name, unique within the account regardless of case.	Not about requests
`spec`jsonb	The playbook's current rulebook, validated by the same strict schema as a key's own rulebook.Settings written by you or an operator. The strict rulebook schema excludes prompt and answer fields. Model, tool and action labels are owner-written identifiers of at most 160 characters; their contents are whatever the owner chooses to write.	Not about requests
`sha256`text	SHA-256 of the canonical rulebook JSON, the same digest each following key's rulebook carries.	Not about requests
`version`integer	Counts rule changes: 1 at creation, plus one for each change of rules. A rename keeps it.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the playbook was created.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When its name or rules last changed.	Not about requests
`updated_by`text	Hash of the principal key that made the last change.	Not about requests

team_auditNot about requests · 9 columns · 1 reviewed

A team's audit log: who changed members, keys, budgets, presets, routes and lane settings, and when. Each entry is hash-chained to the one before it, so an export can be checked offline (scripts/verify-audit.mjs). It records settings changes only, never what anyone asked a model.

How long: No automatic deletion, and rows are never changed after they are written. A database trigger rejects UPDATE and DELETE.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`team_id`text	The team.	Not about requests
`seq`integer	The entry's position in the team's chain: 1, 2, 3, ...	Not about requests
`at`timestamp with time zone	When the change was made.	Not about requests
`actor`text	Who made it: key:<first 16 hex digits of the key hash>, passkey:<member id> or wallet:<address>.	Not about requests
`action`text	What changed, such as member.join, key.create, budget.set, preset.save or route.update.	Not about requests
`target`text	What it changed: a key hash, member id, invite hash prefix, preset or route name.	Not about requests
`detail`jsonb	A few fixed fields about the change: a role, a limit, a lane, a version and hash, the names of the fields that changed.Settings written by you or an operator. Fields chosen by the router for each action (src/teams/audit.ts, src/api/teams.ts): no free text from a call, and for presets only the version, hash and lane, never the system prompt.	Not about requests
`prev_hash`text	The previous entry's hash (64 zeros for the first entry).	Not about requests
`hash`text	sha256(prev_hash bytes \|\| canonical JSON of the entry).	Not about requests

team_membersNot about requests · 5 columns

Which keys are in which team and their role.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`team_id`text	The team.	Not about requests
`key_hash`text	The member key's hash.	Not about requests
`role`text	owner, admin, dev, viewer or agent (member is the older default).	Not about requests
`principal_id`text	For a key issued when a member signed in with a passkey or wallet, that member (team_principals.id).	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests

team_principalsNot about requests · 11 columns

Members of a team who sign in without an API key: a passkey (WebAuthn) or a wallet. There is no email, name or device information: a passkey row holds only its credential id and public key (attestation is not requested), a wallet row only its address.

How long: Kept while the team exists; revoking a member disables the row and the keys issued to it.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Member id (tp_...).	Not about requests
`team_id`text	The team.	Not about requests
`kind`text	passkey or wallet.	Not about requests
`subject`text	For a passkey, its credential id (random bytes the authenticator chose, base64url); for a wallet, its address.	Not about requests
`public_key`text	The passkey's public key (COSE, base64url). It can check signatures, not make them.	Not about requests
`alg`integer	The passkey's signature algorithm: -7 ES256, -8 EdDSA or -257 RS256.	Not about requests
`sign_count`bigint	The passkey's signature counter, so a cloned authenticator is noticed.	Not about requests
`role`text	The member's role: owner (the bound owner wallet), admin, dev or viewer.	Not about requests
`disabled`boolean	Whether the member was revoked.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests
`last_used`timestamp with time zone	When the member last signed in.	Not about requests

teamsNot about requests · 8 columns · 1 reviewed

A team, also called an organisation: a named group of keys under one owning account, optionally bound to a wallet or a Safe, with an optional org budget.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Team id.	Not about requests
`name`text	The team's name, chosen by its owner.	Not about requests
`owner_account`text	The account that owns the team.	Not about requests
`owner_address`text	The wallet or Safe that owns the team, once it signed a one-time message (checked by recovery for a wallet, by EIP-1271 isValidSignature for a contract wallet). Empty until one is bound.A wallet address, not a network address. A blockchain address the owner chose to bind, not a network address of a caller.	Not about requests
`owner_kind`text	account (no wallet bound), eoa (a wallet) or contract (a Safe or another smart wallet).	Not about requests
`owner_verified_at`timestamp with time zone	When the owner's wallet signature was checked.	Not about requests
`budget`bigint	The org budget in pico-USD: a cap on the sum of the limits of the team's keys. Empty means no cap.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests

Providers & attestation

The provider registry and model catalogue, attestation results, measurements, disclosure profiles and the day-zero model lane.

attestation_eventsNot about requests · 14 columns · 3 reviewed

The public proof-time record: one row per attestor run, canary run or change of the health probe's outcome.

How long: Rows older than ATTESTATION_HISTORY_DAYS (default 30) are pruned by the attestor job (pruneAttestationEvents); 0 turns recording off.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`serial	Row number, counting up from 1.	Not about requests
`provider_id`text	The provider.	Not about requests
`kind`text	attestation, canary or probe.	Not about requests
`ts`timestamp with time zone	When it happened.	Not about requests
`ok`boolean	Whether it passed.	Not about requests
`reason`text	A failure code from a fixed list, empty when it passed.	Not about requests
`simulated`boolean	Whether the evidence came from development mode; never counts as a fresh attestation.	Not about requests
`tee_kind`text	The hardware type.	Not about requests
`attestation_hash`text	The report hash of a passing run.	Not about requests
`tls_spki_sha256`text	SHA-256 of the certificate key the connection was pinned to, when pinned.	Not about requests
`measurements`jsonb	Digests and hardware registers of a passing run.Cannot hold request content. Only digests (image, compose, model) and register values; the table's comment states nothing raw from the provider is stored.	Not about requests
`measurement_changed`boolean	Whether the measurement differs from the previous passing run.	Not about requests
`verifiers`jsonb	The names of the verifiers that accepted the quote.Cannot hold request content. A list of verifier names configured by the operator.	Not about requests
`detail`jsonb	Further check results as codes and numbers.Cannot hold request content. Written by the attestation-events code from fixed fields; the table's comment states nothing raw from the provider is stored.	Not about requests

attestationsNot about requests · 9 columns · 2 reviewed

The result of each attestation run against a provider: whether it passed, the report hash and the measurements it committed to.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`serial	Row number, counting up from 1.	Not about requests
`provider_id`text	The provider.	Not about requests
`ts`timestamp with time zone	When the run happened.	Not about requests
`ok`boolean	Whether it passed.	Not about requests
`tee_kind`text	The hardware type.	Not about requests
`report_hash`text	Hash of the report.	Not about requests
`nonce`text	The fresh nonce the router sent to prove the report was made for this run.	Not about requests
`measurements`jsonb	The image, compose and model digests and hardware registers the report committed to.Cannot hold request content. Digests and register values taken from a verified report.	Not about requests
`detail`jsonb	Why a run failed, or which verifiers accepted it, with the signing address and classifier flag, as short strings and flags written by the attestor.Cannot hold request content. Written by attestProvider about a report the router fetched with a fresh nonce. An attestation run starts from the router's schedule, so no caller's request can reach this column.	Not about requests

canariesNot about requests · 8 columns · 1 reviewed

Results of quantisation checks: known prompts sent to a provider to see whether it serves the precision it declares. Made from fixed prompts the router wrote itself, not from any customer request.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`model_id`text	The model checked.	Not about requests
`provider_id`text	The provider checked.	Not about requests
`ts`timestamp with time zone	When the check ran.	Not about requests
`quant_match`boolean	Whether the result matched the declared precision.	Not about requests
`quant_guess`text	The precision the result looks like.	Not about requests
`distance`real	How far the result was from the reference.	Not about requests
`quality`real	A quality score for the result.	Not about requests
`detail`jsonb	The check's accuracy, how many prompts were answered, the declared precision and the fingerprint length.Cannot hold request content. Numbers and the declared precision written by runCanaries (accuracy, answered, declared, logprobs, fingerprint_tokens); the canary prompts are the router's own.	Not about requests

canary_referencesNot about requests · 5 columns · 1 reviewed

The reference fingerprint of a model at each precision, which canary results are compared to.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`model_id`text	The model.	Not about requests
`quant`text	The precision the fingerprint is for: bf16, fp8, int4 and so on.	Not about requests
`fingerprint`jsonb	The model's output fingerprint at that precision for the router's own canary prompts.Cannot hold request content. A model-behaviour fingerprint (token probabilities on the router's own fixed prompts), not a device or network fingerprint and not a customer request.	Not about requests
`source`text	Where the reference came from.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests

lane_candidatesNot about requests · 18 columns · 2 reviewed

New open-weights uploads found on Hugging Face that derive from an approved base model, with their evaluation status.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`serial	Row number, counting up from 1.	Not about requests
`hf_repo`text	The repository.	Not about requests
`base_model`text	The base model.	Not about requests
`revision`text	The revision seen at discovery.	Not about requests
`license`text	The licence.	Not about requests
`variant`text	The variant.	Not about requests
`creator_handle`text	The uploader's handle.	Not about requests
`status`text	discovered, rejected, evaluated, failed, approved or servable.	Not about requests
`reason`text	Why a candidate was rejected.	Not about requests
`model_id`text	The catalogue model id it is served under.	Not about requests
`endpoint_provider`text	The provider whose offer for the model is evaluated.A public address, not a caller's. A provider slug (a short name such as deepinfra), not a network address.	Not about requests
`source_created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the repository was created.	Not about requests
`approved_by`text	Who approved it.	Not about requests
`approved_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was approved.	Not about requests
`approval_note`text	A note written by the approving operator.Settings written by you or an operator. Free text written by an operator when approving a candidate; not derived from any request.	Not about requests
`servable_at`timestamp with time zone	When it became servable.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Not about requests

lane_claimsNot about requests · 11 columns · 1 reviewed

Creator royalty claims: the router issues a challenge, the uploader publishes it in their Hugging Face repository, and the router checks it.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Claim id.	Not about requests
`model_id`text	The model.	Not about requests
`hf_repo`text	The repository.	Not about requests
`handle`text	The uploader's Hugging Face handle.	Not about requests
`address`text	The wallet address royalties are to be sent to.A wallet address, not a network address. A blockchain wallet address supplied by the creator, not a network address.	Not about requests
`challenge`text	The challenge text the uploader must publish.	Not about requests
`status`text	pending or verified.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests
`expires_at`timestamp with time zone	When the challenge expires.	Not about requests
`verified_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was verified.	Not about requests
`onchain_tx`text	The transaction that recorded the claim.	Not about requests

lane_evalsNot about requests · 11 columns · 1 reviewed

One row per evaluation run of a candidate endpoint: refusal rate, capability score and canary accuracy. Made from fixed prompts the router wrote itself, not from any customer request.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`serial	Row number, counting up from 1.	Not about requests
`candidate_id`integer	The candidate evaluated.	Not about requests
`ts`timestamp with time zone	When it ran.	Not about requests
`provider_id`text	The provider evaluated.	Not about requests
`model_id`text	The model evaluated.	Not about requests
`refusal_rate`real	Share of the benign probe prompts that were refused.	Not about requests
`capability_score`real	Share of the exact-check prompts answered correctly.	Not about requests
`canary_accuracy`real	The canary exact-match score.	Not about requests
`canary_quant_match`boolean	Whether the canary matched the declared precision.	Not about requests
`passed`boolean	Whether the candidate passed.	Not about requests
`detail`jsonb	Scores and counts for the run.Cannot hold request content. Numbers written by the evaluation code; the prompts used are the router's own fixed sets.	Not about requests

measurement_bundlesNot about requests · 21 columns · 3 reviewed

Signed measurement bundles: what a provider's measurement is made of, signed with the measurement key, recorded in a public log and verified by the router.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`serial	Row number, counting up from 1.	Not about requests
`provider_id`text	The provider.	Not about requests
`compose_hash`text	The deployment hash the bundle describes.	Not about requests
`bundle_digest`text	SHA-256 of the canonical bundle bytes.	Not about requests
`bundle`jsonb	The bundle itself: the components a measurement is made of.Cannot hold request content. A signed, canonical bundle of digests and component names that an operator hands over and the router verifies.	Not about requests
`signature`text	The bundle's signature, base64.	Not about requests
`signer_key_id`text	SHA-256 of the signer's public key info.	Not about requests
`status`text	pending, verified or rejected.	Not about requests
`rekor_uuid`text	The public-log entry id.	Not about requests
`rekor_entry`text	The entry hash inside that id.	Not about requests
`rekor_log_index`bigint	The entry's index in the public log.	Not about requests
`rekor_integrated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the public log integrated it.	Not about requests
`rekor_entry_json`jsonb	The public-log entry as the log returned it.Cannot hold request content. The response of a public transparency log for the bundle's entry (body, proof, signed timestamp).	Not about requests
`rekor_inclusion_verified`boolean	Whether the inclusion proof verified.	Not about requests
`rekor_checkpoint_verified`boolean	Whether the log's checkpoint signature verified.	Not about requests
`rekor_set_verified`boolean	Whether the signed entry timestamp verified.	Not about requests
`checked_at`timestamp with time zone	When the log was last checked.	Not about requests
`verified_at`timestamp with time zone	When the bundle verified.	Not about requests
`error`text	Why the bundle was rejected or could not be checked.Cannot hold request content. An error string produced while verifying a bundle and its public-log entry; nothing in that check involves a caller's request.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Not about requests

measurementsNot about requests · 32 columns · 1 reviewed

The image, compose and model digests a provider's confidential endpoint has been seen running, each bound into a hardware quote a verifier accepted, with whether the digest was found in a public log.

How long: History is kept: a superseded measurement gets superseded_at and stays.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`serial	Row number, counting up from 1.	Not about requests
`provider_id`text	The provider.	Not about requests
`image_digest`text	The container image digest.	Not about requests
`compose_hash`text	The hash of the deployment definition.	Not about requests
`model_digest`text	The digest of the model weights.	Not about requests
`status`text	observed, ready, registered or revoked.	Not about requests
`verifier`text	Which verifiers accepted the quote, comma separated.	Not about requests
`tee_kind`text	The hardware type.	Not about requests
`quote`text	The verified hardware quote, hex.	Not about requests
`quote_proof_hash`text	keccak256 of the quote bytes.	Not about requests
`report_hash`text	The attestation report hash that produced the row.	Not about requests
`attested_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was attested.	Not about requests
`last_seen_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was last seen.	Not about requests
`rekor_uuid`text	The public-log entry id, when found.	Not about requests
`rekor_entry`text	The entry hash inside that id.	Not about requests
`rekor_log_index`bigint	The entry's index in the public log.	Not about requests
`rekor_kind`text	The entry type.	Not about requests
`rekor_integrated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the public log integrated it.	Not about requests
`rekor_inclusion_verified`boolean	Whether the inclusion proof verified.	Not about requests
`rekor_checkpoint_verified`boolean	Whether the log's checkpoint signature verified.	Not about requests
`rekor_checked_at`timestamp with time zone	When the public log was last checked.	Not about requests
`rekor_error`text	The last error from checking the public log, as a short code or message.Cannot hold request content. An error string produced while looking up a public log entry; nothing in this lookup involves a caller's request.	Not about requests
`calldata`text	Prepared registry call data, when built.	Not about requests
`calldata_target`text	The registry contract it is for.	Not about requests
`calldata_built_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was built.	Not about requests
`tx_hash`text	The registering transaction.	Not about requests
`registered_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was registered.	Not about requests
`revoked_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was revoked.	Not about requests
`superseded_at`timestamp with time zone	When a later verified quote committed to other digests.	Not about requests
`superseded_by`integer	The row that replaced this one.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Not about requests

modelsNot about requests · 12 columns · 2 reviewed

The model catalogue: id, name, context length, modalities and creator.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Model id, author/slug.	Not about requests
`author`text	The author part of the id.	Not about requests
`name`text	Display name.	Not about requests
`description`text	A short description of the model, from the provider listing or an operator.Settings written by you or an operator. Descriptive text about a model from provider listings; it is catalogue data, not a request.	Not about requests
`ctx`integer	Context length in tokens.	Not about requests
`max_out`integer	Maximum output tokens.	Not about requests
`arch`jsonb	Modality, input and output modalities, tokenizer and instruction type.Cannot hold request content. Fixed catalogue fields about the model: modality, input_modalities, output_modalities, tokenizer, instruct_type.	Not about requests
`hf_repo`text	The Hugging Face repository the weights come from, when known.	Not about requests
`creator`text	The creator's payout address, when known.	Not about requests
`royalty_bps`integer	The creator's royalty in basis points.	Not about requests
`created_unix`integer	When the model was created, in Unix seconds.	Not about requests
`hidden`boolean	Whether the model is hidden from listings.	Not about requests

models_laneNot about requests · 10 columns

Per-model metadata for open-weights variants: which lane a model can be served on, its base model, licence and weights source.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`model_id`text	The model.	Not about requests
`variant`text	mainstream, native_low_refusal or abliterated.	Not about requests
`status`text	servable or candidate (not approved for serving).	Not about requests
`base_model`text	The model it derives from.	Not about requests
`license`text	The licence identifier from the weights' model card.	Not about requests
`weights_source`text	Where the weights come from.	Not about requests
`weights_revision`text	The commit the weights were taken from.	Not about requests
`weights_digest`text	SHA-256 of the weights manifest, when there is one.	Not about requests
`creator_handle`text	The uploader's Hugging Face handle.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Not about requests

offersNot about requests · 19 columns · 1 reviewed

What one provider charges to serve one model, and the model's features at that provider.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`model_id`text	The model.	Not about requests
`provider_id`text	The provider.	Not about requests
`provider_model_id`text	The id the provider uses for the model.	Not about requests
`price_prompt`bigint	Pico-USD per prompt token.	Not about requests
`price_completion`bigint	Pico-USD per completion token.	Not about requests
`price_request`bigint	Pico-USD per request.	Not about requests
`price_image`bigint	Pico-USD per image.	Not about requests
`price_web_search`bigint	Pico-USD per web search.	Not about requests
`price_reasoning`bigint	Pico-USD per reasoning token.	Not about requests
`price_cache_read`bigint	Pico-USD per cached prompt token.	Not about requests
`price_cache_write`bigint	Pico-USD per token written to cache.	Not about requests
`quant`text	Quantisation, such as fp8, or unknown.	Not about requests
`ctx`integer	Context length at this provider.	Not about requests
`max_out`integer	Maximum output tokens at this provider.	Not about requests
`supported_parameters`text[]	Request parameters the provider supports.	Not about requests
`features`jsonb	Feature flags such as tools or json mode.Cannot hold request content. Feature flags and limits read from the provider's model listing; about the offer, not any request.	Not about requests
`is_moderated`boolean	Whether the provider moderates content.	Not about requests
`status`text	live, shadow or disabled.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Not about requests

provider_disclosureNot about requests · 8 columns · 2 reviewed

What a provider says, and can prove, about how it handles a prompt: retention, jurisdiction, legal hold and training use, each with a source and a date. Curated by an operator, or retention alone set after network sidecar attestation and signed host policy verification; nothing here comes from traffic.

How long: Kept and replaced in place when an operator updates a provider's profile or a network host passes admission or scheduled policy renewal; removed on network rejection.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`provider_id`text	The provider.	Not about requests
`retention`text	attested, policy or logs (the most conservative when there is no row).	Not about requests
`jurisdiction`text	The provider's jurisdiction, or unknown.	Not about requests
`legal_hold`boolean	Whether a legal hold is declared; empty means not declared.	Not about requests
`legal_hold_note`text	A note on the legal hold, written by an operator.Settings written by you or an operator. Free text written by an operator about a provider's declared legal hold; it is not derived from any request.	Not about requests
`training_use`text	none, opt_in, yes or unknown.	Not about requests
`claims`jsonb	For each stated value, the document it comes from and its date.Cannot hold request content. A map of claim name to { source, as_of } written by an operator. Network admission and scheduled renewal record only retention with the checked host policy version and current time; the host dashboard reads this version and time to describe current build approval without storing another record; jurisdiction, legal hold and training use remain undeclared.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Not about requests

providersNot about requests · 29 columns · 9 reviewed

The provider registry: each upstream that serves models, how to reach it, its status, whether its software is attested, and its bond and payout details.

How long: Kept while the provider is listed; a provider that leaves is delisted (status), not deleted.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`network_host`boolean	Whether this provider was created by wallet-authenticated self-serve network signup; false for existing providers.Settings written by you or an operator. A boolean indicating the admission path, despite its network-related name. It cannot contain an address or any text.	Not about requests
`network_models`text[]	One to eight distinct requested model IDs supplied by the wallet operator, retained for network admission and re-application; separate from priced catalogue entries.	Not about requests
`network_reasons`jsonb	Current admission or scheduled renewal refusal reasons, returned publicly by the network status and host dashboard APIs.Cannot hold request content. Admission and scheduled renewal write policy and screening explanations and attestor failure messages about operator-supplied endpoints and model IDs. No inference body, key or contact is included; endpoint failure messages may name the host server.	Not about requests
`id`text	Provider slug, such as deepinfra.	Not about requests
`name`text	Display name.	Not about requests
`base_url`text	The provider's API address that the router calls.A public address, not a caller's. The address of a provider's server, set by the operator. It is not a caller's address.	Not about requests
`api_key_enc`text	The router's own key at that provider, AES-256-GCM encrypted with APP_SECRET.	Not about requests
`kind`text	openai for a standard API, tee for an attested endpoint, sidecar for a network host.	Not about requests
`headers`jsonb	Extra HTTP headers the router sends to that provider on every call, usually credentials. Stored only as one AES-GCM ciphertext under the router's APP_SECRET.Settings written by you or an operator. Fixed headers the provider's operator supplied in its application, stored encrypted (encrypted_v1). Nothing from a caller's request is ever written to it.	Not about requests
`data_policy`jsonb	What the provider says about training on prompts, retaining them, retention days and zero-data-retention, as entered by the operator or the provider.Cannot hold request content. Fixed fields (training, retains_prompts, retention_days, zdr, moderated) validated on entry; about the provider's policy, not about any request.	Not about requests
`datacenter`text[]	Regions the provider lists.	Not about requests
`attested`boolean	Whether the provider's last verified attestation passed.	Not about requests
`attestation_url`text	Where the provider publishes its attestation report.A public address, not a caller's. The address of a report on a provider's server, set by the operator.	Not about requests
`attestation_hash`text	Hash of the last attestation report the router verified.	Not about requests
`attested_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was verified.	Not about requests
`tee_kind`text	The hardware type: tdx, snp, nvidia-cc, tinfoil or dev.	Not about requests
`classifier_enabled`boolean	Whether the last verified attestation reported the in-enclave hard-block classifier as enabled.	Not about requests
`bond_usdg`bigint	The provider's bond in USDG base units.	Not about requests
`anyr_stake`bigint	The provider's $ANYR stake in base units.	Not about requests
`operator`text	The operator's name.	Not about requests
`payout_mode`text	invoice or usdg.	Not about requests
`payout_address`text	The wallet address payouts go to, when the provider is paid in USDG.A wallet address, not a network address. A blockchain wallet address for payouts, not a network address of a caller.	Not about requests
`status`text	applied, shadow, live, suspended or delisted; network signup uses pending, probation or rejected.	Not about requests
`shadow_until`timestamp with time zone	When a shadow provider is due to be considered for live, or the end of a network host probation period.	Not about requests
`timeout_ms`integer	Request timeout for this provider.	Not about requests
`static_models`jsonb	A model list with prices for providers whose own listing lacks pricing, or network probation offers copied from the signed policy for requested quote-bound model IDs. Rejection clears this list and disables retained offers.Cannot hold request content. A list of model IDs, catalogue slugs, names, optional Hugging Face IDs and quantization, prices, token limits and text modalities entered by an operator and checked before it is applied. Network admission copies these terms only after published-policy signature and hardware quote binding verification.	Not about requests
`contact`text	A contact for the provider's operator, as given in the provider application.Settings written by you or an operator. A contact detail for the provider's operator, given by the operator in a provider application. It is not about callers.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Not about requests

Chain

Blockchain events the router has read, escrow deposits, pay-with sessions and swaps, provider payouts and slashes.

agent_paymentsPer request · 24 columns · 1 reviewed

One row per allowed pay.agent decision: who asked, the recipient wallet and amount Agent Guard allowed, and, once confirmed, the USDG transfer found on Robinhood Chain and the signed payment receipt. Anyroute never holds or moves this money; no balance changes. Disabled unless AGENT_PAY_ENABLED.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table. The status changes from seen to final at the chain's finality point, or to reversed if the transfer leaves the canonical chain within ESCROW_REORG_HORIZON_BLOCKS.

Recipient and payer wallets and the transaction are public on chain and can be correlated with the agent key that asked. Paying a public profile id also stores that profile and its key hash, so the recipient's owner sees the payment in their inbox. An optional memo is accepted only as a SHA-256 digest; the memo itself is never sent to the router.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`decision_id`text	The Agent Guard decision (agent_action_decisions.id) this payment belongs to; random, not a credential.	Per request
`key_hash`text	Hash of the paying agent key; only that key confirms the payment.	Per request
`account_id`text	Account of the paying key, whose linked wallets may send the transfer.	Per request
`policy_sha256`text	Digest of the rulebook (or sorted rulebook digests) the decision was made under.	Per request
`recipient_profile`text	Public profile id that was paid, or that publishes the paid wallet; null for a wallet with no single profile.	Per request
`recipient_key_hash`text	Key hash behind that profile, used only to show the payment in its owner's inbox; never returned publicly.	Per request
`recipient_wallet`text	Lowercase 0x wallet that receives the USDG.	Per request
`amount_units`numeric(78, 0)	Allowed amount in USDG base units (6 decimals).	Per request
`memo_sha256`text	Optional SHA-256 digest of the payer's memo; the memo is not stored.	Per request
`status`text	awaiting_transfer, seen (waiting for finality), final or reversed.	Per request
`status_at`timestamp with time zone	When the status last changed.	Per request
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Per request
`tx_hash`text	The confirming Robinhood Chain transaction (public); unique with its log index.	Per request
`log_index`integer	Log index of the USDG Transfer that pays the decision.	Per request
`block_number`bigint	Block of that transfer.	Per request
`block_hash`text	Canonical hash of that block when last checked.	Per request
`payer_wallet`text	Linked wallet the USDG was sent from.	Per request
`paid_units`numeric(78, 0)	USDG base units actually transferred; counted against the daily action limit.	Per request
`verified_at`timestamp with time zone	When the router first verified the transfer.	Per request
`checked_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was last re-verified.	Per request
`reason`text	Fixed reason text when a payment is reversed.	Per request
`receipt`jsonb	The signed payment receipt payload (anyroute.agent.payment.v1): decision, rulebook digest, payer, recipient, amounts, chain, transaction, block and status.Cannot hold request content. Canonical JSON built by src/agents/pay.ts from the fields of this row; wallets, hashes, amounts and fixed codes only, no request or answer text.	Per request
`receipt_sig`text	Ed25519 signature over the canonical receipt, by the router's receipt key; re-signed on each status change.	Per request
`receipt_key_id`text	Id of the receipt key that signed it.	Per request

agreement_cursorNot about requests · 5 columns · 1 reviewed

Finality-aware resumable agreement event cursor and cross-worker serialization lock.

How long: Public chain journal and projections remain until the operator removes the agreement index. Orphaned events and projections are removed and replayed on reorganization.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`scope`text	Chain id, configured escrow and oracle addresses; isolates deployments.	Not about requests
`block`bigint	Last canonical scanned block number.	Not about requests
`block_hash`text	Hash at the canonical scan endpoint.	Not about requests
`checkpoints`jsonb	Up to 128 scan endpoint block/hash pairs used to find a canonical reorg rewind point.Cannot hold request content. Only decoded public agreement event values and canonical block metadata are stored: wallets, USDG amounts, hashes, identifiers, bps and timestamps. No inference or evidence content is accepted into the chain journal or projection.	Not about requests
`checked_at`timestamp with time zone	Caught-up scan time, zero during backfill. Jury, posting and deletion require freshness within 120 seconds.	Not about requests

agreement_eventsNot about requests · 7 columns · 1 reviewed

Reversible public AgreementEscrow event journal, bounded by confirmation and finality checks.

How long: Public chain journal and projections remain until the operator removes the agreement index. Orphaned events and projections are removed and replayed on reorganization.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`scope`text	Chain id, configured escrow and oracle addresses; isolates deployments.	Not about requests
`tx_hash`text	Public transaction hash, unique with deployment scope and log position.	Not about requests
`log_index`integer	Canonical log position in a block.	Not about requests
`block`bigint	Canonical event block number.	Not about requests
`block_hash`text	Event block hash checked against the RPC.	Not about requests
`event`text	AgreementEscrow milestone lifecycle events and DisputeOracle TallyRecorded, PanelRequired and RulingPosted ABI event names.	Not about requests
`args`jsonb	Public event arguments: agreement id, payer/payee wallets, USDG base-unit amount, terms/deliverable/evidence hashes, milestone index, deadline, oracle address, review deadline, payout amounts, ruling path and verdict encoding, evidence root, jury version, participation and consensus bitmaps and tally hash. indexedEscrow and indexedOracle identify configured contracts. indexedAt is the canonical block timestamp.Cannot hold request content. Only decoded public agreement event values and canonical block metadata are stored: wallets, USDG amounts, hashes, identifiers, bps and timestamps. No inference or evidence content is accepted into the chain journal or projection.	Not about requests

agreement_evidencePer request · 7 columns · 1 reviewed

Party-uploaded text or JSON evidence, encrypted with APP_SECRET and hash-committed. Only the parties have REST access; the router and jury providers read the decrypted bundle.

How long: Evidence and signed jury statements are deleted after canonical resolution plus AGREEMENT_RETENTION_DAYS (30 by default), while agreement-retention runs with a fresh index. Parties may delete their own evidence after that interval. Backups follow the operator backup policy; deletion is not erasure from backups or chain.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`scope`text	Chain id, configured escrow and oracle addresses; isolates deployments.	Per request
`agreement_id`text	Composite decimal agreement.milestone identifier from the configured escrow contract.	Per request
`dispute`text	Canonical dispute transaction hash and log index, or before-dispute plus the creation transaction/log identity for earlier evidence; prevents reuse of a reorged id from exposing old content.	Per request
`party`text	Authenticated account wallet matched to the indexed payer or payee, never a caller IP.	Per request
`sha256`text	SHA-256 of canonical JSON content before encryption; public to both parties.	Per request
`content`text	AES-GCM encrypted canonical JSON evidence; may contain arbitrary text including prompts, deliverables and personal information. The router decrypts it for party detail and jury calls. Default cap 16 KiB per item and 32 entries per party. Evidence is not end-to-end encrypted through the router.Holds request text. The feature explicitly persists party-uploaded evidence content. Encryption at rest does not prevent the router or an operator with APP_SECRET from reading it. Only wallet-linked parties can retrieve it through these routes, and configured attested models receive it for adjudication.	Per request
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	Time this record was first saved by the router.	Per request

agreement_jurySummed from requests · 11 columns · 1 reviewed

Router-signed model jury statement and durable ruling intent for the canonical dispute. Complete hung tallies may enter the panel path; failed or abstaining votes remain unresolved until a valid tally or expiry. Default consensus status is dry_run.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`scope`text	Chain id, configured escrow and oracle addresses; isolates deployments.	Summed from requests
`agreement_id`text	Composite decimal agreement.milestone identifier from the configured escrow contract.	Summed from requests
`dispute`text	Canonical dispute transaction hash and log index, or before-dispute plus the creation transaction/log identity for earlier evidence; prevents reuse of a reorged id from exposing old content.	Summed from requests
`root`text	RFC 6962 SHA-256 Merkle root of canonical header and ordered party-evidence leaves.	Summed from requests
`status`text	dry_run, panel, submitted, posting_failed or posted. A dry_run does not send a transaction. Posted denotes a successful transaction receipt, with escrow state reconciled separately by the index.	Summed from requests
`statement`jsonb	Signed jury scope, dispute, root, leaf digests, fixed rubric digest, model list, majority threshold, per-model verdict/reason or fixed failure code, receipt id/link/policy hash, internal router-signed operational receipt with request/response hashes, provider attestation reference including report hash/time/TEE/TLS pin, checked gateway receipt reference and upstream claims, provider-list-price operator cost estimate and token usage (not an invoice; failed calls may incur unmeasured cost), consensus bps, agreeing-model bitmap (separate from on-chain signer-order bitmaps), issuance time and trust notice. Model reasons may quote evidence text.Holds request text. Structured model verdict reasons are answer text and can repeat uploaded evidence. This statement therefore stores answer content openly in the inventory, behind party-only API access and resolution-based retention. The public key log contains public signing material. Chain calldata contains evidence root and per-key basis-point votes with EIP-712 signatures; the oracle records signer-order bitmaps and tally hash. The worker holds one operator-configured private key per model; models do not hold these keys.	Summed from requests
`key_id`text	Existing router Ed25519 receipt signing key id, published in the transparency key log when enabled and always before posting; dry-run can omit the key log.	Summed from requests
`signature`text	Base64 Ed25519 signature over canonical statement JSON.	Summed from requests
`posting_tx`text	Hash of the persisted oracle transaction, public once broadcast.	Summed from requests
`posting_raw`text	APP_SECRET-encrypted signed oracle transaction, saved before broadcast for identical nonce/byte retries. No private signer key is saved here.	Summed from requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	Time this record was first saved by the router.	Summed from requests

agreement_projectionNot about requests · 4 columns · 1 reviewed

Canonical agreement state rebuilt from the journal; both parties' wallet-linked accounts have API access.

How long: Public chain journal and projections remain until the operator removes the agreement index. Orphaned events and projections are removed and replayed on reorganization.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`scope`text	Chain id, configured escrow and oracle addresses; isolates deployments.	Not about requests
`kind`text	Fixed agreement projection kind; each row is an individual milestone.	Not about requests
`id`text	Composite decimal agreement.milestone identifier from the configured escrow contract.	Not about requests
`data`jsonb	Agreement id and creation transaction/log identity, public payer/payee wallets, amount, terms hash, ordered deliverable hashes, agreement deadline, milestone index, oracle address, review deadline and exact payout amounts, dispute identity/evidence hash/time, resolution time and public on-chain ruling. No uploaded evidence or model reasons.Cannot hold request content. Only decoded public agreement event values and canonical block metadata are stored: wallets, USDG amounts, hashes, identifiers, bps and timestamps. No inference or evidence content is accepted into the chain journal or projection.	Not about requests

chain_cursorNot about requests · 3 columns

How far the router has read each chain.

How long: One row per cursor, overwritten as the chain advances.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	The cursor's name.	Not about requests
`block`bigint	The last block read.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Not about requests

chain_eventsNot about requests · 10 columns · 2 reviewed

Contract events the router has read from the chain, each processed once.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`tx_hash`text	The transaction.	Not about requests
`log_index`integer	The log's position in the transaction.	Not about requests
`contract`text	The contract that emitted it.	Not about requests
`event`text	The event name.	Not about requests
`block_number`bigint	The block.	Not about requests
`args`jsonb	The event's decoded arguments: addresses, amounts and hashes.Cannot hold request content. Decoded on-chain event arguments; public blockchain data.	Not about requests
`processed`boolean	Whether the router has acted on it.	Not about requests
`processed_at`timestamp with time zone	When it did.	Not about requests
`error`text	Why processing the event failed, when it did.Cannot hold request content. An error string from the chain indexer while handling a public on-chain event; the indexer never sees a request.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests

commerce_transfersNot about requests · 9 columns · 2 reviewed

When COMMERCE_STATS_ENABLED and COMMERCE_FUNDING_FROM_BLOCK are set, every USDG Transfer on the configured chain from that block on, so the commerce ledger can tell which wallets funded which. Public chain data only; no account, key, receipt or request is linked to a row.

How long: No automatic deletion: the funding filter reads the whole copy from the start block. Removed only when the operator drops the table or clears the copy.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`tx_hash`text	The public transaction hash.	Not about requests
`log_index`integer	The log's position in the transaction.	Not about requests
`block_number`bigint	The block.	Not about requests
`block_time`timestamp with time zone	The block's time.	Not about requests
`from_address`text	The wallet the USDG left.A wallet address, not a network address. A lowercase blockchain wallet or contract address copied from a public USDG Transfer log; not a caller's network address.	Not about requests
`to_address`text	The wallet the USDG went to.A wallet address, not a network address. A lowercase blockchain wallet or contract address copied from a public USDG Transfer log; not a caller's network address.	Not about requests
`value_usdg`bigint	The amount in USDG base units, capped at the bigint maximum.	Not about requests
`authorized`boolean	Whether an EIP-3009 authorization of the sender moved it (an AuthorizationUsed log by the sender in the same transaction).	Not about requests
`tx_from`text	For an authorized transfer, the public address that sent the transaction (the relayer); null otherwise.	Not about requests

escrow_depositsNot about requests · 21 columns · 2 reviewed

Stock Token, $ANYR and USDG transfers into the escrow wallet: one row per transfer, its price, its status and whether it was credited.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	<transaction>:<log index>.	Not about requests
`tx_hash`text	The transaction.	Not about requests
`log_index`integer	The log's position in the transaction.	Not about requests
`block_number`bigint	The block.	Not about requests
`token`text	The token contract.	Not about requests
`symbol`text	The token symbol.	Not about requests
`from_address`text	The wallet that sent the tokens, as recorded on chain.A wallet address, not a network address. A blockchain wallet address that is public in the transfer itself; not a network address.	Not about requests
`raw_amount`numeric(78, 0)	The amount in token base units.	Not about requests
`status`text	pending_finality, pending, provisional (credited while settling), credited, orphaned or reversed.	Not about requests
`block_hash`text	The block hash when recorded; the credit is checked against it.	Not about requests
`account_id`text	The account it was credited to.	Not about requests
`price18`text	USD per whole token at 18 decimals, as read from the price feed (USDG: exactly 1, credited at par).	Not about requests
`price_updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the feed last updated.	Not about requests
`credited`bigint	The pico-USD credited after the haircut.	Not about requests
`error`text	Why crediting failed, when it did.Cannot hold request content. An error string from the escrow indexer about an on-chain transfer; no request is involved.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests
`credited_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was credited.	Not about requests
`checked_at`timestamp with time zone	When the credit was last re-verified against the canonical chain.	Not about requests
`reversed_at`timestamp with time zone	When a credit was reversed.	Not about requests
`review_reason`text	Set when an operator has to look: a reversal, or an orphan after finality.	Not about requests
`reviewed_at`timestamp with time zone	Set once an operator has reconciled it.	Not about requests

facilitator_settlementsPer request · 21 columns · 1 reviewed

One row per facilitator settle that passed verification: the payer's signed USDG authorization relayed straight to the seller's payTo (or to the treasury for a gas float top-up). (payer, nonce) is unique, so an authorization settles at most once here. Settled rows carry a signed receipt of kind facilitator.settle that joins the hourly anchor.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Payer, payTo, amount, nonce and transaction hash are the same facts the public chain shows for the transfer. Payers are not screened: the facilitator never holds the funds it relays.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Random settlement identifier (fst_ followed by 24 hex characters); also the receipt id.	Per request
`kind`text	payment, or gas_float for a seller's gas float top-up.	Per request
`payer`text	Lowercase wallet address that signed the authorization.	Per request
`pay_to`text	Lowercase wallet address the USDG went to.	Per request
`value`numeric(78, 0)	Authorized USDG base units.	Per request
`nonce`text	The authorization's EIP-3009 nonce.	Per request
`tx_hash`text	Relay transaction hash, once settled.	Per request
`status`text	verified (claimed, relay in flight), settled or failed.	Per request
`error`text	A fixed code for a failed relay (relay_failed).Cannot hold request content. A fixed code written by the facilitator code, never chain error text, a request body or an answer.	Per request
`seller_id`text	Listing the payment belongs to, when the payTo has one.	Per request
`x402_version`smallint	x402 protocol version of the payment, 1 or 2.	Per request
`fee_value`numeric(78, 0)	USDG base units of the facilitator fee authorization, when a fee is charged.	Per request
`fee_tx_hash`text	Transaction hash of the relayed fee authorization.	Per request
`gas_debit`numeric(78, 0)	USDG base units taken from the seller's gas float for this settle.	Per request
`settled_at`timestamp with time zone	When the relay landed and the receipt was signed.	Per request
`receipt_cose`text	The signed receipt (base64 COSE_Sign1): network, asset, transaction, amount, payTo and fee. It names no payer.	Per request
`receipt_leaf`text	The receipt's leaf hash in the hourly anchoring tree.	Per request
`receipt_key_id`text	Receipt signing key id.	Per request
`anchor_index`integer	Anchor (Merkle root) this receipt was included in, once rooted.	Per request
`leaf_index`integer	Position of the receipt's leaf in that anchor's tree.	Per request
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Per request

host_bond_cursorNot about requests · 5 columns · 1 reviewed

Resumable HostBond event scan cursor, isolated by chain and contract. Serializes scans and slash intents across workers.

How long: Kept until the operator removes the bond index. Orphaned journal events and projections are removed on a chain reorganization; slash intent and evidence commitments are retained for idempotency.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`scope`text	Chain id and HostBond contract address; public chain identifiers.	Not about requests
`block`bigint	Last scanned canonical block, or the deployment block minus one before scanning.	Not about requests
`block_hash`text	Canonical block hash at the scan cursor.	Not about requests
`checkpoints`jsonb	Up to 128 scan endpoints as block number/hash pairs. Reorgs rewind to the newest matching checkpoint, or the deployment block when none remain canonical.Cannot hold request content. Contains only public HostBond event values or projections: wallet and contract identifiers, amounts, reason codes, hashes, flags and block times. No inference content or caller connection address is read.	Not about requests
`checked_at`timestamp with time zone	Last caught-up scan time. Zero during backfill; routing boosts and slashing stop after 120 seconds without a caught-up pass.	Not about requests

host_bond_eventsNot about requests · 7 columns · 1 reviewed

Every decoded event from the configured HostBond deployment, including ownership and parameter changes. Reversible journal; no inference records are changed.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`scope`text	Chain id and HostBond contract address.	Not about requests
`tx_hash`text	Public transaction hash, unique with scope and log index.	Not about requests
`log_index`integer	Log position within the canonical block.	Not about requests
`block`bigint	Canonical event block number.	Not about requests
`block_hash`text	Block hash checked against the RPC's canonical chain.	Not about requests
`event`text	ABI event name, including Bonded, UnbondRequested/Cancelled/Unbonded, slash lifecycle, role, ownership and minimum changes.	Not about requests
`args`jsonb	Decoded public ABI arguments: bytes32 host id/evidence root/dispute hash, slash id, operator/recipient/role wallets, amount, total, reason, cooldown/dispute deadline and delisting flag. Numbers are decimal strings; no arbitrary transaction calldata is stored.Cannot hold request content. Contains only public HostBond event values or projections: wallet and contract identifiers, amounts, reason codes, hashes, flags and block times. No inference content or caller connection address is read.	Not about requests

host_bond_projectionNot about requests · 4 columns · 1 reviewed

Reversible HostBond state reduced from the journal, with one row per host, slash or parameter set. The provider's existing bond_usdg field is left unchanged.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`scope`text	Chain id and HostBond contract address.	Not about requests
`kind`text	Projection kind: host, slash or parameters.	Not about requests
`id`text	Bytes32 host id, decimal slash id, or the fixed current parameter key.	Not about requests
`data`jsonb	Host projections contain operator wallet, total and queued bond, unbond deadline and delisting flag. Slash projections contain host id, amount, contract reason, evidence root, dispute deadline/hash, status, approval generation and transaction history. Parameter projection contains minimum bond, approval generation, owner/pending owner, slasher and refund pool wallets. All values are public on-chain data.Cannot hold request content. Contains only public HostBond event values or projections: wallet and contract identifiers, amounts, reason codes, hashes, flags and block times. No inference content or caller connection address is read.	Not about requests

host_slash_evidenceSummed from requests · 13 columns · 1 reviewed

Hash-committed evidence of quote-bound host policy rejection and invalid receipts from the pinned host feed, plus durable proposal/execution intents. Disabled unless NETWORK_BONDS_ENABLED.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`scope`text	Chain id and HostBond contract address.	Summed from requests
`root`text	0x-prefixed SHA-256 commitment of the exact canonical evidence bundle; primary key with scope prevents repeated proposal intents.	Summed from requests
`provider_id`text	Network provider id from the registry.	Summed from requests
`host_id`text	keccak256 of the provider id, matched to the HostBond operator before proposal.Cannot hold request content. A bytes32 contract host identifier, derived from the provider id with keccak256. It is not a caller connection address or a host's network endpoint.	Summed from requests
`canonical`text	Exact canonical structured bundle: format, provider/host ids, fault kind, contract reason or null, policy version/hash where applicable, observed binding or receipt digest, attestation reference, receipt public key when applicable, and rejection digest. Contains hashes and identifiers only. Raw quotes, bindings, receipt envelopes, signature bytes, prompt and answer text are not retained here. A commitment does not by itself prove fault; review requires the source evidence.	Summed from requests
`reason`integer	Contract MeasurementDrift code 0 for verified policy rejection; -1 means invalid receipt evidence awaiting policy review, never automatically proposed.	Summed from requests
`amount`text	Proposal amount in USDG base units: current whole bond at preparation, or would-be amount in dry run. Owner independently approves the exact proposal.	Summed from requests
`status`text	ready, review, dry_run, submitted, executing, cancelled or executed; always reconciled against the canonical journal before action.	Summed from requests
`proposal_tx`text	Hash of the single persisted proposal transaction.	Summed from requests
`proposal_raw`text	APP_SECRET-encrypted signed proposal transaction. Saved before broadcasting; retries reuse identical bytes and nonce. The signed transaction becomes public on broadcast; no slasher key is persisted.	Summed from requests
`execution_tx`text	Hash of the single persisted execution transaction.	Summed from requests
`execution_raw`text	APP_SECRET-encrypted signed execution transaction, saved before broadcast and reused on retry. Independent owner approval and the undisputed window are checked before preparation.	Summed from requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	Time this exact evidence commitment was first stored.	Summed from requests

makegood_payoutsSummed from requests · 8 columns

On-chain make-good refund transfers: one USDG transfer from the refund treasury per payer per batch, signed and stored before it is broadcast so a retry resends the same transfer and never pays twice.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Transfer id.	Summed from requests
`payer`text	Wallet address the refund is sent to.	Summed from requests
`usdg`bigint	Amount in USDG base units: the sum of that payer's owed refunds in the batch.	Summed from requests
`status`text	signed (stored, possibly broadcast), paid (mined successfully) or failed (reverted; its refunds are owed again).	Summed from requests
`tx_hash`text	Hash of the signed transfer transaction.	Summed from requests
`signed_tx_enc`text	The signed transaction bytes encrypted under APP_SECRET, kept to rebroadcast the identical transfer; never the treasury key.	Summed from requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the transfer was signed.	Summed from requests
`settled_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was seen mined or reverted.	Summed from requests

network_payout_dispatchNot about requests · 3 columns

Durable signed USDG transfer for a network payout. Written before broadcasting so recovery sends identical bytes and cannot pay again using another nonce.

How long: No automatic deletion, and rows are never changed after they are written.

The signed transaction can authorize only its encoded transfer, but replaying it before inclusion broadcasts that transfer. It is encrypted with APP_SECRET and never exposed by public APIs. No private signing key is stored here. Reverted, destination-changed or nonce-conflicted transfers require operator reconciliation.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`payout_id`text	The payout whose claimed invoices this transfer settles.	Not about requests
`signed_tx_enc`text	Encrypted serialized signed blockchain transfer: chain, nonce, USDG contract, destination, amount and fees; no inference text or signing key.	Not about requests
`tx_hash`text	Hash of the signed transfer, fixed before first broadcast.	Not about requests

paywith_debtsPer request · 11 columns

What a pay-with call owes in tokens, until a swap settles it.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Debt id.	Per request
`chain_key_hash`text	The key's chain hash.	Per request
`account_id`text	The account.	Per request
`generation_id`text	The generation that created the debt.	Per request
`token`text	The token contract.	Per request
`amount`bigint	Pico-USD owed.	Per request
`raw_estimate`bigint	Estimated token units.	Per request
`fair_price18`text	The fair price used, 18 decimals.	Per request
`swap_id`text	The swap that settled it.	Per request
`raw_allocated`bigint	Token units allocated to it by the swap.	Per request
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Per request

paywith_sessionsNot about requests · 10 columns

Pay-with sessions: a wallet's daily cap for paying with a Stock Token through a key.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`key_hash`text	The key's chain hash.	Not about requests
`wallet`text	The wallet that opened the session.	Not about requests
`token`text	The token contract.	Not about requests
`symbol`text	The token symbol.	Not about requests
`cap_raw_day`bigint	The daily cap in token base units.	Not about requests
`spent_raw_today`bigint	Spent today in token base units.	Summed from requests
`day_start`timestamp with time zone	When today's window began.	Not about requests
`active`boolean	Whether the session is active.	Not about requests
`opened_tx`text	The transaction that opened it.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Not about requests

paywith_swapsSummed from requests · 11 columns · 2 reviewed

Swaps that turn pay-with tokens into USDG to settle debts.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Swap id.	Summed from requests
`key_hash`text	The key's chain hash.	Summed from requests
`token`text	The token contract.	Summed from requests
`raw_spent`bigint	Token units spent.	Summed from requests
`fair_price`text	The fair price used.	Summed from requests
`usdg_out`bigint	USDG base units received.	Summed from requests
`tx`text	The swap transaction.	Summed from requests
`status`text	pending, submitted, confirmed or failed.	Summed from requests
`error`text	Why the swap failed, when it did.Cannot hold request content. An error string from a swap transaction; no request is involved.	Summed from requests
`ts`timestamp with time zone	When the swap was created.	Summed from requests
`allocations`jsonb	Which debts the swap settled and how much of it each got.Cannot hold request content. Debt ids and token amounts written by the pay-with aggregator.	Summed from requests

slashesSummed from requests · 17 columns · 1 reviewed

Penalties proposed against a provider for empty answers, precision fraud, poor uptime or dropped parameters, with the evidence and where it stands.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Slash id.	Summed from requests
`provider_id`text	The provider.	Summed from requests
`model_id`text	The model, when the penalty is per model.	Summed from requests
`kind`text	empty200, quant_fraud, uptime or param_drop.	Summed from requests
`amount_usdg`bigint	The amount in USDG base units.	Summed from requests
`delist`boolean	Whether the provider is delisted with it.	Summed from requests
`evidence_root`text	A Merkle root over the evidence.	Summed from requests
`evidence`jsonb	The evidence: counts of requests and empty answers, canary results or uptime figures, and the window they cover.Cannot hold request content. Assembled by gatherEvidence in slasher.ts from counts, canary results and time windows; no request or answer text is read.	Summed from requests
`status`text	proposed, disputed, cancelled, executed or auto_refunded.	Summed from requests
`proposed_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was proposed.	Summed from requests
`executable_at`timestamp with time zone	When it may be executed.	Summed from requests
`executed_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was.	Summed from requests
`dispute_hash`text	The hash of the provider's dispute.	Summed from requests
`disputed_at`timestamp with time zone	When it disputed.	Summed from requests
`onchain_id`text	The id on chain.	Summed from requests
`tx_hash`text	The transaction.	Summed from requests
`refunded`bigint	Pico-USD refunded to callers affected.	Summed from requests

spent_rootsSummed from requests · 8 columns · 1 reviewed

A Merkle root over every key's cumulative spend, posted on chain so balances can be settled.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`epoch`integer	The epoch.	Summed from requests
`root`text	The Merkle root.	Summed from requests
`as_of`timestamp with time zone	The time the spend is counted to.	Summed from requests
`total_spent_usdg`bigint	Total spend in USDG base units.	Summed from requests
`leaves`jsonb	Pairs of a key's chain hash and its cumulative spend in USDG base units, in tree order.Cannot hold request content. [chainKeyHash, cumulativeSpentUsdg] pairs built from ledger totals.	Summed from requests
`tx_hash`text	The transaction that posted the root.	Summed from requests
`status`text	pending, submitted or confirmed.	Summed from requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Summed from requests

Operations

Settings you save (routes, presets, spend alerts) and the router's own key-value state.

character_memoryNot about requests · 10 columns

Character memory an account keeps: rolling summaries, facts and lorebook notes sealed on the account's own device (AES-256-GCM) under a viewing key the router never receives. The router stores ciphertext, never the memory's text, and cannot tell which character a memory belongs to.

How long: Kept until the account deletes it (DELETE /api/v1/memory/:id, or ?scope= / ?all=1 for many).

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Memory id.	Not about requests
`account_id`text	The account that owns it.	Not about requests
`scope`text	An HMAC of the character id under the client's key: it groups one character's memories without naming the character.	Not about requests
`kind`text	summary, fact, lorebook or state, as the client labels it.	Not about requests
`sealed`text	The ciphertext the client sealed (arm1.<iv>.<ciphertext>); the API refuses anything that is not in this sealed form.	Not about requests
`key_id`text	A 16-hex fingerprint derived from the client's key, so the client can tell which key sealed it. The key cannot be recovered from it.	Not about requests
`bytes`integer	Size of the ciphertext in characters.	Not about requests
`embedding`real[]	Only when the client opts in (embedding_opt_in): a vector the client computed from the memory, for similarity search. It cannot be turned back into the text, but it can reveal what the memory is about, so it is off by default. Empty otherwise.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Not about requests

character_usageSummed from requests · 4 columns

Creator attribution for public characters: how many calls used each one and what they cost, summed per UTC day. It records no request, answer, key or caller.

How long: No automatic deletion: no job or route in the code removes rows from this table. Rows are deleted with their character.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`character_id`text	The public character.	Summed from requests
`period`text	The UTC day, YYYY-MM-DD.	Summed from requests
`calls`integer	Calls that used the character that day (never counted on the unlinkable lane).	Summed from requests
`cost`bigint	What those calls cost in total, in pico-USD.	Summed from requests

charactersNot about requests · 13 columns · 1 reviewed

Character cards an account registers (Tavern Card v2 or v3). A public or unlisted card is text its creator publishes for others to use, kept as written. A private card is kept only as the ciphertext the owner's own device sealed, with the SHA-256 of the card; the router never receives its key or its text at rest.

How long: Kept until the owner deletes the character (DELETE /api/v1/characters/:id), which also deletes its attribution counters.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Character id, used as @character/<id>.	Not about requests
`account_id`text	The account that owns it.	Not about requests
`visibility`text	public (listed in discovery), unlisted (readable by anyone with the id) or private (sealed, owner only).	Not about requests
`name`text	The card's name; empty for a private card.	Not about requests
`tags`text[]	The card's tags, lowercased, for discovery; empty for a private card.	Not about requests
`creator`text	The card's creator field as the card states it; empty for a private card.	Not about requests
`spec`text	chara_card_v2 or chara_card_v3; empty for a private card.	Not about requests
`card`jsonb	The normalized card of a public or unlisted character: name, description, personality, scenario, greetings, example dialogue, system prompt, post-history instructions, tags, creator notes and lorebook. Empty for a private card.Settings written by you or an operator. Written by the card's owner through POST or PUT /api/v1/characters and normalized to the Tavern card fields, at most 512 KB. It is text a creator publishes for others to use, not text taken from a call: chats with the character are not stored here or anywhere else, and a private card is never stored in this column.	Not about requests
`sealed_card`text	A private card as the owner's device sealed it: AES-256-GCM ciphertext under a key the router never receives. Empty for a public or unlisted card.	Not about requests
`card_hash`text	SHA-256 of the card's canonical JSON. For a private card the router checks a card sent with a chat against it before using it.	Not about requests
`default_model`text	The model @character/<id> uses when a request names none.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Not about requests

facilitator_sellersNot about requests · 11 columns · 1 reviewed

Sellers who opted in to the facilitator's discovery index: the paid URL, a price hint, an output schema and tags, each listing signed by the seller's payTo key. Shown publicly at /facilitator/discovery/resources while listed.

How long: Kept until the seller replaces it with a later signed listing; listed false hides it from discovery. No job removes rows.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Random listing identifier (fsl_ followed by 24 hex characters).	Not about requests
`pay_to`text	Lowercase wallet address the seller is paid at, which signed the listing. Public in every 402 response the seller sends.	Not about requests
`resource`text	The seller's paid https URL as signed. The first payTo to list a URL owns that entry.	Not about requests
`price_hint`numeric(78, 0)	Price the seller states, in USDG base units; the seller's own 402 response stays authoritative.	Not about requests
`result_schema`jsonb	JSON schema the seller published for its endpoint's result (x402 outputSchema), as signed.Settings written by you or an operator. Seller-written description of a public paid endpoint's result shape, signed by its payTo key and shown in discovery; never a caller's request or answer.	Not about requests
`tags`text[]	Up to ten lowercase words the seller chose for search.	Not about requests
`listed`boolean	Whether the listing shows in discovery.	Not about requests
`signature`text	The payTo key's EIP-712 signature over the listing.	Not about requests
`signed_at`timestamp with time zone	issuedAt of the stored signature; only a later signature replaces the listing.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Not about requests

host_policiesNot about requests · 7 columns

Public versions of the network host admission policy, signed with the transparency log's Ed25519 key. Publication alone does not admit providers; wallet-authenticated network admission verifies this policy before probation.

How long: No automatic deletion, and rows are never changed after they are written.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`version`integer	Consecutive policy version, beginning at 1.	Not about requests
`issued_at`timestamp with time zone	The policy's issue time supplied by the operator.	Not about requests
`canonical`text	Canonical JSON of the operator's policy: version, issue time, TEE kinds, approved sidecar image and source hashes, engine names and image digests, model IDs and digests, GPU CC requirements and optional model offer terms: catalogue slug, display name, Hugging Face ID, context and completion limits, quantization and positive USD-per-token prompt/completion prices. Offer terms are public operator-provided metadata, not inference content. A strict bounded schema accepts no prompt fields; names are operator-written identifiers with a restricted alphabet, so the router cannot know what meaning the operator assigns them. Public through the policy API.	Not about requests
`sha256`text	SHA-256 of the exact canonical policy bytes.	Not about requests
`signature`text	Base64 Ed25519 signature over the canonical policy bytes.	Not about requests
`verifier_key`text	The public signed-note verifier key identifying the log key that signed this version.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests

kvNot about requests · 3 columns · 1 reviewed

The router's small key-value store: job status, cursors, cached facts about providers, pending sign-in challenges and Telegram bot state. No request or answer text is written here.

How long: Per key family: a wallet sign-in or team challenge is deleted when used and any older than 10 minutes is deleted when the next challenge is made; a team invite is deleted when used and expired ones when the next invite is made; a Telegram user's row is deleted by /forget; other families are overwritten in place.

deposit-watch:<chain id>:<account id>:<transaction hash>: account-scoped submitted-deposit status. Keeps account id, lane (escrow or USDG), transaction hash and submission time, up to 20 submitted hashes per account. Removed after indexed credit, otherwise retained until operator deletion. No typed amount or sender is accepted; display amounts and senders come from public chain logs. The deposit list also caches decoded unindexed USDG logs in process memory for five seconds, containing public key hashes, sending wallets, amounts, transaction hashes and block numbers; it does not credit funds.
fast-credit:lock: an empty singleton row locked during escrow crediting to serialize account and global outstanding-credit caps. Kept until operator deletion.
fast-credit:deposit:<chain id>:<lane>:<transaction>:<log index>: durable provisional deposit bookkeeping. Stores chain and lane identity, account id, sending wallet, transaction and log index, block and canonical hash, fixed capped pico-USD total, provisional pico-USD amount, provisional/final/reversed status, ledger and reversal references and kinds, and escrow price with its timestamp and per-deposit cap marker. Final settlement changes state and credits only the remainder; reversals debit the provisional amount. Kept indefinitely for idempotency. No inference text or caller network address.
telegram-link-code:<account id>: SHA-256 of a random single-use code, account id, principal key hash and expiry. One code per account, replaced on issuance, deleted on consumption/cancellation. Valid for five minutes; expired rows are purged on enabled polling or issuance. The code itself is returned once and stays in page memory until linking, cancellation or navigation; it is never saved in browser storage.
telegram-link:<Telegram user id>: account id, owner/admin principal key hash, Telegram user id, random generation and linked timestamp. One account per Telegram identity and one identity per principal key. Kept until /unlink or DELETE /api/v1/telegram/link; disabling or expiring the key or removing its role prevents use. No API key or message text. Existing chat keys under telegram:user are separate.
telegram-approval:<approval id>:<Telegram user id>:<link generation>: approval id, Telegram user id, generation, expiry, Telegram message id and fixed decision status. Delivery markers stop repeat polling sends and bind buttons to the originating message and current link. Deleted on unlink; expired markers are purged on enabled polling or issuance. Worker interruptions can repeat a notification; decisions use the dashboard's atomic logic. Telegram receives readable intent metadata and alerts, not inference messages or tool arguments. Message text is never stored here.
upstream-balance:<provider id>: latest USD balance (including zero and negative readings), check time and unknown/unsupported check state, with the last successful reading and its time retained across failed checks; upstream-credit-hold:<provider id>: expiry of a five-minute provider-wide routing hold after explicit insufficient credits. Balance readings at or below UPSTREAM_BALANCE_EXHAUSTED_USD (default 0) block routing until a later reading exceeds that threshold, including across restarts and failed polls. Enabled only by UPSTREAM_MONITOR_ENABLED. Overwritten in place; expired hold rows remain until operator deletion. No response text, API keys or caller identifiers are copied. Alerts use the existing alerts:state and alerts:lease rows and configured operations webhook. Balance state changes alert immediately with hashed provider check names; exhausted reminders are no more frequent than six hours. The alerts:state checks also retain the last delivered time for balance notices.
agent-alerts:<account id>: newest 100 metadata-only owner alerts per account, visible for up to 90 days; expired feed, denial and dedupe metadata is purged on the next alert write or enabled worker cleanup, while inactive account rows remain until operator deletion; threshold cooldowns, denial counts with up to 10,000 recent timestamps and random transaction batch markers per key (10-minute rolling retention on writes/cleanup), timestamps, key hashes, selected channels, delivery attempts, destination rule ids or Telegram ids and per-account delivery rate/lease state. No prompt, answer, intent, kill reason, webhook URL or API key is copied. Existing Spend Watch destinations are decrypted for guarded egress; existing Telegram principal links are decrypted and permission-checked before delivery. Email has no account destination. Delivery is at-least-once; a crash after sending can repeat an attempt.
telegram:offset, telegram:user:<Telegram user id>: the update cursor, and per user the API key sealed under APP_SECRET, the chosen model and the private-mode switch (services/telegram.ts). Message text is not stored.
wallet-login:<nonce>: a sign-in challenge (wallet address, the router's own origin, chain id, expiry and the message to sign). Deleted when used; older ones are pruned.
team-invite:<sha256 of the invite>: a single-use team invite (team, role, how to join, expiry and the inviting key's hash). The invite itself is never stored. Deleted when used; expired ones are deleted when the next invite is made.
team-challenge:<id>: a team join, sign-in or owner challenge (team, method, the WebAuthn challenge or the message to sign, and the wallet address when there is one). Deleted when used; older than 10 minutes are pruned.
job-health:<job>, alerts:state, alerts:lease, backup:last: when each background job last ran, a fixed failure marker (operator job snapshots and queue failures redact configured private chain RPC URLs), alert state, an alert lease and the time and checksum of the last database backup.
agreement-jury:heartbeat: written by the isolated agreement-jury worker each pass after its signer keys matched the DisputeOracle's jury on chain: the escrow and oracle addresses, threshold, the jury signers' public addresses and the time. GET /api/v1/status reads it to report whether automatic rulings are on. Overwritten in place; no evidence, verdict or key material.
tls-pin:<provider>, aci-gateway:<provider>, aci-gpu:<model>, attest-policy:<provider>, attest-allow:<provider>, static-models-pending:<provider>, apply-token:<application id>: facts about providers (pinned certificate keys, verified gateway keysets, operator allow-lists, a pending model list, and the SHA-256 of an application token).
paywith-allowance:<chain key hash>, paywith-intent:<chain key hash>, paywith-commitment:<commitment>: a signed pay-with allowance (wallet address and signature), the wallet and token a key holder registered for pay-with, and the swap a usage commitment belongs to.
escrow:checkpoints, spent_settled:<epoch>, margin_unsent, holder-credits-run:<period>:<time>, ipx-oracle:*: chain cursors and settlement bookkeeping. margin_unsent retains accumulated protocol margin and provider-side fees in pico-USD; settlement reports the rounded USDG amount without transferring or clearing it.
sealed-agent:<key hash>: owner-selected HTTPS /attest URL, expected image digest and measured compose hash, random registration revision, last check timestamp, fixed success/failure code, verifier names and verified TLS SPKI hash. Overwritten on registration and each check; deleted by the principal's DELETE endpoint. No quote, certificate, API credential or inference content is stored. Owner-selected hostnames are settings and may carry meanings chosen by that owner. Records remain while disabled until explicitly removed; badge success expires after 30 minutes.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`key`text	The key, a family name plus an identifier (see the families above).	Not about requests
`value`jsonb	The value, as JSON. Its shape depends on the key family.Cannot hold request content. Each family is written by one piece of code from ids, hashes, timestamps, amounts and settings; the families are listed under the table. None takes a value from the body of a chat, embeddings or other inference request.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Not about requests

network_waitlistNot about requests · 9 columns · 1 reviewed

Network interest sign-ups, not host admission or attestation. Stores exactly the submitted role, hardware, readiness, continent, optional contact and payout preference, plus an id, deletion digest and time. Free text is private to the owner export; public statistics contain only counts.

How long: Until the participant deletes it with their code, or the owner deletes the list when the program launches or is cancelled. Program-wide removal is an owner operation; no automatic launch or cancellation signal exists.

Hardware, readiness and contact are user-supplied text. Do not paste prompts or other sensitive information. The owner can read these fields through the ADMIN_TOKEN-protected read-only export. No network address or user agent is stored in this table. The delete code itself is returned once and never stored.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Random UUID identifying this sign-up, not an account or machine identity.	Not about requests
`role`text	Selected role: host_gpu, host_cpu, relay, witness or developer.	Not about requests
`hardware`text	Hardware description typed by the participant, at most 200 characters; unverified free text, not a prompt sent to a model.	Not about requests
`readiness`text	Optional pasted readiness hints, at most 300 characters; unverified free text, not attestation or a prompt sent to a model.	Not about requests
`region`text	Selected continent only; not inferred from a network address.	Not about requests
`contact`text	Optional contact typed by the participant, at most 120 characters; may identify them. Null when omitted or blank.Settings written by you or an operator. Voluntarily supplied contact for the owner to respond to interest, not a connection address read from the request. May contain an email, handle or any contact the participant chooses; kept privately until deletion.	Not about requests
`paid_in`text	Payout preference only: usdg, anyr or any. Payouts are planned, not available.	Not about requests
`delete_code_hash`text	SHA-256 of a random 32-byte deletion code. The raw code is returned once to its holder.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	Server timestamp when the sign-up was saved.	Not about requests

preset_versionsNot about requests · 10 columns · 1 reviewed

The versions of a preset an account calls as @preset/<name>[@<version>]: one row per saved version, never changed after it is written. A preset is a saved route plus the defaults a route cannot hold: a system prompt, a response_format and tool definitions the account owner writes.

How long: Kept until the account deletes the preset (DELETE /api/v1/presets/:name), which deletes every version.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Version id.	Not about requests
`account_id`text	The account that owns it.	Not about requests
`name`text	The name used in @preset/<name>.	Not about requests
`version`integer	The version number: 1, 2, 3, ... per preset.	Not about requests
`hash`text	SHA-256 of the version's canonical JSON, so two versions with the same content have the same hash.	Not about requests
`config`jsonb	The preset: models, provider preferences, sampling controls and, when the owner sets them, a description (up to 280 characters), a system prompt (up to 16,000 characters), a response_format and up to 32 tool definitions.Settings written by you or an operator. Written by the account owner through PUT /api/v1/presets/:name and validated by a strict schema (presetDocSchema) with size caps. The system prompt is text the owner saves as a setting, not text taken from a call: requests that use the preset are not stored here or anywhere else.	Not about requests
`source`text	put for a saved change, rollback for a version restored from an earlier one.	Not about requests
`restored_from`integer	The version a rollback copied; empty otherwise.	Not about requests
`created_by`text	The key that saved the version.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests

sanctions_addressesNot about requests · 3 columns · 1 reviewed

EVM-compatible digital currency addresses extracted from the public OFAC SDN XML for provider admission and USDG payout screening. No names or identity records are stored.

How long: Replaced atomically on a successful refresh; a failed refresh keeps the last good list.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`address`text	Lowercase 0x-prefixed 20-byte wallet address listed by OFAC.A wallet address, not a network address. A public digital currency wallet identifier from the SDN list, never a caller's IP or connection address.	Not about requests
`list_date`timestamp with time zone	Publication date from the SDN XML, at midnight UTC.	Not about requests
`source_hash`text	SHA-256 of the exact downloaded XML bytes; no XML or identity text is retained.	Not about requests

sanctions_metaNot about requests · 6 columns

Singleton metadata for the current sanctions list, exposed by GET /api/v1/network/sanctions.

How long: Replaced with the address list on a successful refresh; retained on failure.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`integer	Singleton identifier, always 1.	Not about requests
`list_date`timestamp with time zone	Publication date from the SDN XML, at midnight UTC; this date determines freshness.	Not about requests
`source_hash`text	SHA-256 of the downloaded XML bytes.	Not about requests
`entry_count`integer	Number of distinct EVM-compatible wallet addresses stored.	Not about requests
`ignored_count`integer	Number of digital currency entries whose identifier is not an EVM-compatible 0x address.	Not about requests
`refreshed_at`timestamp with time zone	When the successful download was stored, in UTC; does not reset the publication date's age.	Not about requests

saved_routesNot about requests · 9 columns · 2 reviewed

A saved routing policy an account calls as @route/<slug>: ordered fallback models, provider preferences and default sampling settings. It cannot hold prompt or system-prompt text.

How long: Kept until the account deletes the route (DELETE /api/v1/routes/:slug).

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Route id.	Not about requests
`account_id`text	The account that owns it.	Not about requests
`slug`text	The name used in @route/<slug>.	Not about requests
`name`text	The route's display name, up to 80 characters.	Not about requests
`description`text	A description written by the account, up to 280 characters.Settings written by you or an operator. A label the owner types about the route (limited to 280 characters). It is a setting, not a request; the API cannot tell what an owner chooses to write.	Not about requests
`config`jsonb	The route: models, provider preferences and a closed list of sampling controls (temperature, top_p, max_tokens, seed, stop sequences and similar).Settings written by you or an operator. Validated by a strict schema (routeConfigSchema) that lists the allowed fields. There is no field for messages or system prompts; the only free text is up to four stop sequences of 32 characters.	Not about requests
`created_by`text	The key that created it.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Not about requests

skillsNot about requests · 22 columns · 4 reviewed

Agent skills published to the Skills Hub: the manifest from SKILL.md, the files as one canonical tar, its SHA-256, where it came from and the static scan report. A skill is public content its author chose to publish; it is not a request.

How long: Kept while the hub lists the skill. A revoked skill stays, marked revoked, so its report and hash remain checkable.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Skill id: sk_ followed by the first 24 hex characters of content_hash.	Not about requests
`name`text	The skill's name from SKILL.md, up to 64 characters.	Not about requests
`slug`text	The name in lowercase letters, digits and hyphens.	Not about requests
`version`text	The version from SKILL.md, up to 32 characters.	Not about requests
`description`text	The description from SKILL.md, up to 1,024 characters.Settings written by you or an operator. Written by the skill's author in the SKILL.md frontmatter of a skill they publish; shown in the public registry. It is not a request to a model.	Not about requests
`author`text	The author named in SKILL.md, up to 80 characters.	Not about requests
`account_id`text	The publishing account, credited the author share of paid installs; empty for a mirrored skill.	Not about requests
`created_by`text	The key hash that imported the skill; empty for the mirror job.	Not about requests
`source`jsonb	Where the skill came from: upload, git (repository URL, ref, commit, folder) or mirror (the registry index).A public address, not a caller's. The public repository URL, ref, commit and folder the importer named, or the registry index the operator configured in SKILLS_SOURCES. It identifies public code, not a caller.	Not about requests
`files`jsonb	The skill's files: path, type, mode, size and SHA-256 of each, in canonical order.Cannot hold request content. Paths, sizes, modes and hashes computed from the published archive.	Not about requests
`tar_sha256`text	The content hash: SHA-256 of the canonical tar of the files, which a client checks after download and the key on chain (SkillRegistry).	Not about requests
`archive`text	The files as a gzipped canonical tar (base64), capped at SKILLS_MAX_BYTES unpacked. It is the published skill, served by the download route.	Not about requests
`size`integer	Unpacked bytes.	Not about requests
`file_count`integer	Number of files.	Not about requests
`level`text	The scan level: trusted, caution or dangerous.	Not about requests
`score`integer	The scan score, 0 to 100.	Not about requests
`report`jsonb	The scan report: scanner version, score, level, counts per severity and each finding (rule, file, line, a 160-character excerpt of the skill's own file, severity).A public address, not a caller's. Computed by the scanner from the published skill's files; the excerpts are lines of those files. Nothing from any request is written here.	Not about requests
`price_usdg`bigint	Install price in USDG base units (6 decimals); 0 for a free skill.	Not about requests
`revoked_at`timestamp with time zone	When the operator revoked the skill.	Not about requests
`revoked_reason`text	The operator's reason for revoking it, up to 280 characters.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Not about requests

spend_alertsNot about requests · 14 columns · 2 reviewed

Alert rules on spend (threshold, share of a budget, anomaly), evaluated by the spend-watch job. They read spending totals, not requests.

How long: Kept until the account deletes the rule (DELETE /api/v1/spend/alerts/:id).

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Rule id.	Not about requests
`account_id`text	The account.	Not about requests
`key_hash`text	The key the rule watches; empty means the whole account.	Not about requests
`kind`text	threshold, budget_pct or anomaly.	Not about requests
`window`text	day, week or month.	Not about requests
`threshold`bigint	The spend threshold in pico-USD, for a threshold rule.	Not about requests
`pct`integer	The budget percentage, for a budget_pct rule.	Not about requests
`webhook_url_enc`text	The address alerts are posted to, if the owner set one. Stored encrypted with the router's APP_SECRET.Settings written by you or an operator. A destination the account owner chose for alerts, stored only as ciphertext. It is not a caller's address.	Not about requests
`enabled`boolean	Whether the rule is on.	Not about requests
`last_fired_at`timestamp with time zone	When it last fired.	Not about requests
`last_period`text	The period it last fired for, so it fires at most once per period.	Not about requests
`state`jsonb	The rule's firing history and delivery status.Cannot hold request content. Firings and their delivery status written by the spend-watch job (period, amount, status, lease); it holds spend figures, never request content.	Not about requests
`created_by`text	The key that created it.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests

status_dp_hoursSummed from requests · 4 columns · 1 reviewed

The differentially private hourly releases of the private-lane counters (the same releases GET /api/v1/stats publishes), copied as released so the status page can show 90 days for the attested and unlinkable lanes. Copying and summing released values is post-processing: it spends no privacy budget and adds nothing about any request.

How long: Deleted after 91 days by the status loop (services/slo.ts pruneStatus).

Column	What it holds	About a request
`instance`text	A random id of the router process that released the hour (a new one each start), so the releases of several processes can be summed.	Summed from requests
`hour`timestamp with time zone	The UTC hour the release covers.	Summed from requests
`epsilon`real	The privacy budget the release spent (the sum over its families).	Summed from requests
`counts`jsonb	The released noisy counts: requests per lane, refusals per fixed reason and requests per fixed latency bucket.Cannot hold request content. Three objects of noisy integers keyed by the fixed, public label lists of lib/dpstats.ts and services/private-stats.ts, copied from a release that was already public. No request, key or time finer than the hour.	Summed from requests

status_incidentsNot about requests · 13 columns · 5 reviewed

Incidents on the public status page: written by the operator through the incident API, or recorded as a suggestion when a lane's availability falls below its target (a suggestion is not shown until the operator confirms it).

How long: No automatic deletion: the incident history is part of the public record.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Incident id (inc_... for an operator's incident, sug_... for an automatic suggestion).	Not about requests
`title`text	The incident's headline, up to 140 characters.Settings written by you or an operator. Written by the operator through POST /api/v1/status/incidents (or a fixed sentence for a suggestion). It is a status notice, not a request.	Not about requests
`status`text	suggested, investigating, identified, monitoring, resolved or dismissed.	Not about requests
`impact`text	none, minor, major or critical.	Not about requests
`lanes`jsonb	The privacy lanes affected.Cannot hold request content. An array of lane names from the fixed list public, attested, unlinkable.	Not about requests
`surfaces`jsonb	The API surfaces affected; empty for all.Cannot hold request content. An array of surface names from the fixed list in services/slo.ts.	Not about requests
`source`text	operator or auto.	Not about requests
`updates`jsonb	The status updates, oldest first: time, status and the operator's text (up to 2,000 characters each).Settings written by you or an operator. Each update is a time, a status from a fixed list and text the operator writes through POST /api/v1/status/incidents/:id/updates; a suggestion's first update is a fixed sentence with numbers. No request text is ever written here.	Not about requests
`evidence`jsonb	For an automatic suggestion: the lanes, surfaces, window, measured availability, target, request count and whether the figure was DP-noised.Cannot hold request content. Numbers and names from fixed lists, computed from status_windows or status_dp_hours, which are themselves sums.	Not about requests
`started_at`timestamp with time zone	When the incident began.	Not about requests
`resolved_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was resolved.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Not about requests

status_windowsSummed from requests · 7 columns

The public status page's record of the public lane (GET /api/v1/status/slo): per API surface and five-minute bucket, how many public-lane requests succeeded, failed with a 5xx, were refused with a 4xx or were rate limited, and how many served requests fell in each fixed latency bucket. Requests on the attested and unlinkable lanes are never counted here.

How long: Deleted after 91 days by the status loop (services/slo.ts pruneStatus).

Column	What it holds	About a request
`surface`text	The API surface: chat, embeddings, batch, messages, ollama or rerank.	Summed from requests
`bucket`timestamp with time zone	Start of the five-minute bucket (UTC).	Summed from requests
`ok`integer	Public-lane requests answered with a 2xx or 3xx.	Summed from requests
`failed`integer	Public-lane requests answered with a 5xx: these count against availability.	Summed from requests
`rejected`integer	Public-lane requests refused with a 4xx other than 429: the caller's error, not counted against availability.	Summed from requests
`rate_limited`integer	Public-lane requests refused with a 429.	Summed from requests
`latency`integer[]	Served public-lane requests per fixed latency bucket (the edges in lib/dpstats.ts), in edge order: time to first token for streams, time to the full response otherwise.	Summed from requests

tool_canary_runsNot about requests · 8 columns

Results of the daily paid canary probe of each listed tool: whether the known answer came back, latency, a failure code, what the probe paid and the settlement transaction.

How long: Deleted after 90 days by the canary job; deleted with the listing.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`bigserial	Run id, a sequence number.	Not about requests
`seller_id`text	The tool listing probed.	Not about requests
`ok`boolean	Whether the answer matched the listing's known answer.	Not about requests
`latency_ms`integer	Time for the probe.	Not about requests
`failure`text	A fixed failure code, or null.	Not about requests
`price_units`bigint	What the probe paid, in USDG base units, if it paid.	Not about requests
`settle_tx`text	The settlement transaction hash the seller reported, if any.	Not about requests
`at`timestamp with time zone	When it ran.	Not about requests

tool_listingsNot about requests · 18 columns · 1 reviewed

x402 tools a seller account listed for the paid tool catalog (/tools), each with a known-answer canary probe and its current probe state. A Skills Hub skill's paid invocation is a listing that names the skill.

How long: Until the listing account removes it (the row stays with status removed so the address cannot silently change hands); delisted rows stay to show why.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Listing id (tl_...), also the seller id on tool calls and canary runs.	Not about requests
`account_id`text	The account that listed the tool.	Not about requests
`created_by`text	Key hash that listed it; never a raw API key.	Not about requests
`skill_id`text	The Skills Hub skill whose paid invocation this is, or null.	Not about requests
`name`text	Seller-written tool name, up to 80 characters.	Not about requests
`summary`text	Seller-written one-line summary, up to 280 characters.	Not about requests
`resource`text	The tool's public https origin and path, without a query string.	Not about requests
`method`text	GET or POST.	Not about requests
`price_units`bigint	The price the tool quoted in its 402 when listed, in USDG base units.	Not about requests
`pay_to`text	The seller's payTo wallet from that quote; calls are refused if the live quote names another wallet.	Not about requests
`network`text	The x402 network name of that quote.	Not about requests
`canary`jsonb	The seller-written probe: method, optional query arguments and JSON body, and the expected substring or SHA-256 of a correct answer.Settings written by you or an operator. Written by the listing account and validated against a strict schema; it describes a public probe, never a caller's request or answer.	Not about requests
`status`text	listed, delisted (three failed probes in a row) or removed.	Not about requests
`failures`integer	Consecutive failed canary probes.	Not about requests
`delisted_at`timestamp with time zone	When the canary rule delisted it.	Not about requests
`checked_at`timestamp with time zone	When it was last probed.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was created.	Not about requests
`updated_at`timestamp with time zone	When the row was last changed.	Not about requests

webhook_deliveriesNot about requests · 14 columns · 1 reviewed

Durable event references, duplicate suppression and delivery attempt metadata without webhook bodies.

How long: Terminal records are deleted after 90 days by the enabled worker; pending records remain until attempted or cancelled. Destination removal cascades deletion. Each event has at most three recorded attempts, and the API returns the last 100 attempts.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Random internal delivery identifier.	Not about requests
`destination_id`text	Owned destination association.	Not about requests
`event_id`text	Stable identifier sent in the event header, shared across retries for duplicate suppression.	Not about requests
`event`text	Fixed event type name; endpoint.check is an owner-requested connectivity notice.	Not about requests
`reference`text	Source identifier only, such as a ledger, policy event, agreement or host id. No source body is copied.	Not about requests
`event_at`timestamp with time zone	Source event time used for retention and ordering.	Not about requests
`event_status`text	Fixed source status at discovery, not arbitrary source text.	Not about requests
`attempts`integer	Claimed delivery attempt count, capped at three.	Not about requests
`status`text	Fixed delivery state: pending, delivered, blocked, failed or cancelled.	Not about requests
`http_status`integer	Receiver HTTP status code, never its response body.	Not about requests
`latency_ms`integer	Elapsed time for the attempted send in milliseconds.	Not about requests
`attempted_at`timestamp with time zone	When the most recent result was recorded.	Not about requests
`next_attempt`timestamp with time zone	Retry lease and due time; ordinary retries wait five minutes.	Not about requests
`history`jsonb	Up to three attempt timestamps, delivery state, HTTP status, latency and retry count.Cannot hold request content. Fixed result codes and numeric timing/count metadata only; excludes webhook bodies, receiver bodies, URL, signature headers, signing secret and exception text.	Not about requests

webhook_destinationsNot about requests · 11 columns · 3 reviewed

Owner-controlled HTTPS destinations, encrypted signing credentials and subscriptions for account event notices.

How long: Until destination removal or linked Spend Watch rule deletion. Revocation erases the encrypted signing key and stops deliveries; database backups can outlive removal.

Column	What it holds	About a request
`id`text	Random destination identifier, scoped to one account.	Not about requests
`account_id`text	Account whose owner manages this destination.	Not about requests
`created_by`text	API key hash used for visibility and authorization; never a raw API key.	Not about requests
`key_hash`text	Optional key scope inherited from a Spend Watch rule; null is account-wide.	Not about requests
`rule_id`text	Optional linked Spend Watch rule identifier, removed with that rule.	Not about requests
`url_enc`text	HTTPS URL encrypted under APP_SECRET; path and query can hold receiver credentials. API responses show scheme and host only.Settings written by you or an operator. Owner-supplied delivery endpoint sealed using APP_SECRET, never the caller network address. URLs can identify the receiver and carry credentials, so only scheme and host are returned.	Not about requests
`secret_enc`text	Server-generated random signing secret encrypted under APP_SECRET, null for an unsigned legacy or revoked destination. Plaintext is revealed only on creation or rotation, never in subsequent reads or delivery logs.	Not about requests
`revoked`boolean	Whether delivery has been stopped and its signing credential removed.	Not about requests
`events`jsonb	Selected fixed event type identifiers.Settings written by you or an operator. Strict event names chosen by the owner, excluding arbitrary text, addresses, prompts or answers.	Not about requests
`scan`jsonb	Bounded reader progress: time window, activity cursor and sweep time.Cannot hold request content. Only timestamps, pagination filter digest and event identifiers; no activity bodies, intent text, endpoint URL or credentials.	Not about requests
`created_at`timestamp with time zone	Creation time and lower bound for event discovery.	Not about requests

In your browser.

What this website keeps in your own browser. None of it is sent to us except the requests you make.

The prompt library keeps names, text, tags, pins, optional model choices and system prompts in this browser until you delete them or clear browser storage. Ordinary prompts use the anyroute-harness-prompts-v1 localStorage key without encryption. Private-mode prompts share the encrypted anyroute-private-history IndexedDB vault and its passphrase; locking or forgetting history also locks or deletes them. Where IndexedDB is unavailable, private prompts last only for this tab. The two libraries stay separate. JSON exports contain readable prompt data, including system prompts. Prompts are sent through the existing chat path only when you submit them. Prompt storage source · Encrypted storage source

Cache Storage: The installable Harness keeps only the static app shell, offline page, scripts, styles, fonts and icons in a browser cache named anyroute-shell- followed by a build digest. Each cached file must match its exported SHA-256. Requests, replies, API responses and URLs with query strings are never cached. A new active app version removes older app caches; browser settings can clear them at any time. No additional data is stored by the router. web/lib/harness-sw.js
sessionStorage: The API key you pasted into the dashboard, for the length of the tab. It is removed when the tab closes and is never written to localStorage. web/lib/api.js
localStorage: The Harness favourite models and view preferences, and the Eval Lab evaluation sets you write. Eval Lab results are kept in IndexedDB. The router never receives them; only the requests you run do. web/components/Harness.jsx

The inventory is read from src/privacy. The check that keeps it true is in the repository. The full text of the file this page is built from is at /keep/inventory.json (390 KB).

What we keep.

The short version.

Where something is kept, exactly

The response cache keeps answers when you ask it to

A call paid with x402 keeps its answer for 24 hours, so a lost answer is never paid for twice

The Batch API keeps a batch's requests and answers until its results expire

A failed provider attempt can keep a short piece of the provider's own error message

Two request headers are kept as you wrote them

Settings you type are stored as you typed them

Character memory is kept only as ciphertext, with a vector if you opt in

Which version this is.

Where a request’s text and a caller’s address are read.

Request text

A caller’s network address

Redis.

Logs.

What a line can carry

What the code never passes to the logger

What this cannot promise

Other places data lives.

Operator capacity and daily counts

Public tool catalog in the router's memory

Signed account event delivery

Make-good refund decisions

Liveness probes to listed agent endpoints

ERC-8004 registries on Robinhood Chain

Track-record Merkle trees in memory

Account activity response in memory

Signed monthly statements in memory

Account export on the caller's device

Proof pack in memory

Lane report in memory

Spend insights response in memory

Market-data tool readings in memory

Decision tags in signed receipts

Account inbox response and browser seen time

Network host routing evidence in memory

Host registration on the operator’s computer

Public network statistics in router memory

Public commerce ledger in router memory

Owner's sealed agent VM

Agreement escrow and dispute records on chain

Messages proxy prices on the caller's computer

Batch requests and answers in the router's memory, without Redis

Response cache in the router's memory

Replay guards in memory

Private-lane counters in memory

Trace export (OpenTelemetry), off unless an endpoint is set

Trace export to a key owner's own destination, off unless the owner sets one

Encrypted database backups

The database, table by table.

Request records

Billing

Receipts & proofs

Keys & auth

Providers & attestation

Chain

Operations

In your browser.